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RICHELIEU 



EICHELIEU 



BY 

EICHAED LODGE, M.A. 

n 

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW, FORMERLY 
FELLOW AND TtJTOR OF BRASENOSE COLLEGE, OXFORD 




Hontioit 

MAGMILLAN AND CO., Ltd. 

NEW YOEK : MACMILLAN & CO. 
1896 



A II rights reserved 




^ 






CONTENTS 



INTRODUCTION 

Ease of the French monarchy — The new appanaged nobles and the 
Hundred Years' "War — Charles VII. expels the English — The 
standing army and the permanent taille — Louis XL humili- 
ates the nobles — Strength of the monarchy imder Francis I.-— 
Evil results of the sale of offices — The wars of religion — De- 
cline of the royal power — Successes of Henry IV. — Victory of 
the crown only partial — Independence of the nobles, the 
Huguenots and the sovereign courts — The minority of Louis 
XIII. — Greatness of Richelieu's work — Difficulty of his 
biography Page 1 



CHAPTER I 

Richelieu's early life 

1585-1614 

The family of du Plessis — The du Plessis de Richelieu — Career of 
Fran9ois du Plessis — Birth of Armand Jean — His life at 
Richelieu — He enters the College of Navarre — Transferred to 
the Academy — The bishopric of Lucon — Armand returns to 
the University — Consecrated bishop at Rome — He quits Paris 
for Lugon — Motives for this step — Letters to Madame de 
Bourges — His conduct as bishop — His religious attitude — 
Early relations with Jansenism — Connection with Berulle and 



VI RICHELIEU 

Father Joseph — Death of Henry IV. — Richelieu in Paris — 
Acquaintance with Barbin and Concini — Returns to his 
diocese — His attitude towards parties at court — Letter to 
Concini — Election to the States-General — Personal appearance 
— Feeble health — Character and aims 



CHAPTER II 

THE STATES-GENERAL RICHELIEU'S FIRST MINISTRY 

1614-1617 

Questions before the States-General — The jpaulette — Quarrels of 
clergy and third estate — Richelieu orator of the clergy — Concini 
and the ministers — Conde and the Huguenots oppose Mary 
de Medici — Treaty of Loudun — Fall of the old ministers — 
Richelieu rises to prominence — Conspiracy of the nobles — 
Arrest of Conde and flight of his associates — Richelieu receives 
office — His difficulties — Measures against the nobles — 
Assassination of Concini — Fall of the ministers — Richelieu at 
the Louvre — He quits tbe court 26 



CHAPTER III 

RICHELIEU AND THE QUEEN-MOTHER 

1617-1624 

Government in the hands of Luynes — Hostility to the Huguenots 
— Edict to restore church lands in Beam — Richelieu exiled to 
his diocese — His answer to the four ministers of Charenton — 
Exile in Avignon — Writes the Instruction du GhrMen — 
Unpopularity of Luynes — The nobles join the queen-mother — 
Her escape from Blois — Richelieu sent to join Mary de Medici 
at Angouleme — His policy at this period — The treaty of 
Angouleme — Henri de Richelieu killed in a duel — Continued 
hostility between Mary de Medici and Luynes — The nobles 



CONTENTS vii 

again rally round the queen-mother — Civil war — The rout of 
Pont-de-Ce — Richelieu negotiates a treaty — His relations with 
Luynes — Enforcement of royal edict in Beam — Huguenot dis- 
content and organisation — Campaign of 1621 — Luynes con- 
stable — His death — Mary de Medici still opposed by Conde 
and the ministers — Campaign of 1622 — Treaty of Montpellier 
— Conde leaves France in disgust — Richelieu receives the 
cardinal's hat — The government of the Brularts (Sillery and 
Puisieux) — La Yieuville procures the dismissal of the ministers 
— Richelieu admitted to the council . . . Page 39 



CHAPTER IV 

THE VALTELLINE AND LA ROCHELLE 

1624-1628 

Richelieu's schemes of domestic reform — Compelled to abandon 
them for foreign politics — Threatening progress of the house of 
Hapsburg — Difficulties in the way of the ministers — Renewed 
alliance with the Dutch — Negotiations about the English 
marriage — Fall of la Vieuville — Richelieu first minister — His 
policy in the English negotiations — Question of the Valtelline 
— The forts in the hands of the pope — De Coeuvres seizes the 
Valtelline — Revolt of the Huguenots — Ships obtained from 
England and Holland — Naval victory over the rebels — 
Negotiations with the Huguenots — Indignation of the Ultra- 
montane party against Richelieu — Treaty of Monzon with 
Spain — Treaty with the Huguenots — Conspiracy of Ornano 
and Madame de Chevreuse — Collapse of the conspiracy — Fate 
of Chalais — Richelieu appointed superintendent of navigation 
and commerce — His maritime schemes — Quarrel between France 
and England — Buckingham's expedition to Rhe — Critical 
position of France— Energy displayed by Richelieu — Relief of 
the fort of St, Martin — Buckingham compelled to abandon 
Rhe — Siege of La Rochelle— Plan of blocking the harbour- 
Period of the king's absence— Richelieu directs the siege- 
Failure of the English attempts to relieve La Rochelle — 
Surrender of the city— Its treatment .... 55 



Viu RICHELIEU 



CHAPTEE V 

THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION AND THE DAY OF DUPES 

1628-1631 

The question of the Mantuan succession — Siege of Casale — Louis 
XIII. and Eichelieu cross the Alps for its relief — Treaty of 
Susa — Peace with England — Treaty between Spain and Rohan 
— Campaign in Languedoc — Submission of the Huguenots — 
They retain religious toleration but lose their political privileges 
— Discontent of Gaston of Orleans — He goes to Lorraine — 
Enmity of Mary de Medici against Richelieu — Its motives — 
Relations of Richelieu and Louis XIII. — Gaston returns to 
France — Imperialist troops sent to Mantua — Richelieu's second 
expedition to Italy — Attitude of Charles Emmanuel of Savoy — 
The French take Pinerolo — Conquest of Savoy — Fall of Mantua 
— Siege of Casale — Truce of Rivalta — Relations of France with 
Gustavus Adolphus — The emperor and the Catholic League — 
Diet of Ratisbon — Treaty of Ratisbon — Richelieu refuses to 
confirm it — Illness of Louis XIII. — Relief of Casale — Open 
quarrel of Mary de Medici with Richelieu — The Day of Dupes — 
Gaston goes to Orleans — Mary de Medici at Compiegne — 
Gaston goes to Lorraine — The queen-mother escapes to Brussels 
— Settlement of the Mantuan succession by treaties of Cherasco 
— France keeps Pinerolo — Successes of Richelieu . Page 81 



CHAPTER VI 

FRANCE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR 

1631-1635 

BicheUeu made duke and peer — Threatened coalition in favour of 
Gaston — Lorraine — Treaty of Vic — Gaston's marriage and 
retreat to Brussels — Gustavus Adolphus in Germany — Services 
which he renders to France — Louis XIII. and Richelieu in 
Lorraine — Treaty of Liverdun — Gaston in France — Montmor- 
ency — Battle of Castelnaudari — Execution of Montmorency — 
Gaston retires to Brussels — Death of Gustavus Adolphus — 
Illness and recovery of Richelieu — Fall and imprisonment of 



CONTENTS ix 

Chateaiineuf — E-ichelieu and his colleagues — League of Heil- 
bronn — Renewed invasion of Lorraine— Surrender of Nancy — 
Abdication of Charles IV. — Complete occupation of Lorraine — 
Gaston's marriage with Margaret annulled — Return of Gaston 
and Puylaurens — Imprisonment and death of Puylaurens — 
Wallenstein's policy — His death— Battle of Nordlingen— Break 
up of the Protestant League in Germany — Treaty of Prague — 
Dangers to France if the war came to an end — Seizure of the 
elector of Trier by the Spaniards — France declares war against 
Spain Page 110 



CHAPTER VII 

REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 

1635-1640 

French alliances — Military preparations — Disasters of 1635 in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Italy, and at sea — Causes of failm-e — 
Campaign of 1636 — Invasion of Picardy — Panic in Paris — 
Richelieu's courage — Repulse of the Spaniards — Conspiracy of 
Orleans and Soissons — Risings in Normandy and Guienne — 
Episode of Louise de la Fayette — Campaign of 1637 — More 
French reverses — Loss of the Valtelline — The French fleet 
recovers the Lerins — Series of triumphs begin in 1638 — Bern- 
hard of Saxe- Weimar takes Breisach — His death — France 
becomes his heir — The Spaniards in Piedmont — Battle and 
captm-e of Turin — Naval victories — Destruction of Spanish 
fleet in the Downs — Relations with England — Revolt of Cata- 
lonia and Portugal — Capture of Arras — Extent of Richelieu's 
triumphs — Birth of the dauphin — Death of Father Joseph 133 

CHAPTER VIII 

DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 

Richelieu's influence almost as great in France as abroad — The aims 
of his domestic policy — Treatment of the Huguenots — Measures 
against the nobles : the destruction of fortresses ; edict against 
duelling ; appointment of intendants — Relations with the 
Parliament of Paris — Hostility to the provincial estates — 



RICHELIEU 

Organisation of the Conseil du Boy — The Gonseil d'etat — 
Centralisation inevitable — -Merits of Richelieu's government : 
military and naval organisation ; patronage of commerce and 
colonisation — Defects : neglect of manufactures and agri- 
culture ; financial maladministration — Attempts to conciliate 
public opinion — Meetings of notables — Patronage of literature 
and foundation of the Academy — Origin of the Gazette de la 
France Page 157 



CHAPTER IX 

RICHELIEU AND THE CHURCH 

Condition of the French Church during the religious wars — 
Religious revival in the seventeenth century — Charitable 
orders — Advance of clerical and secular education — Monastic 
reform — Richelieu's relations with the papacy — Relations of 
Church and State — Clerical taxation — Richelieu and St. 
Cyran — Richelieu's opportunism in ecclesiastical matters— 
His superstition — Case of Urbain Grandier . . .184 

CHAPTER X 

Richelieu's last years 

1641, 1642 

Military events of 1641 and 1642 — Rising of Soissons — His death — 
Conspiracy of Cinq-Mars — Richelieu's illness at JSTarbonne — 
His Avill — Detection of the plot — Execution of Cinq- Mars and 
de Thou — Completeness of Richelieu's success — His death — 
Continuance of his policy — Gradual relaxation of severity — 
Death of Louis XI 11. — Permanence of Richelieu's influence — 
Richelieu's character — His ill-health — His isolation — The in- 
security of his position — His relations with Louis XIII. — His 
vindictiveness — His unpopularity 207 



Appendix A. — The Genealogy of the Richelieu family 
Appendix B. — The chief books on the period 
Appendix C. — The Testament 



231 
232 
234 



INTRODUCTION 

Rise of the French monarch}' — The new appanaged nobles and the 
Hundred Years' "War — Charles VII. expels the English — The 
standing army and the permanent taille — Louis XL humiliates 
the nobles — Strength of the monarchy under Francis L — Evil 
results of the sale of offices — The wars of religion — Decline of 
the royal power— Successes of Henry IV. — Victory of the crown 
only partial — Independence of the nobles, the Huguenots, and 
the sovereign courts — The minority of Louis XI I L — Greatness 
of Richelieu's work — Difficulty of his biography. 

The history of France from the tenth to the close of 
the eighteenth century is bound up with the history of 
the French monarchy. Under the early Capets France 
was a mere geographical expression ; its kings were 
little more than the titular chiefs among a number of 
feudal nobles, and their practical authority was limited 
to the He de France. From this powerless condition 
the monarchy was gradually raised by the energy of 
Louis yi., the prudence of Philip Augustus, and the 
legislative ability and high personal character of Louis 
IX. But the real founder of absolute monarchy in 
France was Philip IV., who created that administrative 
system which gradually extended itself over the whole 
kingdom, and undermined the independent local institu- 
tions of feudalism. Successful war and the extinction 



2 RICHELIEU 

of the old mediaeval families enabled the crown to 
bring most of the provinces under its direct rule. But 
a new danger arose from the practice of granting these 
provinces out as appanages to members of the royal 
family, who formed a new nobility as eager for inde- 
pendence as the feudal magnates whose place they had 
taken. At the same time the disasters of the wars 
with Edward III. and Henry V. seriously weakened the 
monarchy, which sunk again into impotence under John 
II. and Charles YI. But the falling structure was 
successfully rebuilt under Charles VII. and Louis XL 
In the former reign the English were expelled, a stand- 
ing army established, and a revenue secured by the 
imposition of the permanent taille. Louis XL broke up 
the formidable League of the Public Weal, and the 
decline of the great Burgundian power on the death of 
Charles the Bold freed the French crown from its most 
dangerous rival. The marriage of the heiress of Brittany 
to two successive kings extinguished the independence 
of the last of the feudal provinces. The victory of the 
monarchy seemed to be assured, when Francis I., at the 
head of a compact and well-organised kingdom, success- 
fully resisted the enormous but ill-compacted power of 
Charles V. 

But a subtle evil was already undermining the 
foundations of this imposing edifice, and was destined 
in the end to overthrow it. This was financial mal- 
administration. The chronic deficit, which was the 
chief immediate cause of the Revolution of 1789, was 
already in existence in the sixteenth century. It is 
not a little curious that France, the home of financial 
theories, has only produced in its long history three 



INTRODUCTION 3 

great financial administrators — Jacques Coeiir, Sully, 
and Colbert ; and their efforts only succeeded in post- 
poning the inevitable crash. Among the ruinous 
exjjedients to which the crown was impelled by an 
empty treasury, the most fatal was the sale of offices. 
This practice, which originated in the fifteenth century, 
was raised into a system by Louis XII., who is said to 
have copied the usages of the Eoman court. In order 
to make these offices valuable their holders must be 
irremovable. Thus the crown, of its own accord, 
surrendered the control over its own officials. The 
administrative institutions, such as the parliament of 
Paris, which had been the most efficient agents in 
extending the royal power, became in the seventeenth 
century the most serious opponents of royalty. 

The period following the death of Henry II. (1560) 
is the most critical in the history of France. A country 
on which geography had imposed the necessity of unity, 
and which had risen to greatness in Europe by attaining 
that unity under a strong monarchy, was sucldenlj^ 
divided by the most powerful of forces — religion. Not 
only was the practical authority of the crown almost 
annihilated during the long struggle between Catholics 
and Huguenots, but its theoretical foundations were 
torn up and examined by polemical writers on both 
sides. While the Huguenots endeavoured to conciliate 
support by vindicating the independence of nobles and 
municipalities, the Jesuits taught that the voice of the 
people was the voice of God, and that circumstances 
might arise in which tyrannicide was not only a right 
but a duty. At the same 'time military necessities 
forced the kings to intrust the government of the great 



4 RICHELIEU 

provinces to powerful nobles, who used their delegated 
authority in their own interests, and threatened to 
revive a military feudalism which recalled the anarchy 
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. 

The struggle ended at last in the defeat of both the 
extreme parties ; and their defeat was due to their 
collision with that passionate desire for unity which has 
been the dominant force in French history from that day 
to this. The Huguenots, the prototypes of the later 
Girondins, aimed at establishing a system of local isola- 
tion, which must have effaced France from among the 
great states of Europe. The success of the League would 
have subjected the Galilean Church to Rome, and would 
have made France a vassal and tool of the Spanish Haps- 
burgs. The victory of Henry IV. and the middle party, 
which represented national interests and instincts, was 
secured by Henry's acceptance of Roman Catholicism, and 
by his grant of the Edict of Nantes to the Huguenots. 

Henry IV. is a great as well as an attractive figure 
in history, and he deserves much of the idolatry with 
which the French have always regarded him. He 
restored order after the chaos of the religious wars. 
He founded the Bourbon monarchy, which was to 
preside for the next two centuries over the history of 
France, and was to guide that country to an ascendency 
in Europe, to which it still looks back with boastful 
regret. With the aid of Sully he restored the balance 
between income and expenditure, and encouraged the 
development of the internal resources of France. He 
humbled the power of Philip II., and inaugurated the 
foreign policy which was followed with such success by 
Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV. 



INTRODUCTION 5 

But the work of Henry IV. was still incomplete, 
when he was removed by the dagger of Ravaillac. 
Neither he nor Sully had the genius or the foresight to 
found a new system of government, which was necessary 
for the triumph of the new dynasty. Even in the task 
of destroying abuses, both king and minister were tram- 
melled by their past lives, and by the circumstances 
under which Henry had come to the throne. In some 
matters a policy of compromise was all that was possible 
for them. Under their rule the forces of disorder were 
checked rather than annihilated. Again, the provincial 
governorships remained in the hands of the great 
nobles, though their authority was limited by the ap- 
pointment of lieutenant-generals, who were to act as 
the agents of the crown, and by the policy of intrusting 
the chief towns in a province to persons independent of 
the governor. And the supplementary clauses of the 
Edict of Nantes conferred upon the Huguenots, not only 
religious toleration, but also a political independence 
which enabled them to stir up disorder whenever it 
suited their interests. Above all, the sale of offices, 
instead of being abolished, was systematised by the in- 
stitution of the jMulette. Members of the parliament 
and of the other central courts, by paying an annual tax 
to the crown, became the absolute proprietors of their 
offices, which they could transmit to their heirs or dis- 
pose of by sale to whom they pleased. Thus the office- 
holders in France came to form a vast hereditary cor- 
poration, with corporate interests to defend, and virtuallj^ 
independent of the crown. The nobles, the Huguenots, 
and the sovereign courts, were left by Henry IV. to be 
the great obstacles in the way of his successors, 



6 RICHELIEU 

The insecurity of the monarchy under these condi- 
tions was clearly manifested during the regency of Mary 
de Medici. There are few more depressing and weari- 
some periods of history than the first thirteen years of - 
the reign of Louis XIII. The incessant intrigues of the 
great princes against the crown and against each other, 
the complete subordination of national to personal 
interests, the petty rivalries of the Huguenot leaders, 
Bouillon and Eohan, the coalitions against the queen's 
favourite, Concini, and against the king's favourite, 
Luynes, have been described in contemporary memoirs 
with a fulness which they only merit as an effective 
contrast to the state of things which preceded and which 
followed them. The regent and her ministers purchased 
a few years' peace by lavish bribes to the nobles at the 
expense of the monarchy, while she sought to strengthen 
herself against domestic opposition by abandoning the 
foreign policy of her husband, and concluding a close 
alliance with Spain. The revival of the Hapsburg sup- 
remacy, threatened in the first period of the Tliirty 
Years' War, was allowed to progress without hindrance 
from France. 

From these disorders and dangers France was saved 
by the greatest political genius she has ever produced. 
No man was ever more completely a politician than 
Eichelieu, and no figure is more indispensable in a 
series which professes to form a gallery of " Foreign 
Statesmen." His own memoirs treat of nothing but 
politics. The character of the man himself must be 
looked for in the accounts of contemporaries, few of 
whom were able to estimate his greatness or to ap- 
preciate his aims. The details of his private life have 



INTRODUCTION 7 

to be gleaned from scattered sources, but chiefly from 
the letters and papers which have been edited in so 
masterly a manner by M. d'Avenel. 

In writing the life of Richelieu one must narrate the 
history of France and, to a great extent, of Europe 
during an eventful period of nearly twenty years. 
Perhaps this consideration helps to explain why no first- 
rate biography of him has been produced, even in 
France. In spite of the innumerable books that have 
been written on this period, the work of Aubery, although 
an avowed panegyric, and published as long ago as 1661, 
has never been completely superseded. It is to be hoped 
that M. Hanotaux may yet find sufficient leisure amid the 
distractions of political life to continue the great work 
which he has begun, and that this will fill what is an 
undoubted lacuna in historical literature. In the mean- 
time this little volume can only attempt a brief estimate 
of the work which Richelieu achieved — and achieved 
with such success that he must be regarded as the chief 
founder, not only of France before the Revolution, but 
of much that is most characteristic of France at the 
present day. 



CHAPTEE I 

RICHELIEU'S EARLY LIFE 

1585-1614 

The family of du Plessis — The du Plessis de Richelieu — Career 
of Frangois du Plessis — Birth of Armand Jean — His life at 
Richelieu — He enters the College of Navarre — Transferred to 
the Academy — The bishopric of Lu9on — Armand returns to the 
University — Consecrated bishop at Rome — He quits Paris for 
Lucon — Motives for this step — Letters to Madame de Bourges 
— His conduct as bishop — His religious attitude — Early rela- 
tions with Jansenism — Connection with Berulle and Father 
Joseph — Death of Henry IV. — Richelieu in Paris — Acquaint- 
ance with Barbin and Concini — Returns to his diocese— His 
attitude towards parties at court — Letter to Concini — Election 
to the States-General — Personal appearance — Feeble health — 
Character and aims. 

The family of du Plessis has no history. For genera- 
tions it had lived in provincial obscurity on the borders 
of Poitou. In the fifteenth century Francois du Plessis, 
a younger member of the family, inherited the estate of 
Richelieu from his maternal uncle, Louis de Cl6rembault. 
His descendants were the du Plessis de Richelieu, and 
their chief residence was the castle of that name, situated 
on the Mable, near the frontier of Poitou and Touraine. 
The first member of the family who played any not- 
able part in history was Francois du Plessis, great- 



CHAP. I RICHELIEU'S EARLY LIFE 9 

grandson of the inheritor of Richelieu. He rendered 
valuable services to Henry of Anjou during his brief 
tenure of the crown of Poland, and retained his favour 
when he returned to France as Henry IH. Eaised to 
the dignity of grand provost of France, Francois du 
Plessis became one of the most prominent and loyal 
servants of the last of the Valois. When his master 
died under the dagger of Jacques Clement, it was he 
who arrested the assassin and took down the depositions 
of the eye-witnesses. 

The death of Henry III. left his Catholic followers 
in a difficult position. The traditions of his family 
seemed to impel Fran9ois du Plessis to join the League. 
But he showed on this occasion a practical foresight 
worthy of his great son, and at once espoused the cause 
of Henry of Navarre. He had already gained the con- 
fidence of the new king by his bravery at Arques and at 
Ivry, and had just been appointed captain of the guard, 
when he was carried off by a fever during the siege of 
Paris on July 10, 1590. 

Francois du Plessis was married to Suzanne de la 
Porte, daughter of the celebrated avocat, Francois de la 
Porte, and herself possessed of the practical ability which 
characterised her family. They had three sons and two 
daughters, and the youngest child, Armand Jean, was 
born at Paris in the rue du Boulay, on September 9, 
1585. The child was so feeble and sickly that it was 
not thought safe to have him baptized till May 5, 1586. 
His god-parents were Marshal Biron, Marshal d'Aumont, 
and his paternal grandmother, Fran^oise de la Roche- 
chouart. 

Armand Jean was only five years old when his father 



10 RICHELIEU CHAP. 

died, and his mother carried her children from the capital 
to the seclusion of Richelieu. There, amid the disturb- 
ances of the civil war between Henry IV. and the League, 
the boy's education was carried on for the next seven 
years. We have no evidence that he showed any 
youthful precocity or gave any signs of future greatness. 
Aubery, who wrote under the auspices of Richelieu's 
relatives, and who would certainly have preserved any 
family traditions about his hero, tells us nothing of this 
period of his life, so that we may conclude that there 
was nothing to tell. 

A distant province like Poitou offered few educa- 
tional advantages in the sixteenth century, and at the 
age of twelve Armand was sent to Paris, and was 
admitted to the College of Navarre. There he went 
through the ordinary courses of grammar and philosophy, 
and an anecdote of his later years proves that he retained 
a grateful recollection of this period of his education. 
In 1597 Jean Yon, one of the philosophical teachers of 
the College of Navarre, held for the third time the office 
of Rector of the University, and the young scholar, robed 
as a chorister, accompanied him on a solemn procession 
to the tomb of St. Denis. In later days, whenever the 
University wished to prefer a petition to the all-powerful 
cardinal, the venerable Yon was always included in the 
deputation. Richelieu confessed that he never saw his 
old teacher without a sentiment of respectful fear, and 
the deputation, even if its request were not granted, 
was certain of a gracious answer from the minister. 

At this time Richelieu was destined for a military 
career, and he had only received the usual rudimentary 
education when he was transferred from the College of 



I RICHELIEU'S EARLY LIFE 11 

Navarre to the Acadmiie, an institution founded by 
Antoine de Pluvinel to train the sons of noble families 
in the exercises and accomplishments which were to fit 
them for a soldier's life. It was here that Armand 
acquired the military tastes which never deserted him. 
He was at all times ready to exchange his cassock 
for a knight's armour, and equally willing to give his 
advice as to the handling of an army or the construction 
of a fortress. 

The young marquis de Chillon, as he called himself 
at the Academy, was only seventeen years old when an 
event occurred which suddenly altered all his aspirations. 
In 1584 Henry III., in accordance with a practice not 
uncommon in those days, had granted to Francois du 
Plessis the disposal of the bishopric of Lu9on. His 
widow, left in somewhat straitened circumstances, had 
found the revenues of the bishopric one of her chief 
resources.' The episcopal functions were exercised in 
the meantime by one Fran9ois Yver, who was avowedly 
only a " warming-pan " until one of the sons could take 
his place. But the chapter of the diocese resented the 
diversion of the episcopal revenue to secular and per- 
sonal uses, and threatened to go to law with M. Yver, 
whose position was indefensible. In these circumstances 
Madame de Eichelieu determined to procure the appoint- 
ment of her second son, Alphonse Louis, to the bishopric. 
From 1595 he is occasionally spoken of as bishop of 
Lu^on, though he never really held the office. Suddenly, 
about 1602, he absolutely refused to seek consecration, 
became a monk, and entered the Grande Chartreuse. 
In the next year M. Yver, on the suit of the chapter, 
was ordered by the parliament to devote a third of the 



12 RICHELIEU chap 

revenue of the bishopric to the repairs of the cathedral 
and of the episcopal palace. 

These events were a great blow to Madame de 
Richelieu, but she had still one expedient left. By a 
petition she delayed the enforcement of the decree of 
parliament, and in the meantime her third son was to 
assume the position which his brother refused. Armand 
seems to have made no opposition to his mother's will. 
In 1603 he quitted the Academy, and resumed his 
•studies at the University. His eldest brother, Henri, 
was now at court, where Henry IV. had received him 
with favour as his father's son, and where he was able 
to defend the interests of his family. In 1606 the king 
wrote to the French envoy at Eome, urging him to 
obtain from the pope the appointment of Armand Jean 
du Plessis to the bishopric of Lu9on, although he had 
not yet reached the canonical age. 

Meanwhile Eichelieu, who had taken deacon's orders 
and completed his theological course in this year, became 
impatient of the delays of the papal court, and hurried 
to Eome to look after his own interests. He succeeded 
in obtaining favour with the pope, and was consecrated 
by the cardinal de Givry on April 17, 1607. There is 
no foundation whatever for the story told in later years 
by Eichelieu's detractors that he deceived the pope as 
to his age by producing a false certificate of birth, and 
that when he afterwards confessed the fraud Paul Y. 
declared that "that young man will be a great rogue." 
Equally unfounded is the counterbalancing story that 
the pope was so impressed with Eichelieu's stores of 
theological learning that he exclaimed, JEquum est ut 
qui swpra cetatem sapis infra mtatem ordineris (It is only 



I EICHELIEU'S EARLY LIFE 13 

fair that one whose knowledge is above his age should be 
ordained under age). 

On his return he resumed his studies at the Uni- 
versity until, on October 24, 1607, he was admitted a 
member of the Sorbonne or theological faculty. For the 
next year he remained in Paris, acquiring a certain 
reputation as a preacher, cultivating the acquaintance of 
all who might be of use to him, and retaining the favour 
of the king, who frequently spoke of him as "my bishop." 
From the first, his ambition was for political distinction ; 
his avowed model was the cardinal du Perron, who had 
acquired a great but fleeting reputation as the champion of 
the orthodox creed against the Huguenots. Everything 
seemed to attract the young prelate to remain in Paris : 
in days when ecclesiastical duties sat lightly on church dig- 
nitaries, it appeared preposterous to expect him to reside 
in a petty, unattractive provincial town like Lu^on, far 
removed from the capital, without society, with dull and 
depressing surroundings, and close to the chief strong- 
hold of the heretics. Yet in 1608 Eichelieu suddenly 
determined to bury himself for a time in what he him- 
self termed "the most villainous, filthy, and disagree- 
able diocese in the world." 

His m^otives for this step are wrapped in complete 
obscurity. It is certain that Henry IV., though no 
strict champion of discipline, approved of prelates resid- 
ing in their sees. He may have hinted to the young 
bishop that his newly- acquired position carried some 
duties with it. But it is more probable that the decision 
was due to Eichelieu himself. He was always keenly 
alive to practical considerations. He may well have 
felt that to obtain distinction he must do something to 



14 RICHELIEU chap. 

deserve it. His powers were immature, and he had no 
experience in the conduct of affairs. Tlie bishopric of 
Lu^on was not a great stage to appear on, but it offered 
opportunities for practical work, and its very neighbour- 
hood to La Rochelle made it the more important at a 
time when the position of the Huguenots might at any 
moment become the most pressing question of the day. 
It is possible that poverty may have been another 
motive. The family estates were fairly extensive, but 
they brought in a small revenue, and Richelieu was the 
youngest child. Even his elder brother, who enjoyed 
a considerable pension from the king, was always- com- 
plaining of want of funds. Richelieu was throughout 
his life extremely sensitive to public opinion. He could 
make a respectable figure as a resident bishop on an 
income which was lamentably meagre for an aspiring 
politician in Paris. 

His first care was to provide himself with a residence. 
His palace was in ruins, and in those days furnishing 
was a matter of great expense and difficulty. His 
letters to Madame de Bourges, who acted as a sort of 
maternal adviser and purchaser for him in Paris, are 
among the most interesting specimens of his correspond- 
ence, and illustrate that careful attention to details 
which always characterised him. The following was 
written in the spring of 1609, when he had already 
been some months at Lu9on. 

" I shall not want for occupation here, I can assure you, 
for everything is so completely in ruins that it needs much 
exertion to restore them. I am extremely ill lodged, for 
I have no place where I can make a fire on account of 
the smoke. You can imagine that I don't desire bitter 



I RICHELIEU'S EARLY LIFE 15 

weather, but there is no remedy but patience. . . . 
There is no place to walk about in, no garden or alley 
of any sort, so that my house is my prison. I quit this 
subject to tell you that we have not found in the parcel 
a tunic and dalmatic of white tafFety, which belonged to 
the ornaments of white damask which you have pro- 
cured for me : this makes me think that they must have 
been forgotten. ... I must tell you that I have bought 
the bed with velvet hangings from Madame de Marcon- 
net, which I am having done up, so that it will be 
worth 500 francs. I am also getting several other 
pieces of furniture, but I shall want a tapestry. If it were 
possible to exchange the valance of silk and gold from the 
bed of the late bishop of Lugon for a Bergamasque 
canopy, like that which you have already bought me, 
it would suit me very well. There are still at Richelieu 
several portions of the said bed, such as the laths of the 
framework, etc., which I could send to you. You see 
that I write to you about my establishment, which is 
not yet well supplied : but time will do everything. I 
have secured a maitre cVhdtel who serves me very well, 
and in a way that would please you : without him I was 
very badly off, but now I have nothing to do but to 
look after my accounts, for whatever visitors come to 
see me, he knows exactly what to do. He is the young 
la Brosse, who was formerly in the service of M. de 
Montpensier." 

In another letter of slightly later date he shows a 
desire to impress his guests by his magnificence : " Please 
let me know what would be the cost of two dozen 
silver plates of the best size that are made. I should 
like to have them, if possible, for 10,000 crowns, for 



16 RICHELIEU chap. 

my funds are not large ; but I know that for a matter 
of another hundred crowns you would not let me 
have anything paltry. I am a beggar, as you know, 
so that I cannot play the wealthy prelate ; but still, if 
I only had silver plates, my nobility would be much 
enhanced." 

But Kichelieu was not only occupied with the 
splendour of his table and the hangings of his bed. 
That he was, by the standard of those days, an excellent 
bishop, there can be no doubt. In his diocese he first 
found an opportunity to display those administrative 
talents which he was afterwards to employ in the service 
of his country. His correspondence shows that he took 
the widest view of his episcopal functions. Not content 
with admonishing his clergy, and seeking energetic 
recruits from all quarters, he also attended to the secular 
interests of his flock. In the hope of obtaining relief 
for their financial necessities, he writes urgent letters to 
the assessors of taxes, and even to the great duke of 
Sully. To his delight his merits begin to be appre- 
ciated. He hears that the cardinal du Perron speaks of 
him as a model for other bishops to copy. 

Of Eichelieu's attitude towards religion it is not easy 
to speak with precision. It was never the guiding force 
of his life ; at all times he subordinated religious interests 
to considerations of policy. No doubt has ever been 
cast upon the sincerity of 'his belief. Scepticism was in 
those days the luxury of a few leisurely and self-indul- 
gent critics. Eichelieu's essentially practical mind was 
averse to the speculative subtleties which lead to un- 
belief. Numerous passages in his memoirs show that 
he was more inclined to accept the current superstitions 



I RICHELIEU'S EARLY LIFE 17 

of his time than too curiously to inspect the evidence 
for them. 

Still more difficult is it to lay down any formula 
about his relations with ecclesiastical parties. At the 
beginning of his career the chief divisions in France were 
the Ultramontanes, the Galileans, and the Huguenots. 
To these were added before his death the Jansenists, a 
sort of advanced guard of Gallicanism. To the Huguenots 
Richelieu had no leaning, and he was ever ready to 
enter the lists of controversy against them ; but he Avas 
always personally tolerant towards them, both as bishop 
and as minister. In a letter of 1611 he speaks of 
Ohamier, one of their most vehement and outspoken 
champions, in terms of studied moderation : " He deserves 
to be esteemed as one of the most amiable of those who are 
imbued with these new errors, and if he may be blamed 
for anything besides his creed, it seems to be a certain 
too ardent zeal, which others might perhaps term in- 
discreet." With the sects of his own Church Eichelieu's 
relations changed at different periods, and each had at 
times occasion to charge him with treachery or desertion. 
So far as their differences were doctrinal rather than 
political, he had no particular bias. He was a sufficient 
master of the scholastic theology for controversial 
purposes, as was proved by the works published during 
his lifetime. But the real object of these writings was 
to further his own advancement rather than to secure 
the acceptance of his particular views. He had none 
of the self-sacrificing enthusiasm and none of the 
deeply -rooted conviction of the religious prophet or 
martyr. 

At one time there can be no doubt that he was 




18 RICHELIEU chap. 

powerfully impelled towards Gallican, if not Jansenist, 
opinions. One of the neighbours of whom he saw most 
was Chasteignier de la Eochepozay, the fighting bishop 
of Poitiers, whose father had been the friend and com- 
panion-in-arms of Fran9ois du Plessis. The bishop of 
Poitiers had appointed as his grand-vicar, Duvergier de 
Hauranne, afterwards abb4 of St. Cyran, and famous as 
the apostle of Jansenism in France. Another link in 
the chain was Sebastien Bouthillier, afterwards dean of 
Lu9on, whose father had been the confidential clerk and 
had succeeded to the practice of Francois de la Porte, 
Richelieu's maternal grandfather. Sebastien with his 
three brothers formed a small bodyguard of devoted ad- 
herents to Richelieu, and at every crisis of his early 
career we find a Bouthillier at his side. The dean of 
Lu^on was an intimate friend of St. Cyran, and it 
was he who introduced him to another founder of the 
Jansenist sect, Arnauld d'Andilly. These four young 
men, Richelieu, the bishop of Poitiers, d'Hauranne, and 
Sebastien Bouthillier, formed a small association for 
the prosecution of theological study. Sometimes they 
met together at Poitiers, but when this was impossible 
they kept up a constant correspondence with each 
other. 

But intimate as his connection was with these 
associates, Richelieu was careful not to commit himself 
to their opinions. His published letters prove that his 
aim at this time was to conciliate friends on all sides, 
and to quarrel with no one who could render him anj^ 
service. He cultivated the acquaintance of Berulle, 
the founder of the Oratoire, who established at Lu9on 
the second house which his association possessed in 



I RICHELIEU'S EARLY LIFE 19 

the kingdom. But the most important friendship which 
he formed during his residence at Lu9on was with 
Francois du Tremblay, already known as a stern 
monastic reformer, and afterwards famous as Father 
Joseph, "the gray cardinal" Du Tremblay, who be- 
longed to a noble family of Anjou, was eight years 
older than Richelieu. Like him, he had been destined 
for a military career, but at the age of twenty-two he 
yielded to an irresistible religious impulse and dis- 
gusted his family by becoming a Capuchin monk. He 
became an active agent in the movement of ecclesias- 
tical reform which characterised the first half of the 
seventeenth century. Among the institutions which 
were subject to his care was the famous abbey of 
Fontevrault, near to which was the priory of Les 
Roches, where Richelieu occasionally resided. In 1611 
the abbess died, and Father Joseph wrote to the court 
to secure the succession of Antoinette d'Orleans, who 
had aided him in introducing much-needed reforms into 
the abbey. Richelieu received instructions to supervise 
the election, and it was this affair which brought 
together the two men who were destined to be so 
closely connected in the future. 

Before this the death of Henry IV. had to some 
extent modified Richelieu's plans of life. He realised 
that the regency of Mary de Medici inaugurated a new 
period in France, that retired merit would be of no 
further use to him, and that in some way or other he 
must thrust himself forward. He drew up a formal 
oath of fealty, in which he and the chapter of Lu9on 
expressed their devoted loyalty to the king and regent. 
This document was sent up to his eldest brother to be 



20 RICHELIEU chap. 

presented to the queen-mother. But Henri de Eichelieu, 
who was a great person at court, and one of the mystic 
" seventeen seigneurs " who aspired to set the fashions 
of the day, rather scoffed at this exuberant profession 
of fidelity, and suppressed the document, on the ground 
that no one else had done anything of the kind. This 
was not enough to discourage the aspiring bishop, who 
determined in the future to make frequent visits to 
Paris. He writes to Madame de Bourges to ask her to 
find a private lodging for him. A furnished room, he 
admits, would be more suitable to his purse ; but he 
would be uncomfortable, and moreover he wishes to 
make a figure in the world. " Being, like you, of a 
somewhat boastful humour, I should like to be at my 
ease, and to appear still more so ; and this I could do 
more easily if I had a lodging to myself. Poverty is a 
poor accompaniment for noble birth, but a good heart 
is the only remedy against fortune." 

Richelieu spent six months in Paris in 1610, and 
though he did not obtain any employment, his time was 
not wholly wasted. At the house of the Bouthillier he 
made the acquaintance of Barbin, who held an influential 
post in the queen's household. Barbin introduced him 
to Concini, and thus established a connection with the 
favourite, which enabled him five years later to enter 
upon a political life. But at this time Concini, though 
high in his mistress's favour, had not aspired to influence 
the government, which was entirely in the hands of 
Villeroy, Sillery, and Jeannin, the veteran ministers of 
Henry IV. 

Richelieu soon saw that his opportunity had not yet 
come, and he again quitted Paris for his diocese. But 



I KICHELIEU'S EAELY LIFE 21 

from this time he watched the development of events 
with ever-increasing interest, and he had made up his 
mind which side to take in the inevitable contest. The 
queen-mother had exhausted the treasures which Sully 
had amassed in bribes to the princes — she had given 
them offices, governorships, all that they demanded. 
By these means, and by dexterously playing off the 
Guises against the prince of Cond6, she endeavoured 
to maintain at least the semblance of peace until the 
king should reach his majority, at the age of thirteen. 
But her concessions failed to conciliate the nobles, whose 
requests became the more insatiable the more they were 
granted. The ruling sentiment of Richelieu's career 
was his hatred of disunion and of princely independence. 
All his sympathies in the approaching struggle were 
with the court, with which he tried to draw closer the 
connection established in 1610. When the Huguenots 
in 1612 showed their discontent at the double marriage 
with Spain, and their leader, Rohan, made himself 
master of St. Jean d'Angely, Richelieu used his in- 
fluence with the veteran Huguenot, du Plessis Mornay, 
to maintain order in his province, and wrote to the 
secretary of state, Pontchartrain, to assure him of his 
active co-operation. 

His foresight had already perceived the means by 
which he was first to rise to power. He had no par- 
ticular respect for Concini, who played a very vacillating 
part in the relations between the regent and the princes. 
But Concini's wife had that secure influence over Mary 
de Medici which comes from the habits of a lifetime, 
and the favourite might be a useful step in the ladder 
of promotion. At the beginning of 1614 the storm 



22 RICHELIEU chap 

seemed at last about to burst. Cond6 and all the chief 
nobles, except the Guise party, had withdrawn from 
court and were collecting forces. Concini himself, now 
known as the marshal d'Ancre, who had intrigued with 
Conde against the ministers, was in disgrace at Amiens. 
Richelieu seized the opportunity to write to him the 
following letter, dated February 12, 1614 : — 

"Always honouring those to whom I have once 
promised service, I write you this letter to renew my 
assurance, and to know if I can be of any use to you ; 
for I prefer to testify the truth of my affection on im- 
portant occasions, rather than to offer you the mere 
appearance of it when there is no need : so I will use 
no more words on this subject. I will only beg you to 
believe that my promises will always be followed by 
fulfilment, and that, as long as you do me the honour to 
love me, I shall always serve you worthily." 

On this occasion civil war was averted by negotiations, 
and the treaty of St. Menehould was signed on May 15. 
Once more the queen granted all that was asked of her. 
Every confederate received something for himself, either 
office, promotion, or money. But among their demands 
was one which was intended to express their devotion 
to the public welfare — the summons of the States- 
General. This was also conceded, and the assembly 
was finally summoned to meet at Paris in October. 
The nobles had intended to use it as a means of 
advancing their own interests, but they were dis- 
appointed. The court succeeded in managing the 
elections, and the vast majority of delegates were 
devotedly royalist. Richelieu was active in the cause ; 
and the exertions of his three friends, the bishop of 



I RICHELIEU'S EARLY LIFE 23 

Poitiers, Duvergier de Hauranne, and Sebastien Bout- 
hillier, secured his own return as deputy for the clergy 
of the province of Poitou. As soon as the cahier of his 
order had been drawn up he carried it to Paris in 
October. 

He was now on the threshold of his public career, 
and we may pause for a moment to consider the man 
himself, before attempting to follow him through the 
maze of intrigues in which he was so soon to be in- 
volved. His figure was tall and slight, but had not 
yet contracted the stoop in the shoulders which 
diminished his height in later years. His face was 
long and pale, with a prominent and well-formed nose, 
and surmounted by masses of long black hair. His lips 
were thin and tightly drawn, at times relaxing in 
a winning smile, but more often expressing stern 
resolution. Perhaps his most striking characteristic 
was a pair of bright penetrating eyes, under eye- 
brows which were naturally arched as if to express 
surprise. Clad in his purple bishop's robe, as he 
appeared at the meeting of the States, he was the model 
of an imposing ecclesiastic. 

His great misfortune was his ill-health. During his 
residence in the low, marshy district of Lu^on he had 
become liable to aguish fevers, which frequently 
reduced him to absolute impotence of thought and 
action. The energy with which he had thrown himself 
into his theological studies and the administrative work 
of his diocese had prematurely exhausted a frame which 
had been feeble from infancy. He was subject to 
excruciating headaches, which frequently lasted for days 
at a time. On one of these occasions he resristered a 



24 RICHELIEU chap 

vow, which has come down to us, and which shows the 
vein of superstition running through his imperious nature. 
If the Deity will cure his head within eight days, he 
promises to endow a chaplain with thirty livres a year 
to celebrate a mass every Sunday in the castle of 
Eichelieu. 

He was capable, as we have already seen, of inspiring 
warm feelings of friendship and devotion ; but his own 
nature was cold and reserved. His letters of condolence, 
even when he writes to his sister on the death of one 
of her children, are as measured and formal as a 
diplomatic epistle. Few human beings, except his 
favourite niece, could boast a secure hold upon his 
affection. Throughout his life he held himself aloof 
from ties that might bind and impede him. Political 
interests severed him from many of the friends of his 
early manhood, as, for instance, from St. Cyran, and he 
had no hesitation in sacrificing them for the success of 
his designs. He could appreciate devotion, but he 
could not return it. 

Richelieu set out for Paris in 1614 with a resolute 
determination to carve out a career for himself. In his 
bishopric he had learned to exercise his powers, and had 
acquired confidence in them. He was no longer troubled 
with the self-distrust which had led to his retirement in 
1608. He had spared no trouble to form connections 
wherever opportunity off'ered, but he had been careful 
to avoid entangling pledges. That he had at all made 
up his mind to carry through the vast schemes of his 
later life it would be preposterous to suppose. His 
ability was practical rather than theoretical. His policy 
was always to make use of circumstances, rather than to 



I RICHELIEU'S EARLY LIFE 25 

attempt to wrest them to his wishes. His one firm 
intention was to raise himself to political power ; and he 
had the sublime confidence of every truly great man 
that his own rule would be for the advantag;e of his 
country. 



CHAPTER II 

THE STATES-GENERAL — RICHELIEU's FIRST MINISTRY 
1614-1617 

Questions before tlie States - General — The paulette — Quarrels of 
clergy and third estate — Richelieu orator of the clergy — Concini 
and the ministers — Conde and the Huguenots oppose Mary 
de Medici — Treaty of Loudun — Fall of the old ministers — 
Richelieu rises to prominence — Conspiracy of the nobles — 
Arrest of Conde and flight of his associates — Richelieu receives 
office — His difficulties — Measures against the nobles — 
Assassination of Concini — Fall of the ministers — Richelieu at 
the Louvre — He quits the court. 

The States-G-eneral, which met on October 27, 1614, 
are interesting as the last assembly held before the 
famous meeting of 1789. In itself, however, it was 
of very slight importance. The essential weakness of 
these assemblies lay in the deeply-rooted class divisions 
which ruined all prospect of constitutional government 
in France, in the want of any practical check upon the 
executive, such as is given in England by the control of 
supply and expenditure, and in the tradition that their 
only function was to formulate grievances. The great 
questions raised at this meeting were the "pauleUe and 
the sale of offices, and the relations of the spiritual and 
temporal powers. The nobles and clergy agreed to 



CHAP. II THE STATES-GENERAL 27 

demand the abolition of the paulette. The deputies of 
the third estate, most of whom belonged to the official 
class, were by no means eager for a change which 
would have deprived them of a valuable property. The 
instructions of their constituents, however, were too 
distinct for them to refuse their co-operation to the 
other estates, but they insisted upon complicating the 
question by demanding at the same time a diminution 
of the taille and a reduction of the lavish pensions 
granted by the crown. This last request was a direct 
attack upon the nobles, and a quarrel was imminent 
between the two estates, when attention was diverted 
to a new question. 

The third estate demanded the recognition as a 
fundamental law that the king holds his crown from 
Grod alone, and that no power, whether spiritual or 
temporal, has the right to dispense subjects from their 
oath of allegiance. This at once raised all the thorny 
questions about the power of the papacy, which had been 
discussed with such vehemence in France for the last 
sixty years. The clergy hastened to resent the intro- 
duction of such a subject by a body of laymen, and to 
point out that the acceptance of the resolution would 
produce a schism in the Church. The support of the 
court secured them a complete victory. Mary de Medici 
had committed herself entirely to an ultramontane 
policy which was involved in the alliance with Spain. 
She had, moreover, a personal interest in the matter. 
An attack upon the supremacy of the pope would cast 
a slur upon the legitimacy of her own marriage, which 
rested upon a papal dispensation, and consequently ujoon 
the right of her son to wear the crown. The king 



28 RICHELIEU chap. 

evoked the matter to his own consideration, and the 
proposition was ultimately erased from the cahier of the 
third estate. 

Emboldened by this victory, the clergy proceeded to 
demand the acceptance in France of the decrees of the 
Council of Trent, reserving the liberties of the Galilean 
Church. The nobles, irritated by the attitude of the 
third estate on the subject of royal pensions, hastened 
to support them. But the obstinacy of the third estate, 
more royalist than the court, succeeded in preventing 
the carrying through of a measure which France had 
persistently avoided for sixty years. 

At last the cahiers of the three orders were com- 
pleted, and were presented to the king in a formal 
session on February 23, 1615. We have, unfortunately, 
no record of the part played by Richelieu in the pre- 
ceding debates, but that it must have been a distinguished 
one is proved by the fact that he was chosen on this 
occasion as the orator of his order. His harangue, 
which lasted more than an hour, is said to have 
attracted great attention. That it expressed his own 
personal views is improbable ; many of its sentiments 
are in opposition to the whole tenor of his subsequent 
career. He seems to have conceived that his duty or 
his interest compelled him to act as the mere mouth- 
piece of the dominant majority, and to express opinions 
which he knew would be favourably received by the 
court. His whole argument is based upon the premises 
of ultramontanism. He condemns the practice of lay 
investiture, the attempt to levy taxes upon the clergy, 
whose only contributions ought to be their prayers, the 
interference with clerical jurisdiction, and the non- 



II THE STATES-GENERAL 29 

recognition of the Council of Trent. Only two passages 
seem to express the personal convictions of the orator — 
his vigorous denunciation of the exclusion of ecclesiastics 
from the control of affairs, and his lavish praises of the 
governm-ent of the regent. 

From this time Eichelieu was a man of mark ; both 
Mary de Medici and Concini realised the value of the 
services which he might render to them, and his 
admission to political employment was assured. Hence- 
forth his residence in Paris becomes more continuous, 
and his diocese occupies less and less of his attention. 
For a long time Concini had been kept in the back- 
ground by the close union among the ministers of the 
late king, whom the regent had never ventured to 
dismiss. But this union had lately been weakened by 
a growing jealousy between Villeroy and the chancellor 
Sillery ; and the chief link between them was broken in 
November 1613, by the death of Villeroy's grand- 
daughter, who had married Sillery's son, de Puisieux. 
The discord among the ministers was Concini's oppor- 
tunity, and he determined to make use of it to get rid 
first of one section and then of the other. His rise to 
power was accompanied by that of Eichelieu. 

In the autumn of 1615 it was decided that the 
court should travel to the Spanish frontier to complete 
the double marriage which had been formally agreed 
to three years before. Conde and the other malcontent 
princes had given their approval to the marriages, but 
they now refused to accompany the court, and set to 
work to raise troops in their respective provinces. 
Regardless of the danger, Mary de Medici insisted 
upon continuing her journey to Bayonne. Her eldest 



30 RICHELIEU chap. 

daughter was sent to Spain to become the wife of the 
future Philip TV., and Louis XIII. was formally married 
to the infanta, Anne of Austria. Meanwhile Conde had 
collected an army, had evaded the royal troops under 
marshal Bois-Dauphin, and had crossed the Loire into 
Poitou. At Parthenay he was met by deputies of the 
extreme party of the Huguenots, who had already 
defied the royal authority, and the advice of their more 
moderate leaders, by transferring their assembly from 
Grenoble to Nimes. They now concluded a close 
alliance with the oligarchical party, which pledged itself 
to prevent the recognition of the Council of Trent, to 
oppose the probable results of the Spanish alliance, and 
to maintain the Edict of Nantes. Thus the monarchy 
was once more face to face with the forces of dis- 
union. 

Neither Concini nor Eichelieu had accompanied the 
court, and Mary de Medici was still surrounded by her 
old advisers. After some discussion in the council it 
was decided to adhere to the well-worn policy of 
negotiation and concession. The office of mediator was 
undertaken by the duke of Nevers and the English i 
ambassador, and their exertions resulted in the treaty 
of Loudun, which was concluded in the spring of 1616. 
The treaty marks a complete momentary victory for 
the aristocratic party over the alliance between the 
crown and the clergy, which had signalised the close of 
the States- General. The king promised to give a 
favourable consideration to the demands of the third 
estate, to reject the decrees of the Council of Trent, to 
maintain the freedom of the Galilean Church, to respect 
the privileges of the parliaments and other sovereign 



II RICHELIEU'S FIRST MINISTRY 31 

courts, to uphold the existing alliance of France, many 
of which were opposed to Spanish interests, and finally 
to continue to the Huguenots all the concessions which 
had been granted to them by his predecessors. Secret 
articles stipulated for concessions to the individual 
princes, and the peace is said to have cost the king 
more than six million livres. Conde, who exchanged 
the government of Guienne for the more central 
province of Berri, was to be chief of the council, and 
was to sign all royal edicts. 

The treaty of Loudun was followed by the fall of 
Sillery. As the chancellorship was, like so many other 
offices, a property for life, it was impossible to deprive 
him of it. All that could be done was to exile him 
from the court, and to intrust the seals to a keeper, 
du Vair, who had acquired a reputation as president of 
the parliament of Provence. But this first ministerial 
change was not enough to satisfy Mary de Medici or 
Concini. Before long Jeannin was deprived of the 
control of the finances, which was entrusted to Barbin. 
Villeroy was not absolutely dismissed, but he lost all 
influence. His colleague in the secretaryship of state, 
de Puisieux, shared the disgrace of his father, and his 
office was now given to Mangot, an ally of Barbin. 
Concini was prudent enough not to attempt to secure 
office for himself, but the ministers were in the habit of 
visiting him in his own apartments, and his vanity led 
him to magnify the extent of his influence over aff'airs. 

The queen-mother had succeeded in freeing herself 
from the tutelage in which she had hitherto been kept 
by the veteran ministers of her husband, but her 
position was by no means secure nor satisfactory. Since 



32 RICHELIEU chap. 

the majority of her son she had been far more eager for 
power than she had been during the regency. One of 
her most darling schemes, the Spanish marriages, had 
been successfully completed. But she was confronted 
by a powerful coalition of the chief princes, the third 
estate, and the Huguenots, and she had been forced to 
concede their demands at Loudun. When Conde came 
to Paris he was apparently all powerful. His palace 
was crowded, while the Louvre was deserted. Mary 
was naturally anxious to turn the tables upon her 
conquerors, and eagerly welcomed any assistance which 
promised to contribute to her success. These circum- 
stances gave Richelieu the opportunity for which he was 
waiting. Whatever his personal opinions may have 
been, he appeared before the world as the devoted 
adherent of Mary de Medici and Concini, as the close 
friend and ally of Barbin and Mangot. He succeeded 
in obtaining the reward for which he was labouring. 
Early in 1616 he was appointed almoner to the young 
queen, Anne of Austria, and about the same time he 
was admitted a member of the council of State. He 
was employed on embassies to the prince of Cond4 and 
to the duke of Nevers. In August a royal edict granted 
to him an annual sum of 6000 livres "in considera- 
tion of the good and praiseworthy services which 
he has rendered, and which he continues to render 
every day." At this time it was intended to send him 
as ambassador to Spain to settle a dispute which had 
arisen in Italy with the duke of Savoy. But affairs at 
home soon became too critical for him to be spared, and 
the Spanish embassy was entrusted to somebody else. 
The princes were unwilling to lose without a 



II RICHELIEU'S FIRST MINISTRY 33 

struggle the advantages which they had secured at 
Loudun. They were especially irritated by the influence 
of Concini, a Florentine adventurer who had crept into 
power by the favour of his wife. The court tried to 
separate them by stimulating their ill-feeling against 
Cond6 for having kept the lion's share of the spoil for 
himself. But hatred of the foreigner was stronger than 
their mutual jealousies, and in the autumn a general 
conspiracy was formed against the favourite. Its most 
active leader was the duke of Bouillon, the " demon of 
rebellions," as Eichelieu calls him, and with him were 
combined Oond6, the dukes of Mayenne, Guise, and 
Nevers. It was the first time that the Guises and Cond6 
had been on the same side. 

The coalition was extremely formidable, especially as 
its hostility could not be limited to Concini. The con- 
spirators felt, though Cond6 alone ventured to express 
the general sentiment, that the overthrow of the 
favourite would excite the bitter enmity of the queen- 
mother, and that they would never be safe from her 
vengeance unless they could succeed in separating her 
from the king. But Mary de Medici, thus personally 
threatened, was surrounded by very different advisers 
to those who had counselled the shameful surrenders 
of St. Menehould and Loudun. It was resolved to 
paralyse the opposition by a bold measure, nothing less 
than the arrest of Conde and as many as possible of his 
allies. The scheme was carefully prepared, and the 
secret was wonderfully kept, considering the number of 
those to whom it was entrusted. Unfortunately, the 
queen -mother's irresolution allowed the day to pass 
which had been originally fixed, when most of the princes 

D 



34 RICHELIEU chap. 

were at the Louvre. Meanwhile, some suspicions were 
excited among the princes, but Conde was so confident 
in his power that he refused to entertain them. On 
September 1 he was arrested as he was leaving the 
council, and was at once imprisoned in a chamber of the 
Louvre. 

The news struck consternation among the other 
nobles, who hastened to secure their personal safety by 
flight from Paris. As soon as they had recovered from 
their first fright, they held a conference at Soissons, 
where they agreed to raise troops in their respective 
provinces, to meet in twelve days at Noyon, and thence 
to advance upon Paris. Meanwhile, the prompt 
measures taken by the ministers had succeeded in pre- 
venting any serious outbreak in the capital, where 
Conde was extremely popular, and they set to work to 
sow dissension among their opponents. The Guises 
were soon detached from the coalition, and even the 
duke of Longueville was drawn over to the court by 
the influence of Mangot. Nevers and Bouillon, how- 
ever, continued to hold out, and to prepare for civil war. 

It is extremely probable, though there is no direct 
evidence, that Eichelieu, as a member of the council, 
took part in the discussions which preceded the arrest 
of Cond6. A vigorous policy was quite to his taste, 
and he had long been the intimate associate of Barbin, 
to whom, in his Memoirs, he attributes the chief part in 
these events. But one of the ministers, du Vair, was 
entirely out of sympathy with his colleagues. He had 
already proposed the release of Cond6, and he now 
suggested calling in the parliament to settle the dissen- 
sions between the crown and the nobles. Such feeble- 



II RICHELIEU'S FIRST MINISTRY 35 

ness was intolerable. On November 25 the seals were 
taken from du Vair and given to Mangot. At the 
same time the secretaryship of state, held by the latter, 
was given to Eichelieu, who, five days later, received a 
formal grant of precedence over the other secretaries. 
This completed the fall of Viileroy, who showed his 
resentment at being placed below his youthful colleague 
by ceasing to attend the council altogether. 

Richelieu's first tenure of office only lasted for five 
months ; but during that period he succeeded in impart- 
ing to the actions of the government a firmness and 
consistency such as had not been witnessed since the 
death of Henry IV. He had many difficulties to 
contend with. The departments with which he was 
especially concerned were those of war and foreign 
affairs, and both were left to him in the greatest 
disorder. The regiments were below their proper 
numbers, the commissariat was wholly neglected, and 
the habits of discipline seemed to have been lost. 
Money was wanting for the soldiers' pay, and on this, 
as on several later occasions, Richelieu found it 
necessary to make large advances from his own funds. 
As for the foreign office, the most recent and im- 
portant documents were missing. He had actually to 
write to the existing ambassadors for copies of the in- 
structions that had been given to them. But perhaps 
the greatest difficulty of all was interposed by Concini 
himself, to whose favour he owed his appointment. 
The favourite's head had been turned by his rapid rise 
to power, and it was doubtful whether his insolence or 
his incapacity were the more conspicuous. Richelieu 
has preserved the fragment of a letter to Barbin, which 



36 RICHELIEU chap. 

illustrates the way in which he treated the ministers 
whom he regarded as his tools. "By God, sir, I com- 
plain of you that your treatment of me is too bad ; you 
negotiate for peace without consulting me; you have 
induced the queen to urge me to abandon the suit 
which I have commenced against M. de Montbazon to 
make him pay what he owes me. By all the devils, 
what do you and the queen expect me to do ? Rage 
gnaws me to the very bones." France was weary of the 
caprices of a foreigner who had used his influence to 
amass riches and offices in his own hands. The 
ministers had reason to suspect that he was plotting to 
secure their dismissal, and Eichelieu and Barbin actually 
offered their resignations to the queen-mother. 

In spite of these obstacles, Richelieu and his 
colleagues succeeded in dealing the princes more 
severe blows than they had experienced at any pre- 
vious period of the reign. Envoys were despatched 
to England, Holland, and Germany to remove any 
suspicions that might have been excited by the Spanish 
marriages, and to prevent any assistance being given 
by these powers to the rebels. The instructions to 
Schomberg, the ambassador to Germany, were drawn 
up by Richelieu himself, and contain the clearest ex- 
position of the position and policy of the court. At 
the same time three armies were set on foot to act 
simultaneously in the Ile-de-France, Champagne, and 
the Nivernais. Everywhere the royal troops carried all 
before them. The eyes of Europe were fixed upon the 
siege of Soissons, where the duke of Mayenne was 
blockaded by the army under the count of Auvergne. 

Suddenly the whole aspect of affairs was altered by 



II RICHELIEU S FIRST MINISTRY 37 

an incident which was entirely unforeseen. Concini's 
unpopularity was a serious source of weakness to the 
ministers ; but the fatal blow was struck from a quarter 
from which it was least expected. Hitherto Louis 
XIII., who was only fifteen years old, had been regarded 
as a mere cipher in the administration. But the king 
had his favourites as well as the queen - mother. 
Prominent among these was a young man of obscure 
origin, Luynes, whose chief recommendation was his 
skill in falconry. Mary de Medici and Concini had 
taken him under their patronage, and had thought to 
secure his allegiance by giving him the government of 
Amboise. But Luynes had ambitious designs of his 
own which were by no means satisfied by the position 
of personal favourite. He persuaded Louis that 
Concini purposely excluded him from affairs, that the 
princes were perfectly loyal and were only alienated by 
the omnipotence of the Florentine, and that the queen- 
mother was influenced by a blind preference for his 
younger brother, Gaston. It was not difficult to per- 
suade Louis to free himself from the galling yoke of his 
mother's omnipotence by striking a blow against a man 
whom he personally detested. The plot against Concini 
was arranged as secretly and successfully as that 
against Conde. No suspicions had been aroused in the 
mind of the favourite when on April 24 he was arrested 
on the bridge leading to the Louvre. He had only 
time to ejaculate, "la prisoner ! " when he was killed 
by three pistol bullets. His captors excused their 
precipitancy on the ground that he had offered 
resistance. All precautions had been taken. . The 
queen-mother's guard was disarmed, and she found 



38 RICHELIEU chap, ii 

herself a prisoner in her own apartments. Concini's 
wife was arrested, brought to trial, and executed. The 
body of the murdered man was disinterred by the mob, 
hanged by the feet on the Pont Neuf, dragged in 
hideous triumph through the streets, and finally burnt. 
The news of Concini's death fell like a thunderbolt 
upon the ministers, who were expecting to hear every 
day of the fall of Soissons. Mangot was arrested, 
compelled to resign the seals, and then released as of 
small importance. Barbin, who was regarded as the 
chief agent in the late government, was strictly im- 
prisoned. Richelieu alone was treated with some 
favour by the triumphant faction. He went boldly to 
the Louvre, where people who had courted him two 
hours before refused to recognise him. He found the 
young king raised upon a billiard table that he might 
be better seen by the crowd, and was assured both by 
him and by Luynes that they did not regard him 
as belonging to the faction of Concini. He was even 
granted admission to the council, where he found all 
the old ministers, Villeroy, Sillery, Jeannin, and du 
Vair in consultation. They received him with great 
coolness, and demanded in what capacity he appeared. 
On the answer that he came by special order of the 
king, they acquiesced in his presence, but he abstained 
from taking any part in the discussions, and soon after- 
wards retired. The change, however, was too complete 
and too sudden for him to retain his position, and he 
found himself compelled by necessity, if not by his own 
sense of gratitude, to follow the fortunes of the queen- 
mother. 



CHAPTER III 

RICHELIEU AND THE QUEEN-MOTHER 

1617-1624 

Government in the hands of Lnynes — Hostility to the Huguenots 
— Edict to restore church lands in Beam — Richelieu exiled to 
his diocese — His answer to the four ministers of Charenton — 
Exile in Avignon — Writes the Instruction du Chretien — 
Unpopularity of Luynes — The nobles join the queen-mother — 
Her escape from Blois — Richelieu sent to join Mary de Medici 
at Angouleme — His policy at this period — The treaty of 
Angouleme — Henri de Richelieu killed in a duel — Continued 
hostility between Mary de Medici and Luynes — The nobles 
again rally round the queen-mother — Civil war — The rout of 
Pont-de-Ce — Richelieu negotiates a treaty — His relations with 
Luynes — Enforcement of royal edict in Beam — Huguenot dis- 
content and organisation — Campaign of 1621 — Luynes con- 
stable — His death — Mary de Medici still opposed by Conde 
and the ministers — Campaign of 1622 — Treaty of Montpellier 
— Conde leaves France in disgust — Richelieu receives the 
cardinal's hat — The government of the Brularts (Sillery and 
Puisieux) — La Vieuville procures the dismissal of the ministers 
— Richelieu admitted to the council. 

The death of Concini and the fall of Mary de Medici 
seemed at first to effect a complete revolution. The 
rebellion of the nobles was at an end; in fact, they 
were received at court as if they had been fighting the 
king's battles against his enemies. But they soon 



40 RICHELIEU chap. 

discovered that the change of policy was not so com- 
plete as it appeared at first. They were jealously 
excluded from the royal council. Conde, on whose 
release they had confidently reckoned, was removed 
from the Bastille to Vincennes, but his prison doors 
were as securely guarded as ever. The nobles realised 
that the ascendency of the king's favourite was as 
intolerable as that of Concini. Nothing had happened 
to reconcile the hostile interests of the monarchy and 
the aristocracy. 

The new government, though it had lost the oppor- 
tunity of annihilating the power of the princes, was in 
other respects not wanting in energy and decision. 
Luynes, who took the chief conduct of affairs into his 
own hands, was a far abler man than Concini. He 
was determined to avoid the reproach of subservience 
to Spain which had been cast upon the rule of the 
queen-mother. French assistance was sent to the 
duke of Savoy, which compelled the Spaniards to 
withdraw their troops from Piedmont and to conclude 
the treaty of Pavia. But at the same time a resolute 
attitude was adopted towards the Huguenots. An 
anomalous state of things existed in B6arn, which was 
ruled by the French king without being united with 
France. Henry IV., after his conversion, had restored 
Roman Catholicism in his little Protestant kingdom; 
but he had left the church lands in the hands of the 
Huguenots, while the Catholic clergy received their 
stipends from the royal revenue. The French clergy 
had never ceased to demand that the Church of B6arn 
should be restored to its lawful possessions, and in 
June 1617 a royal edict was issued to gratify this 



Ill RICHELIEU AND THE QUEEN- MOTHER 41 

demand. The Huguenots met at Orthez to protest, 
and the Parliament of Pan refused to register the edict. 
The struggle about its enforcement marks the beginning 
of the civil war, which ended in the loss by the 
Huguenots of their political independence. 

Meanwhile Richelieu, with the permission of the 
king, had followed Mary de Medici into exile at Blois, 
where he was appointed president of her council. But 
he had many enemies at court, who persuaded the 
king that it was dangerous to allow him to remain in 
his mother's service. On June 15 he received a royal 
letter ordering him to reside within his diocese. He 
employed his compulsory solitude at the Priory of 
Coussay in composing a controversial work against the 
Huguenots. This took the form of an answer to four 
ministers of Oharenton, who had replied to a hostile 
sermon preached before the king by Father Arnoux. 
The book itself is of slight merit, and its chief object 
was to keep the author prominently before men's eyes. 
It contains more vehement denunciations than argu- 
ments, and its intolerant tone is in marked contrast to 
Richelieu's own actions during his ministry. 

The active defence of the orthodox creed did not 
suffice "to secure Richelieu from the suspicions excited 
by his continued correspondence with the queen-mother. 
Coussay was considered too near to Blois, and early in 
1618 he was exiled to Avignon, where he resided for a 
year. He was followed thither by his brother, Henri 
de Richelieu, and by the husband of his elder sister, 
de Pont-Courlay. So rigorous was the attitude of the 
court towards the family that Henri de Richelieu was 
not even allowed to pay a short visit to his home on 



42 RICHELIEU chap. 

the death of his wife. Eichelieu, as before, solaced 
himself with the labours of composition. His new 
book, the Instruction du Chrdtien, had a great vogue in 
his own lifetime, when it passed through more than 
thirty editions, but has since fallen into well-deserved 
neglect. French prose was not then the polished instru- 
ment that it became in the hands of Pascal and Fen^lon, 
and Eichelieu, in spite of his interest in literature, had 
little literary sense or capacity. The only occasions 
on which he wrote really well and pointedly were when 
his pen was inspired by scornful indignation. A letter 
which he sent about the end of 1610 to the grand 
vicars of Lugon is in its way quite a model. 

During Kichelieu's absence from court the ill-feeling 
against the administration of Luynes, in spite of the 
success of his anti-Spanish policy in Italy, was steadily 
increasing. He tried to conciliate popular opinion by 
abolishing the paulette, but the only result was to alienate 
the official classes, who represented that he merely wanted 
to make money by the sale of their offices. He showed 
no mercy towards his opponents, and thought he could 
rule by terror like an Italian prince. He did all he 
could in the trial of Barbin to induce the judges to 
sentence him to death, and when a bare majority refused 
to inflict a harsher penalty than exile, he persuaded the 
king to reverse his prerogative of mercy, and to com- 
mute the sentence to perpetual imprisonment. The 
queen-mother was treated with great severity at Blois ; 
all her trusted servants were removed, and their places 
filled by nominees of Luynes, whose real functions were 
to act as spies upon her actions. At the same time his 
personal ambition was still more insatiable than that of 



Ill RICHELIEU AND THE QUEEN-MOTHER 43 

Concini had been. He married the daughter of the 
duke of Montbazon, afterwards famous as the duchess 
of Ohevreuse. He extorted from Mayenne the im- 
portant government of the Ile-de-France, to which he 
afterwards added that of Picardy. He was raised to 
the rank of duke and peer. 

The great nobles were furious at this rapid rise of a 
man, whose father, as they said, was the bastard son of 
a canon of Marseilles and his chambermaid. In their 
jealous indignation they rallied to the support of the 
queen-mother, to whom they had so long been opposed. 
The chief agent in the negotiations was Rucelai, another 
of the numerous Italian adventurers who had been 
attracted to France by the marriages of French kings 
with ladies of the house of Medici. It was arranged 
that the queen should be released from prison, and 
that the duke of Epernon, the veteran champion of the 
nobles, should undertake the task of aiding her. In 
the night of February 21, 1619, she escaped from a 
window of the castle of Blois by means of a rope-ladder, 
and succeeded in making her way to Loches, where she 
was received by Epernon. 

The escape of the queen-mother caused great con- 
sternation at court, and preparations were at once 
made for the civil war which seemed inevitable. At 
the same time the struggle might be averted if she 
could only be separated from the aristocratic party, 
with which circumstances had forced her into an un- 
natural alliance. Eichelieu's old allies. Father Joseph 
and Sebastien Bouthillier, suggested that he was the 
very man for the purpose. He already possessed the 
confidence of Mary de Medici, and his influence would 



44 RICHELIEU chap. 

serve to counteract the hot-headed counsels of Epernon 
and Eucelai. Luynes, who had never shown such 
hostiHty to Richelieu as others of his party, readily 
adopted the suggestion ; and the sieur de Tremblay, 
Father Joseph's brother, was sent to carry the necessary 
instructions to Avignon. As Richelieu set out to obey 
the order he was captured by a body of soldiers at 
Vienne, but was at once released when it was known 
that he had instructions from the king. He found the 
queen-mother at Angouleme, where his arrival was 
resented by the councillors, who sought to monopolise 
influence over her. Richelieu's attitude during the next 
two years has often been a puzzle to historians, but it 
is really perfectly clear. The part which he had to 
play was a difficult one, and he has frequently been 
accused of betraying the queen-mother in the interests 
of the court. But the charge is absolutely unfounded. 
Devotion to Mary de Medici was rendered imperative 
by his interest, as well as by his duty, but he was 
under no such obligations to her associates. His clear 
and unmistakable object was to separate his mistress 
from the great nobles, and to effect her complete recon- 
ciliation with the king. He was conscious of a double 
allegiance, to the queen-mother and the king, and he 
displayed no common skill and dexterity in steering his 
course when the two points to be aimed at seemed to 
lie in opposite directions. 

A personal quarrel between Epernon and Rucelai 
induced the former to urge Richelieu's admission to the 
council, which he had formerly opposed. His presence 
gave a great impulse to the negotiations with the court, 
and the treaty of Angouleme was hastily concluded on 



Ill RICHELIEU AITD THE QUEEN-MOTHER 45 

April 30. A. complete amnesty was promised to the 
adherents of Mary de Medici, and she resigned the 
government of Normandy for that of Anjou, with the 
towns of Angers, Pont-de-C6, and Ohinon. Normandy 
was given to the duke of Longueville in exchange for 
Picardy, which Luynes took into his own hands. The 
partisans of Eucelai were bitterly dissatisfied with the 
treaty, which they had done all in their power to pre- 
vent, and their discontent had disastrous consequences 
for Kichelieu. The queen had entrusted the govern- 
ment of Angers to his eldest brother, M'ho received a 
challenge from the marquis de Themines, a member of 
Rucelai's faction. In the duel which followed, Henri 
de Kichelieu was killed. This was a terrible blow to 
Richelieu, who was sincerely attached to his brother. 
The latter was a general favourite at court, and, in the 
judgment of Fontenay-Mareuil, he might, if he had 
lived, have rendered valuable services to the great 
cardinal. 

The treaty of Angouleme was far from producing 
the results which Richelieu hoped. The dominant 
faction at the court remained bitterly hostile to the 
queen - mother. When she met her son at Tours, 
Luynes or one of his brothers was always present at 
their interviews, and succeeded in averting the restoration 
of her influence. The king set out to return to Paris, 
while Mary de Medici proceeded to Angers to take 
possession of her new government. The desired re- 
conciliation was as far off as ever. The queen's ad- 
herents were treated with marked neglect or resentment. 
A new guardian, the Colonel d'Ornano, was appointed 
for her younger son, without even asking her opinion. 



46 RICHELIEU chap. 

But the most direct blow was the release of Cond6 and 
the issue of a royal declaration in his favour, which 
virtually condemned the queen and all who had had a 
hand in his imprisonment. Eichelieu in vain urged 
her to go to Paris, and to trust to the gradual revival 
of maternal authority over the king. She preferred to 
listen to the counsels of her more extreme followers, 
who wished her to remain at the head of the party of 
princes, and she demanded the dismissal of Luynes as an 
enemy of the state. It was the fear of this that had 
led to the release of Cond6, in order that he might form 
a rival party among the nobles in opposition to the 
queen's adherents. 

The year 1620 witnessed the outbreak of the civil 
war, which Richelieu had striven so desperately to avert. 
One after another the chief princes, Venddme and his 
brother, Soissons, Longueville, Nemours, left the court 
with the avowed intention of resorting to armed force. 
Unfortunately all except Longueville hastened to join 
Mary de Medici at Angers, where they strengthened the 
violent opponents of Richelieu, while their jealous 
rivalry for the post of leader did much to weaken the 
cause which they had espoused. Their dissensions 
encouraged Luynes and Conde, now closely allied to- 
gether, to take energetic measures. Carrying the king 
with them, they advanced into Normandy, where Rouen 
and the other chief towns surrendered in rapid succession, 
while Longueville fled to Dieppe without striking a blow. 
They then turned southward to confront the hostile 
coalition in Anjou. The most futile arrangements had 
been made by Vendome and Marillac to resist the 
attack. Instead of strengthening the defences of Angers, 



Ill RICHELIEU AND THE QUEEN-MOTHER 47 

which might have held out for months, they undertook 
to unite Angers and Pont-de-C6 by an entrenchment two 
leagues long, which they could not possibly complete in 
time, and which they had not men enough to defend, 
even if it had been completed. Eichelieu pointed out 
the folly of the enterprise, but he was not in a position 
to insist upon his opinion, and it was probably rejected 
with scorn. The royal troops earned the position with 
an ease that was almost ridiculous. The rout of Pont- 
de-Ce became a byword in that generation. Venddme 
himself was the first to carry the news to Mary de 
Medici, whose position was now hopeless. Richelieu 
urged her to cross the Loire and escape to Angouleme, 
where she could at least negotiate in security. But his 
advice was overruled by the cowardice of Vendome and 
the countess of Soissons, and nothing remained but an 
unconditional surrender. Richelieu and the cardinal 
de Sourdis were entrusted with the negotiations on their 
behalf, and they were relieved to find that Luynes was 
ready to grant the same terms after the victory as he 
had offered before. The treaty of Pont-de-Ce contained 
no stipulations of any importance ; it professed to be 
nothing more than a reconciliation, a mutual promise 
that all injuries should be forgotten, 

Richelieu's attitude in these events is clearly ex- 
pressed in his assertion that the queen-mother "was 
saved from ruin by her defeat." If she had won a 
victory, all the fruits would have remained in the hands 
of the princes who fought for her. As it was, she was 
freed from all obligations to them, and the way was 
opened for the recovery of her influence at court. His 
most immediate object was to eff"ect a real reconciliation 



48 RICHELIEU chap. 

between Mary de Medici and Luynes, who was beginning 
to resent the pretensions of Conde, and was not unwilling 
to provide a rival to him in the person of the queen- 
mother. In the hope of effecting this purpose, Eichelieu 
agreed to a marriage between his niece, Mademoiselle 
de Pont-Courlay, and the sieur de Combalet, nephew of 
Luynes. But the event disappointed his schemes, which 
were destined to be carried through in a wholly unfore- 
seen manner. 

The escape of Mary de Medici and the events which 
followed it had completely diverted attention from the 
edict about church property in Beam, which had never 
been enforced. After the treaty of Pont-de-C6, Luynes 
carried off Louis XIII. to suppress the resistance of the 
Huguenots. The campaign was soon over. Navarreins, 
the one fortress of the province, was compelled to 
surrender, and the Roman Catholic clergy were placed 
in possession of the ecclesiastical lands. A royal edict 
was issued to unite Beam and Lower Navarre with the 
crown of France. Thus one of the great bulwarks of 
Protestantism was destroyed, the work of centralisation 
made a notable advance, and the king was received in 
triumph on his return to Paris. 

Meanwhile the French Huguenots had watched the 
progress of events in Beam with growing misgivings. 
The leaders of the extreme party determined to antici- 
pate attack by organisation. In defiance of a royal 
prohibition, they held an assembly at La Eochelle and 
demanded the restoration in B^arn of the state of things 
existing in 1616, the withdrawal of the garrisons 
recently established in Guienne and Poitou, and the 
satisfaction of the demands preferred in their last meet- 



Ill RICHELIEU AND THE QUEEN"-MOTHER 49 

ing. The king offered to remove some of their 
grievances, but ordered the immediate dissolution of 
their assembly. This was urged by Lesdigaieres and 
other moderate leaders ; but they were powerless to 
control the more turbulent spirits, who believed that 
the divided court would never venture on active 
measures against them. In order to be prepared, 
however, for every danger, they proceeded to divide 
France into seven great provinces, in each of which 
there was to be a military commander and a provincial 
council. The supreme direction was to be entrusted to 
a commander-in-chief, who was to receive instructions 
from the general assembly at La Rochelle. As Bouillon 
refused the office and Lesdiguieres was suspected on 
account of his relations with the court, the supreme 
command was entrusted to the duke of Rohan, the 
governor of St. Jean d'Angely. These preparations 
and the evident intention to form "a republic within 
the kingdom " excited the greatest indignation in Paris, 
and Louis XIII. determined to crush the rebellion by 
force. 

Meanwhile Eichelieu had failed to effect the desired 
reconciliation between Luynes and the queen-mother, 
and the latter was jealously excluded from the royal 
council. The marriage between Combalet and Made- 
moiselle de Pont-Courlay had been completed, but it 
had failed to produce any confidence between the two 
uncles. Luynes even took advantage of the marriage 
to endeavour to separate Richelieu from Mary de 
Medici, by giving out that the bishop of Lu^on was now 
devoted to his interests, and that through him he was 
informed of all the queen's secrets. There were not 

E 



50 RICHELIEU chap. 

wanting advisers who urged Mary to renew her alliance 
with the princes, and to try once more the chances of 
war against the favourite. Richelieu, however, was 
eager to prevent a coalition which he had been at such 
pains to break up, and he succeeded in persuading the 
queen-mother to remain patient and to avoid hostilities. 
This moderation enabled Luynes to embark in the 
campaign of 1621. In order to raise funds, he was 
obliged to restore the pauletfe, and to raise a ruinous 
loan on the security of the gabeMe on salt. At the same 
time the office of constable, which had been vacant since 
the death of Montmorency in 161 4, was revived and con- 
ferred upon Luynes, although his military distinctions 
were of the slightest. In May the king with his army 
entered Poitou, and after a short siege captured St. Jean 
d'Angely. After detaching Epernon to blockade La 
Rochelle, Louis entered Guienne, and for a time carried 
all before him. These successes encouraged Luynes to 
undertake the siege of Montauban, the chief Huguenot 
stronghold in the south. But here his good fortune 
deserted him, and after serious losses had been sus- 
tained he was compelled to raise the siege. After the 
death of du Vair, Luynes held the seals for a short time, 
and this led Conde to remark that "he was a good 
keeper of the seals in time of war, and a good constable 
in time of peace." His omnipotence had been tolerated 
as long as he was successful, but his first failure led to 
the outbreak of opposition. Puisieux intrigued against 
him in the ministry, but he was still strong enough to 
maintain his position against attack. To recover his lost 
prestige he laid siege to Monheur, a fortress near Toulouse. 
There he was seized by a fever, which carried him off 



Ill RICHELIEU AND THE QUEEN-MOTHER 51 

in four days (December 14, 1621). The reputation of 
Luynes has suffered from the unpopularity which dogs the 
footsteps of favourites ; but there can be no doubt that he 
deserves a more prominent place in history than has been 
usually allotted to him. He anticipated in some respects 
the future policy of Richelieu. He crushed a formidable 
coalition of the princes, and he inflicted the first serious 
blow upon the political independence of the Huguenots. 
Eichelieu and Mary de Medici had good reason to 
rejoice at the constable's death, but they soon found 
that all obstacles were not yet removed from their path. 
Conde and the ministers continued Luynes's policy of 
opposition to the queen -mother. Unable to prevent 
any longer her admission to the council, they did all 
they could to exclude her from any real control of affairs. 
The first subject of discussion in 1622 was the desira- 
bility of continuing the war against the Huguenots. 
Mary de Medici, expressing in council the opinions 
which Eichelieu had drawn up for her, urged that civil 
war was rendered impolitic by the present condition of 
affairs in Europe, and that the primary duty of France 
was to check the growing power of the house of Hapsburg. 
But Cond6, eager to separate the king from his mother, 
succeeded in persuading him to undertake a new cam- 
paign. The queen determined to follow him, but she 
fell ill at Nantes, and was compelled to retire to the 
waters of Pougues, whither Richelieu accompanied her. 
Meanwhile the king advanced into Poitou, where he 
defeated Soubise, Rohan's brother, and took Royan after 
a six days' siege. But for the second time he declined 
to attack La Rochelle, and leaving Soissons to cover 
the great stronghold of the enemy, he marched into 



52 RICHELIEU chap. 

Languedoc. In order to restrain the growing preten- 
sions of Cond6, the constableship was given to Les- 
diguieres, who was thus induced to throw himself 
altogether on the side of the crown, and to become a 
convert to Eoman Catholicism. The chief event of the 
campaign was the siege of Montpellier, which was under- 
taken by Conde. But he was unsuccessful, and his 
failure enabled the moderate party to induce the king 
to agree to a peace. The treaty of Montpellier was 
arranged between Lesdiguieres and Rohan. The Edict 
of Nantes was confirmed, but the Huguenots were only 
allowed to retain two fortified places, Montauban and 
La Eochelle. Conde was so indignant at the treaty, 
which was signed without his having any knowledge of 
it, that he left the court and set out on a journey to 
Italy. 

This year witnessed an important event in the life 
of Richelieu — his elevation to the cardinalate. As early 
as 1619 Mary de Medici had persuaded Louis XIII., 
when she met him after the treaty of Angouleme, to 
demand this appointment from the pope. In the next 
year, after the affair at Pont-de-C6, she induced him to 
write a second letter, and to send Sebastien Bouthillier 
to Rome to urge the matter on the pope's attention. 
For two years the faithful adherent of Richelieu re- 
mained at Rome trying to remove the difiiculties in the 
way of the nomination. The chief of these difficulties 
arose from the resolute opposition of Luynes, and this 
ended with his death, but Richelieu always suspected 
the ministers of intriguing against his candidature. At 
last Gregory XV. was induced to grant the coveted 
dignity, and Richelieu received the news of his promo- 



Ill RICHELIEU AND THE QUEEN-MOTHER 53 

tion in September. He went to Tarascon to thank the 
king in person, and Louis, who seems never to have 
regarded him with disfavour, told him that he could 
not have succeeded as long as Luynes lived. 

Eichelieu had welcomed the conclusion of the treaty 
of Montpellier as rendering possible a vigorous foreign 
policy in opposition to the threatening power of Austria 
and Spain. But he was grievously disappointed. The 
withdrawal of Conde left the chief power in the hands 
of Sillery and his son Puisieux, both experienced in the 
conduct of affairs, but inclined by temperament to half- 
hearted measures, and absorbed in the desire of main- 
taining their own authority. Even the queen-mother, 
so long devoted to the Spanish alliance, was at last 
awakened to the dangers which threatened France, and 
wished to abandon the vacillating policy which had so 
long been followed. This brought her into collision 
with the ministers, who sought to strengthen themselves 
by an alliance with the great nobles. When Conde 
returned from Italy they invited him to court in the 
hope of playing him off against Mary de Medici. But 
they were destined to fall before the opposition of one 
of their own supporters. They had obtained the 
removal of Schomberg from the control of finances, on 
an unfounded charge of malversation, and his office was 
given to the marquis of la Vieuville. But la Yieuville 
soon began to chafe at the subordinate position in 
which he was kept by his colleagues, and intrigued 
against them with the queen-mother. The discovery 
that considerable sums of money had passed through 
the hands of Puisieux and had never been properly 
accounted for, gave his enemies a handle against him 



54 RICHELIEU chap, hi 

and his father. In January 1624 Sillery for the 
second time was driven from court, and the office of 
first minister passed into the hands of la Vieuville. 
But he soon realised that he possessed neither the 
experience nor the capacity to deal with the difficulties 
in which France was involved, and he looked round for 
assistance. His connection with Maryde Medici naturally 
suggested that he should have recourse to the ablest of 
her servants, but he feared that he would himself be over- 
shadowed by Kichelieu's superiority. He proposed to 
form a council for foreign affairs, with the cardinal as 
president ; but the members were to be excluded from 
the council of the king. Such a position was not likely 
to commend itself to Eichelieu, and in April 1624 la 
Vieuville was compelled to advise the king to admit 
the cardinal to the council of state. Thus Eichelieu 
entered office for the second time, and commenced an 
administration which was destined to be the most 
glorious in the history of France. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE VALTELLINE AND LA ROCHELLE 

1624-1628 

Richelieu's schemes of domestic reform — Compelled to abandon 
them for foreign politics — Threatening progress of the house 
of Hapsburg — Difficulties in the way of the ministers — Renewed 
alliance with the Dutch — Negotiations about the English 
marriage- — Fall of la Vieuville — Richelieu first minister — His 
policy in the English negotiations — Question of the Yaltelline 
— The forts in the hands of the pope — De Coeuvres seizes the 
Yaltelline — Revolt of the Huguenots — Ships obtained from 
England and Holland — Naval victory over the rebels — Negotia- 
tions with the Huguenots — Indignation of the Ultramontane 
party against R,ichelieu — Treaty of Monzon with Spain — Treaty 
with the Huguenots — Conspiracy of Ornano and Madame de 
Chevreuse — Collapse of the conspiracy — Fate of Chalais — 
Richelieu appointed superintendent of navigation and commerce 
— His maritime schemes — Quarrel between France and England 
— Buckingham's expedition to Rhe — Critical position of France 
— Energy displayed by Richelieu — Relief of the fort of St, 
Martin — Buckingham compelled to abandon Rhe — Siege of 
La Rochelle — Plan of blocking the harbour — Period of the 
king's absence — Richelieu directs the siege — Failure of the 
English attempts to relieve La Rochelle — Surrender of the 
city — Its treatment. 

Richelieu, according to his own account, pleaded ill- 
health as an excuse for declining the burdensome responsi- 
bilities of office, but his scruples were overcome by the 



56 RICHELIEU CHAr. 

urgent entreaties of the king and the queen -mother, 
and on April 29, 1624, he was formally admitted to the 
council. La Vieuville, who regarded his new colleague 
with the jealousy of conscious inferiority, wished to 
subordinate him to the chancellor and the constable, 
but Richelieu insisted on the right of a cardinal to 
precedence even over princes of the blood. M. d'Avenel 
has published an interesting document, in which the 
new minister drew up a comprehensive scheme of internal 
reforms. The decrees of the Council of Trent were to 
be accepted, but without prejudice to the rights of the 
crown and the liberties of the Galilean Church. The 
monasteries were to be reformed and their number 
diminished, on the ground that they were a serious 
obstruction to industry. The expenses of the royal 
household were to be reduced by rigid economy. The 
paillette and the sale of offices were to be abolished, and 
on the death of existing office-holders the number of 
places was to be diminished. To relieve the people, 
the gabelle on salt was to be reformed so as to fall 
upon foreigners rather than upon subjects, and the 
exemptions from the taille were to be cut down in 
number and refused in the future. Provincial govern- 
ments were only to be held for three years, and all 
useless fortifications were to be demolished. 

If Eichelieu had carried out these reforms he would 
have deserved the lasting gratitude of France. But 
they represent the pious wishes of a newly-appointed 
minister rather than the matured intentions of an 
experienced statesman. Possibly many of the changes 
would have been repudiated by Richelieu himself in 
later years ; but at the moment his attention was 



IV THE VALTELLINE AND LA ROCHELLE 57 

distracted from domestic affairs by the overwhelming 
pressure of foreign politics. Since the death of Henry 
IV. the policy of opposition to the house of Hapsburg 
had been abandoned, with fatal results to France. In 
the great war which began in Germany in 1618 the 
emperor and the Catholic League had won a series of 
victories. Not only was the Bohemian revolt suppressed, 
but both the Upper and the Lower Palatinate had been 
conquered, and in 1623 they were transferred, with the 
electoral vote, to Maximilian of Bavaria. Ferdinand 
11. , as the champion of the Counter-reformation, held a 
stronger position in Germany than any of his predecessors 
since Charles Y., and he threatened to become stronger 
still, if once he could form an army of his own, and thus 
free himself from dependence upon the Catholic princes. 
Still more serious for France was the progress made by 
the neighbouring power of Spain, the close ally of the 
emperor. Philip IV. and Olivares were reviving the 
ambitious aims of Philip II. Their troops, under 
Spinola, had reduced the Lower Palatinate, and they 
now threatened to conquer the United Provinces, which 
could hardly make an effective resistance without support. 
England, which under Elizabeth had been a champion 
of Protestantism, and which had special reasons for 
sympathy with the Elector Palatine, was paralysed by 
the fatuous policy of James L, who allowed himself to 
be fooled by the prospect of marrying his son to the 
Spanish infanta. Unless resolute steps were taken, 
Spain threatened to shut France in altogether on her 
eastern frontier by a chain of dependent or subject 
territories. Negotiations had been opened with Vienna 
for the surrender of Tyrol and Elsass to the Spanish 



58 RICHELIEU chap. 

crown. And finally Spain attempted to evade the 
Alpine barrier which shut off her Italian territories 
from her possessions in Central Europe. In 1622 her 
troops had seized the important pass of the Valtelline, 
which connected Lombardy with Tyrol, in defiance of 
the claim of France to control the valley. 

Sillery and Puisieux had fallen because they had 
failed to check the aggressions of Spain, and the task 
was now intrusted to la Vieuville and Richelieu ; but 
they were hampered by serious difficulties in their way. 
France was a Roman Catholic country, and Richelieu 
was a cardinal of the Church. Though he might be 
willing to subordinate religious to political interests, 
and though he defended this by the example of the 
Roman court itself, yet he could not aff'ord to give 
Spain the advantage of posing as the champion of the 
orthodox creed. Moreover, in France itself there was 
a strong Ultramontane party which resented any rupture 
with Spain, and Richelieu's patroness, Mary de Medici, 
would hardly pardon such a complete change of attitude 
as would appear to condemn her conduct during the 
regency. Above all, it was imperative not to entangle 
France in foreign relations which might advance the 
interests of the Huguenots. Thus alliances with Protest- 
ant powers could only be half-hearted, and accompanied 
with reservations fatal to their efficiency. Vigorous 
intervention in Germany, perhaps the best method of 
checkmating the schemes of Spain, was impossible, 
because it would alienate the Catholic League, which 
it was Richelieu's intention to conciliate, in the hope 
of playing the princes off" against the emperor. The 
attempt to recover ascendency in the Valtelline was 



IV THE VALTELLINE AND LA ROCHELLE 59 

rendered difficult by the necessity of keeping on good 
terms with Eome, and of securing the Catholic inhabitants 
of the valley from oppression by their Protestant rulers. 

Through these difficulties, which were not diminished 
by the absence of a good understanding with his principal 
colleague, Eichelieu steered his way with a mixture of 
caution and resolution which does more credit to his 
intellect than to his convictions. France hastened to 
renew its alliance with the Dutch, which had been 
broken off since Henry IV. 's death, and to welcome 
the overtures made by England. Buckingham's journey 
to Madrid had resulted in breaking off the proposed 
Spanish marriage, and James I. now demanded the 
hand of Louis XIII.'s sister, Henrietta Maria, for the 
Prince of Wales. The negotiations were long and 
tedious. Richelieu's claim to precedence as a cardinal 
being disputed by the English envoys, he feigned illness, 
and received them in his bed. But the great difficulty 
arose from the French demand that James should promise 
toleration to the English Roman Catholics, as he had 
offered to do in his negotiations with Spain. The English 
king was willing to give a verbal promise, but France 
insisted upon a formal and binding agreement, counter- 
signed by an English minister. 

During the negotiations the differences between 
Richelieu and la Vieuville became more and more 
manifest. The latter assured the English envoys that 
the demand for toleration was a mere form to satisfy 
the pope and the French Catholics, and that Louis 
XHL really cared nothing about the matter. The king, 
who considered that his honour compelled him to exact 
at least as favourable terms as had been proffered to 



60 RIOHI^LIEU CHAP. 

Spain, was furious at this attempt to frustrate his 
wishes. In August la Yieuville was dismissed, and 
Eichelieu was left without a rival in the ministry. His 
superior tact and determination enabled him to score a 
diplomatic triumph. The English court, urged on by 
the reckless Buckingham, agreed to make the desired 
stipulation, and to be satisfied with the barren con- 
cession that it should not form part of the marriage 
contract. Father Berulle was sent to Eome to procure 
the papal dispensation, and the marriage was celebrated 
in the spring of 1625, soon after Charles I. had succeeded 
to the throne on his father's death. 

If Eichelieu, as he gives out in his Memoirs, was the 
guiding spirit throughout this transaction, his policy 
is open to serious criticism. Buckingham wished France 
to assist Mansfeld in the recovery of the Palatinate. 
Eichelieu, on the other hand, was determined not to 
entangle himself in Germany, but wished to involve 
England in a war with Spain, in order to divert Spanish 
attention from the Yaltelline. His trump card in the 
negotiations was the knowledge that Buckingham was 
resolved on the French alliance, and that Buckingham 
dominated both James and Charles. This enabled him 
to make the alliance on his own terms. But it was 
extremely foolish, from the political point of view, to 
exact such concessions to the Eoman Catholics. Not 
only were causes of quarrel certain to arise from so 
one-sided an agreement, but it necessarily involved the 
English court in a quarrel with the parliament, and 
without the supplies of parliament English intervention 
on the continent was sure to be futile. Possibly 
Eichelieu may not have appreciated the importance of 



IV THE VALTELLINE AND LA ROCHELLE 61 

the parliamentary aspect of the matter, but it is more 
probable that he was not a free agent, and that the line 
which he took was forced upon him. It was not in his 
power to acquire all at once that ascendency over the 
king which he afterwards established, and in this question 
of the English marriage the real decision rested with 
Louis and his mother. If Eichelieu had attempted to 
oppose them he would have shared the fate of la 
Vieuviile. 

France had been driven to renew her Protestant 
alliances in Europe, mainly by events in the Valtelline. 
This important valley, which runs from Lake Como into 
Tyrol, was the property of the three Grison leagues, 
which themselves formed part of the Swiss Confedera- 
tion. Ever since the reign of Louis XII. the Grisons 
had been the allies of France, and had pledged them- 
selves to close their Alpine passes against the enemies 
of that country. But for some time the Spanish governor 
of Milan had been endeavouring by intrigues and threats 
to secure the control of the Valtelline, and in 160-3 the 
fort of Fuentes had been built at the entrance of the 
pass. Since then a Spanish party had grown up in the 
Grisons, and had set itself to oppose the dominant 
influence of France. In 1620 this party organised a 
revolt of the Roman Catholic population of the Val- 
telline against the oppressions of the judges appointed 
by the Protestant leagues. The Spaniards aided the 
rebels in expelling the Swiss troops that were sent 
against them, and four forts were constructed in the 
valley and garrisoned by Spanish troops. The Grisons 
now appealed for assistance to France, and a French 
envoy negotiated the treaty of Madrid (April 25, 



62. RICHELIEU chap. 

1621), by which the forts were to be destroyed, and 
everything restored to its former condition. But the 
outbreak of the Huguenot war encouraged the Spaniards 
to evade the fulfilment of the treaty, and in 1622 the 
Grisons, attacked simultaneously from Austria and from 
Milan, and despairing of French aid, made terms with 
Spain, by which they renounced their sovereignty over 
the Valtelline, and agreed to grant a passage to Spanish 
troops. The conclusion of the treaty of Montpellier 
at last enabled Louis XIII. to turn his attention to 
affairs in Italy, and in February 1623 he formed a 
league with Venice and Savoy to compel Spain to carry 
out the treaty of Madrid. The Spaniards, who were 
not prepared to embark in a new war, now agreed to 
submit the dispute to the arbitration of the pope, and 
the forts were handed over to papal troops under 
the command of the marquis of Bagny. But Urban 
VIII. , although personally inclined to oppose the domina- 
tion of Spain in Italy, was unable to resist the pressure 
of the Spanish party in Rome, which urged the impiety 
of restoring Protestant rule in the Valtelline. The 
terms which the pope proposed were so favourable to 
Spain that they were unhesitatingly rejected by Riche- 
lieu, who at last decided on energetic measures. In 
the winter of 1624 the marquis de Coeuvres, who had 
been sent on an embassy to the Swiss cantons, was 
ordered to raise troops for the reduction of the Val- 
telline. The attack was entirely successful ; the papal 
garrisons were taken unprepared, and early in 1625 the 
valley and the forts were completely in the hands of 
the Swiss and the Grisons. At the same time, in order 
to divert the attention of Spain, the constable Les- 



IV THE VALTELLINE AND LA ROCHELLE 63 

diguieres was sent to co-operate with the duke of 
Savoy in an attack on Genoa. 

But Spain could count on efficient supporters within 
France. No sooner had the government embarked in a 
foreign war than Huguenot discontent broke out into 
open rebellion. The Huguenots, who were still headed 
by Kohan and Soubise, complained that the treaty of 
Montpellier had not been carried out, and especially 
that the fortifications of Fort St. Louis, which threat- 
ened La Eochelle, had been strengthened instead of 
being destroyed. In January 1625 Soubise, who had 
already seized the island of Rhe, suddenly attacked and 
captured the royal vessels in the harbour of Blavet. 
This success was the signal for a general rising ; La 
Eochelle espoused the cause of Soubise, and Eohan took 
up arms in Languedoc. The court was panic-stricken 
at the news, and a majority of the council wished to 
conclude a peace with Spain at any price. All Eichelieu's 
firmness was needed to prevent an abject surrender of 
French interests in Italy. The great difficulty in the 
way of suppressing the Huguenots was the want of 
ships, and Eichelieu resolved to obtain them from the 
Protestant powers. Both England and Holland were 
furious with the Huguenots for threatening to ruin the 
grand combination against Spain, and they promptly 
agreed, not only to supply vessels, but to allow France 
to man them with French captains and troops. Mont- 
morency took command of the fleet and won a complete 
victory over the rebels, who were driven from Ehe and 
Ol6ron. Soubise fled to England, and the Huguenots 
hastened to sue for peace. 

It was at this time that Christian IV. of Denmark 



64 RICHELIEU chap. 

undertook the championship of the Protestant cause in 
Germany. Eichelieu considered that Spain, involved in 
hostilities with the English and Dutch, and pledged to 
the assistance of the emperor, could not act with energy 
in Italy, and that a very moderate effort would compel her 
to concede to the French demands. He therefore made 
use of English mediation to conduct negotiations with 
the Huguenots. This policy excited the bitter hostility 
of the Ultramontane party, who resented the collision 
with the papacy even more than the breach with Spain. 
This party was now headed by Berulle, and it was sup- 
ported within the council by Marillac, the controller of 
finance, and afterwards keeper of the seals. Virulent 
pamphlets were published against Richelieu, in one of 
which he was stigmatised as the "cardinal of la Rochelle." 
To conciliate his opponents, who might at any moment 
be strengthened by the adhesion of the queen-mother, 
he was compelled to authorise the comte du Fargis, the 
French ambassador at Madrid, to open negotiations with 
Olivares. But du Fargis allowed himself to be gained 
over by the Ultramontanes, and in January 1626, without 
authority, he signed a treaty with Spain. Richelieu, who 
saw clearly that powerful influences were at work in the 
matter, and who feared the alienation of Venice and Savoy, 
insisted on repudiating this treaty, and also another which 
du Fargis signed at Monzon on March 5. The final 
treaty, modified to suit the interests of France, was not 
signed till May 10 at Barcelona, but it is usually known 
in history as the treaty of Monzon. The sovereignty of 
the Valtelline was to be restored to the Grisons. Spain 
abandoned all claim to control the passes, and the forts 
were to be again handed over to the pope and destroyed. 



IV THE VALTELLINE AND LA ROCHeIlE 65 

Meanwhile the English ambassadors, ignorant of the 
events in Spain, were urging on the negotiations with 
the Huguenots, in order that France might be able to 
act with energy in Italy. Thanks to their exertions the 
Huguenots were induced to withdraw their demand for 
the destruction of Fort St. Louis, and to accept a very 
disadvantageous treaty on February 5. But, from the 
point of view of the government, the treaty had one very 
serious defect — that it was based upon English mediation. 
Charles I. had revenged himself for Louis's intervention 
on behalf of the Roman Catholics. The Huguenot 
deputies declared that they would never have accepted 
the treaty but for pressure from England, and for the 
assurance that henceforth "they might lawfully accept 
assistance from the English king." 

For the moment, however, Richelieu seemed to have 
triumphed. He had humbled the Huguenots with the 
help of their natural allies, and he had forced Spain to 
resign her hold upon the Yaltelline. But his very 
success had served to stimulate discontent at home. All 
the interests which dreaded the growth of a strong 
monarchy combined against the minister who threatened 
to destroy all restrictions upon royal absolutism. Even 
before peace was concluded ru,mours began to circulate 
of approaching changes in the government. The per- 
sonage upon whom all eyes were turned was the king's 
younger brother, G-aston, whose succession to the throne 
seemed almost inevitable, since Louis's health was feeble 
and his marriage had proved for many years unfruitful. 
But Gaston himself was not very formidable ; he was 
only the tool of those who surrounded him. The real 
contrivers of the plot were the marshal d'Ornano, whom 

F 



66 RICHELIEU chap. 

Richelieu himself had released from prison and restored 
to his former office as governor to Monsieur, and the 
duchess of Ohevreuse, the widow of Luynes, who had 
since married a member of the house of Guise. It is 
difficult to ascertain their precise objects ; probably they 
had never distinctly formulated them themselves. Their 
overt measures were to demand the admission of Gaston 
to the council, and to oppose the plan of marrying him 
to Mademoiselle de Montpensier. Rumour accused them 
of having further designs : to remove Louis XIII. to a 
monastery, to place Gaston on the throne, and to marry 
him to Anne of Austria. The latter is said to have ex- 
claimed in answer to the charge, " I should not have 
gained enough by the change." It is certain, at all 
events, that the conspiracy was directed against Riche- 
lieu, whose removal was a necessary preliminary to any 
further measures. Nearly all the princes were more or 
less involved : Conde, because he resented his continued 
exclusion from the court ; the young Soissons, because 
he wished to secure the Montpensier inheritance for 
himself ; the rest from a general desire to increase their 
own importance and independence. To the Frenchmen 
of the seventeenth century a plot was an attraction 
itself ; they did not need any carefully-prepared schemes 
or skilfully-dangled bribes to induce them to embark in 
it. According to Richelieu, foreign powers were also 
implicated. England, Holland, and Savoy all resented 
the conclusion of the treaty of Monzon, and were willing 
to overthrow the statesman whom they considered 
responsible ; while Spain was always on the look-out for 
the opportunity of stirring up domestic disorder in 
France. 



IV THE VALTELLINE AND LA ROCHELLE 67 

The plotters seemed to have talked with a reckless 
indiscretion, which had been natural enough under the 
feeble regency, but which was madness now that power 
had fallen to a man capable and willing to use it. 
Eichelieu waited till he had collected enough evidence 
to satisfy the king, and then struck with vigour and 
decision. On May 4, Ornano was seized and imprisoned 
at Yincennes, where he died four months later. Gaston 
went in a rage to the cardinal, who firmly accepted the 
responsibility for the action. To most of the conspirators 
little severity was shown. The king's half-brothers, the 
duke of Venddme and the Grand Prior, were taken 
prisoners, and Madame de Chevreuse, exiled from the 
court, escaped to Lorraine. Conde hastened to come 
to terms with the government, and the other princes 
were treated with passive contempt. Gaston, who was 
formally reconciled with Louis and his mother, received 
the duchies of Orleans and Chartres as an appanage, and 
Richelieu himself officiated at his marriage with Made- 
moiselle de Montpensier. But while a politic clemency 
spared the leaders, one of their tools was selected for 
condign punishment, as an example of the dangers of 
conspiring. Henri de Talleyrand, count of Ohalais, whose 
mother had bought for him the office of master of the 
wardrobe, had been drawn into the plot by the seductive 
charms of the duchess of Chevreuse. His youthful in- 
discretion had led him into foolish conversations, which 
were now brought up against him. He was tried before 
a specially appointed commission, and was condemned 
to be beheaded and quartered. In spite of the frantic 
supplications of his mother, the sentence was carried out. 
That he was more or less guilty there is little doubt ; 



68 RICHELIEU chap. 

but he was far less to blame than others who escaped, 
and his untimely fate will always excite a feeling of in- 
dignation against the ruthless policy which chose him as 
a sacrifice. 

The inevitable result of this abortive conspiracy was 
to strengthen the minister against whom it was directed. 
The king granted Eichelieu a bodyguard of a hundred 
men, to protect him against the malice of his enemies. 
His control over the government became the more 
absolute as it appeared that he was the necessary 
bulwark of the royal power. At this moment the 
constableship was left vacant by the death of the veteran 
Lesdiguieres, and Eichelieu seized the opportunity to 
suppress an office which gave excessive authority and 
independence to its holder. The corresponding office of 
admiral was purchased from Montmorency for 1,200,000 
livres, and was also suppressed. Thus the army and 
navy were brought under the direct control of the 
ministers, and a great step was taken in the process of 
centralisation. Eichelieu himself was profoundly im- 
pressed with the necessity of making France a great 
naval power, in order to protect and extend French 
commerce, and to avoid the humiliation of depending for 
foreign assistance against Huguenot rebellion. To give 
him the necessary authority, the king conferred upon 
him the novel office of " grand-master, chief, and super- 
intendent-general of navigation and commerce." Large 
sums of money were raised to build and purchase ships, 
and to furnish them with crews and necessary stores. 
As a navy in those days must be based upon a large 
mercantile marine, Eichelieu projected the formation 
of a great company at Morbihan, which should dispute 



IV THE VALTELLINE AND LA ROCHELLE 69 

the trade with the East and West Indies, with England, 
Holland, and Spain. 

Eichelieu's measures were not only dictated by a wise 
comprehension of the future interests of France : his 
gaze was never long withdrawn from the immediate 
drama of foreign affairs. The Protestant cause in 
Europe, with which France could not but be intimately 
connected, had suffered severe blows in 1 626. Christian 
IV. of Denmark had been crushed by Tilly and the 
troops of the Catholic League ; Mansfeld had been 
irretrievably defeated by the imperial army under 
Wallenstein. To make matters worse, England, which 
was more responsible than any other power for the failure 
of the Danish king, and which had failed in its own 
naval attack upon Spain, did not hesitate to add to 
its difficulties by picking a quarrel with France. The 
marriage contract of Henrietta Maria had produced 
nothing but quarrels and misunderstandings between 
the two powers. Charles I. could not grant the pro- 
mised toleration to the Roman Catholics in face of 
parliamentary opposition, and so he calmly repudiated 
his promise and allowed the penal laws to be enforced. 
He quarrelled with his wife for her avowed partiality 
for her native country and her own religion. So far 
did his anger carry him that he expelled with insult the 
French ladies and priests of the queen's household. 
He resented the maritime schemes of Eichelieu as an 
encroachment upon the naval supremacy which he 
claimed as England's right. English cruisers captured 
French vessels on the slightest pretext, and their 
cargoes were sold by order of the English courts as 
contraband of war. 



70 RICHELIEU chap. 

So far as these disputes constituted causes of war, it 
was France which had most cause of complaint. But 
indignant as Louis XIII. and Mary de Medici might be 
at the treatment of Henrietta Maria and the shameless 
disregard of the marriage contract, they would have 
been restrained by Eichelieu from endeavouring to 
redress their grievances by arms. It was England 
which embarked upon the war, and her conduct was so 
obviously fatuous under existing circumstances that men 
were at a loss to account for it. The real author of the 
French war, as of the French alliance, was Buckingham. 
When he had visited France to escort Charles I.'s bride 
to England, he had been audacious enough to make open 
love to Anne of Austria, the neglected wife of Louis 
XIII. Since then he had several times suggested his 
return to Paris as envoy for the settlement of disputes, 
but his proposal had always been rejected by the king 
and queen-mother, who had no desire that he should 
carry his insolent overtures any further. Contem- 
poraries did not hesitate to assert and to believe 
that the proud favourite considered himself in- 
sulted, and that he revenged himself by attacking 
France. It is more probable that he wished to con- 
ciliate the hostile majority in parliament, who had 
never forgiven him for allowing English ships to be 
employed against the Huguenots. With a sublime self- 
confidence, which no failure had been able to weaken, he 
believed that his enterprise would be irresistible, and 
that a rapid success would give him a position in England 
which nothing could shake. Although the Huguenots 
were not in revolt, he announced himself as the champion 
of their interests, and complained that the recent treaty 



IV THE VALTELLINE AND LA EOCHELLE 71 

had been broken by the retention of Fort St. Louis,. and 
by the construction of the two forts of St. Martin and 
La Pr6e on the island of Eh65 which commanded the 
entrance to the harbour of La Rochelle. No pains were 
spared in fitting out the fleet, which sailed from Stokes 
Bay on June 27, 1627. Its exact destination was at 
first uncertain, but on July 10 it anchored ofi" the coast 
of Ehe. Two days later the troops were landed after 
a stubborn struggle, and proceeded to lay siege to the 
fort of St. Martin. 

It was a critical moment in the career of Richelieu. 
Louis XIII. was ill with a tertian fever, and the 
cardinal did not dare to leave him. Yet upon him fell 
all the responsibility of resisting an invasion, which had 
been foreseen but very insufiftciently provided against. 
And the English were not the only enemies to be 
considered. Rohan, urged on by Buckingham, hastened 
to raise once more the standard of revolt in Languedoc. 
La Rochelle was at first inclined to resent an enterprise 
about which it had never been consulted, and to remain 
obstinately neutral. But it was certain that the 
citizens would be forced before long to espouse the 
English cause. And Buckingham had made careful 
preparations to divert the attention of France. His 
envoy had gained over Charles IV. of Lorraine, at 
whose court the duchess of Chevreuse continued her 
incessant intrigues against Richelieu. The discon- 
tented count of Soissons was at Turin, and both Savoy 
and Venice only waited for the news of an English 
victory to join the coalition against France. And 
within France itself there were many opponents of the 
cardinal who would have welcomed a defeat which 



72 RICHELIEU chap. 

should discredit his administration. He had no ally to 
look to except Spain, with whom France had concluded 
a treaty in April. But it was notorious that Spain only 
desired to embroil France with England, and that 
Olivares had actually revealed the treaty to Buckingham 
in order to induce him to accept his terms. The most 
immediate danger, however, was in the island of Rhe. 
Toiras, the commander, had received lavish grants of 
money, but had neglected to hurry on his preparations. 
Neither of the two forts was in a condition to resist 
attack, and at the moment of his landing Buckingham 
might have carried either of them by assault. But he 
paid no attention to La Pr6e, and wasted four days 
before reaching St. Martin, His delay enabled the 
garrison by great exertion to complete the defences just 
in time, and the English were compelled to abandon the 
assault for a blockade. This gave the French time to 
organise the relief of the fortress ; but the matter was 
still urgent. Toiras had barely food enough to last 
two months, and his needs were increased when 
Buckingham collected the mothers, wives, and daughters 
of the garrison, and drove them into the fortress by a 
volley of English bullets. As the English naval force 
was superior to any that France could bring against it, 
and as the assailants must sooner or later have the 
co-operation of La Eochelle, it seemed as if the surrender 
of the fort was only a question of time. 

But Richelieu's energy rose to the occasion. Though 
he spent the whole day and many nights by the king's 
bed, and was compelled to disguise his anxieties for fear 
of alarming the patient, he undertook the whole super- 
intendence of the necessary measures for the relief of St. 



IV THE VALTELLINE AND LA ROCHELLE 73 

Martin. He had the capacity, which seems peculiar to 
great statesmen, of grasping every minute detail as 
clearly as the general outline of a scheme. Nothing 
was too small for him, and he shrank from no labour or 
responsibility. The duke of Angouleme was appointed 
to command the army in Poitou, with instructions to 
watch over La Eochelle and prevent any assistance being 
given to the English. Before long it was found neces- 
sary to extend this supervision to a regular siege. 
Agents were sent in every direction to collect sailors, 
ships, and provisions, at the ports of Brouage and the 
Sables d'Olonne. Special care was taken to provide a 
number of pinnaces and rowing-boats from Bayonne, so 
that the relieving force might be independent of the 
wind, and might evade the shallows of a low tide. 
Succour was sent to the island of 016ron, which was 
more fertile than Eh(^, and which would become of 
immense importance if the latter were lost. The Spanish 
offers of assistance were accepted, though Eichelieu had 
little confidence in their good faith, and the subsidy 
treaty was renewed with the Dutch, so as to secure at 
least their neutrality. As the treasury was wholly un- 
able to meet the extraordinary expenditure, Richelieu 
employed his own money and his own credit to supply 
the deficiency. 

Before the end of August the king was well enough 
to travel, and he and Richelieu at once set out to join 
the army before La Rochelle. Their arrival did much 
to stimulate the exertions to assist the besieged fort, but 
though some few supplies had been smuggled in, 
nothing substantial had been achieved. The garrison 
was more and more pressed by want, and on Sep- 



74 RICHELIEU chap. 

tember 25 an offer of surrender was actually made, but 
postponed to the next day. That very evening the 
wind took a favourable turn, and the relieving force 
succeeded in making its way through the English fleet, 
with the loss of only one boat. St. Martin was safe for 
nearly six weeks. For the moment the English were 
so discouraged as to decide on abandoning the enterprise, 
but the promise of speedy reinforcements induced them 
to change their mind. But the English administration 
was hopelessly corrupt and ineflicient, and Charles's good- 
will was not enough to fit out the ships in time, or to 
provide favourable winds when they were ready. Mean- 
while the besiegers were suffering from the inclemency 
of an early winter, and found themselves in danger of 
being in their turn besieged. Eichelieu had succeeded in 
sending troops across to the island, where they found 
a safe shelter in the neglected fort of La Pree. It 
was known that Toiras could not hold out beyond 
November 5, but Buckingham could not hold out so 
long. On October 27 he made a futile attempt to 
storm the fort, and two days later he proceeded to 
embark his troops. But Marshal Schomberg brought 
up the newly-arrived soldiers from La Pree, and the 
English retreat was turned into a confused and ruinous 
rout. Buckingham returned to England with barely a 
third of the force that had accompanied him. Some 
three weeks later the Spanish fleet, which a little before 
might have rendered invaluable services, arrived at 
Morbihan. 

The English invasion had forced Richelieu into a 
closer alliance with the ultra-Catholic party than he 
would have formed of his own accord, and he found 



IV THE A^ALTELLINE AND LA ROCHELLE 75 

it advisable to cement the alliance by inducing the 
pope to give the cardinal's hat to B6rulle, though 
the latter was his avowed rival for the favour of the 
queen-mother. The full extent of the dangers which 
threatened France had been recently revealed by the 
papers of Montague, the English envoy, who had been 
captured on the borders of Lorraine. These disclosed, 
not only the intrigues of Buckingham with Lorraine, 
Savoy, and the count of Soissons, but also a design 
on the part of the emperor to assert his claim to 
the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which had 
been occupied by France since 1553, but had never 
been resigned by the Empire. Some documents found 
in Buckingham's camp at St. Martin also revealed 
the intrigues of Spain with England. But Eichelieu 
determined to disregard as much as possible these 
external dangers, and to concentrate his attention 
upon the siege of La Eochelle. The task of making 
head against Eohan in Languedoc was entrusted to 
Cond6, a notorious hater of the religion which his 
fathers had professed, and to Montmorency, the 
governor of the province. The king and cardinal 
set to work to form an efficient blockade of the 
Huguenot stronghold in the west. The three com- 
manders of the army, Angouleme, Schomberg, and 
Bassompierre, undertook to close all access to the town 
by land by the construction of a line of fortifications, 
three leagues in length, which were defended by 
eleven forts and eighteen redoubts. But relief from 
the land side was little to be dreaded, and the most 
serious problem was to close the entrance to the 
harbour. This was the special care of Eichelieu him- 



76 RICHELIEU chap. 

self. Acting on the advice of two French engineers, 
he ordered the construction of two great moles, one 
from each side of the harbour, at a sufficient distance 
from the town to be out of range of cannon-shot. 
The moles were to be built of huge stones, with a 
slope on each side, so as to break the force of the 
waves. In the middle a space was to be left for the 
tide to go in and out, but this was to be partially 
blocked by sunken ships, and to be guarded by the 
French fleet. In January this fleet arrived from 
Morbihan under the command of the duke of Guise, 
and with it came the Spanish vessels which had 
professed to come for the relief of St. Martin. But 
they had scarcely been eight days at anchor when a 
false report of the approach of the English compelled 
the Spaniards to show their true colours, and to 
demand leave to depart. The officers themselves were 
ashamed of the part which they had to play, and 
which they vainly tried to excuse on the ground of 
necessary preparation for a joint attack upon England 
in the summer. 

Eichelieu had other difficulties to contend with 
besides the fury of the winds, the heroic obstinacy of 
the besieged citizens, and the aid which was promised 
to them by England. All whose interests were 
opposed to the strengthening of the monarchy looked 
forward to the fall of La Kochelle with serious mis- 
givings. Bassompierre only expressed the prevalent 
sentiment of his class when he exclaimed, "We shall 
be fools enough to take the city." The most careful 
supervision and the exercise of sovereign authority 
were needed to prevent careless or treasonable neglect 



IV THE VALTELLINE AND LA ROCHELLE 77 

of the siege operations. It was, therefore, a heavy 
blow to him when he learnt that Louis XIIL, weary 
of the monotony of camp life, and dreading the winter 
climate on the salt marshes, announced his determina- 
tion to return to Paris. At first he risked the royal 
displeasure by opposing the king's wishes, and when 
he had to give way, he found it necessary to offer 
an opportunity for the intrigues of his opponents by 
consenting to remain at La Eochelle. Fortunately 
Louis was capable of appreciating his devotion. Not 
only did he entrust Eichelieu during his absence with 
the supreme command by sea and land, but he resisted 
the attempts of his mother to prolong his stay in the 
capital, and in April had once more returned to the 
siege. 

Eichelieu had now the opportunity of displaying 
the military tastes and capacity which he had 
developed" in his younger days. Attired in a garb 
which betrayed the soldier rather than the ecclesiastic, 
he undertook the personal direction of the siege 
works by land and sea. The strictest discipline was 
maintained, and the cardinal triumphantly compared 
his camp to a well-ordered monastery. The men 
were well paid, well fed, and well clothed — a striking 
contrast to the condition of most of the armies of that 
period, — and the amount of sickness was surprisingly 
small. Steady progress was made with the moles, 
though the ravages of the sea more than once made 
it necessary to do much of the work over again ; but 
each time some lesson was learnt and some fault 
of construction was remedied. Eichelieu had good 
reason for energetic action, when he heard that the 



78 RICHELIEU chap. 

queen-mother had joined the ranks of his opponents, 
and that war had broken out in Italy about the 
succession to Mantua and Montferrat. Twice he tried 
to surprise the town during the night, but both 
attempts failed, and he had to trust to the slow but 
certain results of the blockade. The return of the 
king removed some of his worst anxieties, but he 
was still worried by the urgent necessity of relieving 
Oasale, which was besieged by the Spaniards. He 
could, however, do nothing till La Eochelle had fallen. 
In May an English fleet under Lord Denbigh sailed 
to relieve the town, but it was ill-equipped, and the 
sailors were the discontented victims of impressment. 
After viewing the defences of the harbour, and up- 
braiding the deputies from La Eochelle for their false 
information, the English retired without striking a 
blow, but promising that they would return with a 
stronger force. Meanwhile the besieged were reduced 
to the greatest straits. The supplies of food were 
carefully reserved for the fighting men ; the women 
and children, and all who could not bear arms, were 
forced to support a miserable existence on roots, shell- 
fish, and even boiled leather. At last the useless 
mouths were driven out, but the king sternly refused 
to let them pass, and many died of starvation 
between the walls and the royal lines. Nothing but 
the iron resolution of the mayor, Guiton, prevented 
an immediate surrender, when the news came that 
Buckingham, just as he was preparing to start for 
their relief, had fallen a victim to Felton's knife. 
This event delayed the expedition, but it sailed in 
September under the command of the earl of Lindsay. 



IV THE VALTELLINE AND LA ROCHELLE 79 

It was now too late. The two moles had been 
completed, and the gap between them had not only 
been filled with sunken vessels, but was also guarded 
night and day by a number of ships fastened together 
in the shape of a half-moon. The only chance was 
to make a way through by means of fire-ships, which 
had once been so successful at Antwerp. But the 
fire-ships were ill- directed, and were grappled and 
towed to shore by French boats. The English 
attack was a failure. Charles vainly tried to negotiate 
on terms which might have been possible before 
Buckingham's repulse from Ehe, but which were 
preposterous now that the fall of La Eochelle was 
inevitable. The citizens at last realised that their 
cause was hopeless, and on October 28 they agreed 
to capitulate^ on condition that their lives should be 
spared, and liberty of worship allowed to them. 
Richelieu's influence over the king was strong enough 
to prevent the attack upon a rebellious city from 
being converted into a crusade against heresy. Two 
days later the triumphal entry took place. The three 
marshals marched abreast to avoid any disputes as to 
precedence, then came the cardinal alone, and then 
the king. Richelieu appeared on that day as the 
first subject of France. On the city of La Rochelle 
fell the punishment from which the citizens were 
spared. Its walls were destroyed, its municipal 
privileges were cancelled, and no Protestant who had 
not been born there might take up his residence in 
the town. Even the fortresses of St. Louis and St. 
Martin were to be razed to the ground, as there was 
no longer any need for their existence. 



80 RICHELIEU chap, iv 

Thus Eichelieu had lived to achieve the scheme 
which he had dreamed of when he was simple bishop 
of Lu9on. He had humbled the last municipality 
which was capable of resisting the power of the 
monarchy. To him, more than any other man, was 
the victory due, and his wise moderation had prevented 
its being abused in a way that would have produced 
lasting disaffection and disunion in France. The 
capture of La Eochelle was the achievement to which, 
in his later years, he looked back with the greatest 
pride and the most unalloyed satisfaction. 



CHAPTER V 

THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION AND THE DAY OF DUPES 

1628-1631 

The question of the Mantuan succession — Siege of Casale — Louis 
XIII. and Richelieu cross the Alps for its relief — Treaty of 
Susa — Peace with England— Treaty between Spain and Rohan 
— Campaign in Languedoc — Submission of the Huguenots — 
They retain religious toleration but lose their political privileges 
— Discontent of Gaston of Orleans ^ — He goes to Lorraine — 
Enmity of Mary de Medici against Richelieu — Its motives — 
Relations of Richelieu and Louis XIII. — Gaston returns to 
France — Imperialist troops sent to Mantua — Richelieu's second 
expedition to Italy — Attitude of Charles Emmanuel of Savoy — 
The French take Pinerolo — Conquest of Savoy — Fall of Mantua 
. — Siege of Casale — Truce of Rivalta — Relations of France with 
Gustavus Adolphus — The emperor and the Catholic League — 
Diet of Ratisbon — Treaty of Ratisbon — Richelieu refuses to 
confirm it — Illness of Louis XIII. — Relief of Casale — Open 
qua':'rel of Mary de Medici with Richelieu — The Day of Dupes 
— Gaston goes to Orleans — Mary de Medici at Compiegne — 
Gaston goes to Lorraine— The queen-mother escapes to Brussels 
— Settlement of the Mantuan succession by treaties of Cherasco 
— France keeps Pinerolo— Successes of Richelieu. 

La Eochelle had falleD, but Casale was still holding out. 
It was not yet too late for Richelieu to resume that 
policy of opposition to Spain which the quarrel with 
England and the revolt of the Huguenots had compelled 

G 



82 RICHELIEU chap. 

him for a time to abandon. He had allied himself with 
the Ultramontane party, but he was not their slave. To 
their intense disgust he again postponed the annihilation 
of Eohan and the Huguenots in the south, while he 
concentrated his attention upon the maintenance of 
French interests in Italy. The question of the Man- 
tuan succession requires a few words of explanation. 

Yincenzo di Gonzaga, who had succeeded two of his 
brothers as duke of Mantua and marquis of Mont- 
ferrat, died without issue on December 26, 1627. His 
nearest male heir was Charles of Gonzaga, duke of 
JSTevers, a French subject, and governor of the French 
province of Champagne. But though female succession 
was excluded in Mantua, it was lawful in Montferrat, 
and to prevent the separation of his territories, the late 
duke had married his niece, Mary, to Nevers's son, the 
duke of Rethel. In January 1628 the duke of Nevers 
took possession of his inheritance, to which his legal 
claim was unquestionable. But Spain, the dominant 
power in Italy, was determined to prevent the establish- 
ment of French influence within that country. En- 
couraged by the prospect of Spanish support, various 
claimants came forward to oppose the succession of the 
French duke. The duke of Guastalla, also a descendant 
of the Gonzagas, laid claim to Mantua on the ground 
that the Nevers family had forfeited its rights by 
having borne arms against the emperor. The duchess 
of Lorraine, sister of the three last dukes, maintained 
the legality of female succession in Montferrat, and 
Charles Emmanuel of Savoy advanced an old claim of 
his family to the same province. The emperor Ferdi- 
nand II., urged on by Spain, asserted his right as suzerain 



V THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION 83 

to settle these disputes, and in the meanwhile ordered 
the provinces to be handed over to his commissioner, 
John of Nassau. 

The new duke of Mantua, trusting in support from 
France, refused to obey this order, and the Spaniards 
at once undertook to enforce the imperial authority. 
They were most immediately interested in Montferrat, 
which they regarded as a bulwark of the duchy of 
Milan. The alliance of Savoy was easily purchased by 
the promise of considerable territories in Montferrat, 
and Don Gonzales, governor of Milan, led an army to 
the siege of Casale, the chief fortress of the province. 
Nevers, hardly established in Mantua, could not hope 
to resist the combined forces of Spain and Savoy. 
France, occupied in the siege of La Rochelle, could not 
interfere effectually in Italy, and a small force which 
was sent under the marquis of Uxelles was repulsed at 
the entrance into Piedmont. Fortunately a small body 
of French volunteers had thrown themselves into the 
citadel of Casale, where the, defective skill and vigilance 
of the besiegers enabled them to maintain themselves 
until the fall of La Rochelle set Richelieu and the royal 
army at liberty. 

Although the season was extremely ill-suited for 
such an enterprise, Richelieu determined to cross the 
Alps for the relief of Casale, and if possible to take the 
king with him. Mary de Medici, who cherished an old 
grudge against Nevers, and disapproved of the expedition 
altogether, did all in her power to induce her son to 
stay in Paris. But Louis XIII. had tasted the sweets 
of martial glory before La Rochelle, and the success of 
his arms had inspired him with enthusiastic confidence 



84 RICHELIEU chap. 

in the cardinal. On January 15, 1629, they quitted 
Paris together, and after travelling through Champagne 
they reached Grenoble on February 14. No other 
minister accompanied them, Schomberg having fallen ill 
at Troyes, and the whole burden of making preparations 
for the campaign fell upon Eichelieu. The adminis- 
trative system in the provinces was extremely corrupt 
and inefficient, and only the most authoritative super- 
vision could secure that orders should be punctually 
carried out. But the cardinal's energy vanquished all 
obstacles, and on February 22 the king set out from 
Grenoble for the pass of Mont Genevre. Charles 
Emmanuel sent his eldest son, who had married 
Louis's sister, to negotiate, but Richelieu discovered 
that the negotiations were merely intended to procure 
delay while the intrenchments on the Italian side of the 
pass were being strengthened. The order to advance 
was given, and the French attack carried all before it. 
The intrenchments were forced, and on March 3 the 
king entered Susa in triumph. This vigorous action 
brought the duke of Savoy to reason, and the prince of 
Piedmont was again sent to arrange terms with Richelieu. 
The treaty of Susa was signed on March 11, The 
duke promised to give the French passage through his 
territories, and to furnish supplies for the relief of Casale. 
As security for the fulfilment of his promise Susa was 
to be left in French occupation. He also undertook for 
Don Gonzales that the Spaniards would retire from 
Casale and Montferrat, that they would abstain from 
any further acts of hostility against the duke of 
Mantua, and that the confirmation of these terms by 
Philip TV, should be obtained within six weeks. Louis, 



V THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION 85 

on the other hand, promised to procure for the duke the 
town of Trino and other lands in Montferrat to the 
value of 15,000 crowns, as the price of the renunciation 
of his claims. At the same time Richelieu drew up a 
projected league for mutual defence between France, the 
pope, Venice, Mantua, and Savoy. Charles Emmanuel 
undertook to adhere to this league when it had been 
joined by the other states. 

The prompt action of the French had thus secured 
for them a second military triumph within six months. 
The Spaniards could not hope to resist the royal army, 
and Don Gonzales was compelled to accept the terms 
which Charles Emmanuel had arranged for him. Casale 
was relieved, and there was yet plenty of time left to 
reduce the Huguenots. Louis XIII. set out from Susa 
in April to commence this task. Eichelieu remained 
behind to watch the duke of Savoy, who was too veteran 
an intriguer to be trusted to fulfil his engagements of 
his own accord, but on May 19 the cardinal was able to 
join the king before Privas, the Protestant stronghold 
of the Yivarais. He had already dealt a crushing blow 
to the Huguenots by concluding a treaty with England. 
Charles I. abandoned the cause of the rebels, who had 
been led to rely upon English assistance, and Louis 
withdrew his demand for the restoration of Henrietta's 
household. Rohan, who had foreseen the defection of 
England, had sought compensation in an alliance with 
Spain, and the Most Catholic king had not hesitated 
to sign a treaty with the leader of Protestantism in 
France. If any had been needed, this treaty would 
have supplied ample justification to Richelieu for his 
determination to crush the Huguenots. It provided 



86 KICHELIEU chap. 

that if they succeeded in forming an independent state, 
they would grant toleration to Roman Catholic worship. 
The possibility of such an ideal being entertained was 
enough to convince Richelieu that he must strike boldly 
and decisively if he wished to effect that unity of France 
which was the ultimate object of all his exertions. 

Before Spanish assistance could arrive the blow had 
been struck. Privas was taken soon after Richelieu's 
arrival, and sacked with all the horrors of war. This 
severity, which the cardinal in his Memoirs maintains 
to have been unintentional, was as effective as if it had 
been deliberately planned. The Vivarais submitted, 
and the king entered the Oevennes, offering amnesty 
and toleration to all who submitted, and to those who 
resisted the fate of Privas. The alternative was 
irresistible, and one town after another opened its 
gates. The rebellion had collapsed, and the Huguenot 
deputies hastened to accept the terms which were 
offered to them, not as a treaty between equals, but 
as an act of grace from a sovereign to his subjects. 
The Edict of Nantes was confirmed, but the political 
privileges which had been granted at the same time by 
supplemental edicts were cancelled. The Huguenot 
fortifications were to be razed to the ground, and there were 
to be no more "towns of surety." Freedom of worship 
and of individual belief was granted, but it was granted 
as a royal favour which could at any time be revoked. 
Henry IV. had not been strong enough to enforce 
toleration hj the royal authority, and had been forced 
to place weapons of self-defence in the hands of the 
Huguenots. Thanks to Richelieu, the monarch}^ could 
now afford to dispense with such precautions, and could 



V THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION 87 

thus revoke privileges which its own weakness had 
rendered necessary, and which had been used against 
itself. The danger of the formation of " a state within 
the state " was at an end. The only misfortune was 
that Richelieu could not ensure that the monarchy 
should always be tolerant. 

After a triumphal entry into Nimes, Louis XIII. set 
out for Paris on July 25. E-ichelieu remained behind 
to obtain the submission of Montauban, only second to 
La Eochelle as a Huguenot fortress, to supervise the 
destruction of the fortifications, and to put an end to 
the administrative independence of Languedoc. It was 
not till September 14 that he was able to rejoin the 
king at Fontainebleau. He soon found that he had to 
confront difficulties at court quite as serious as those 
which he had coped with abroad. Gaston of Orleans 
had never been well disposed to Richelieu, whom he 
accused of a deliberate scheme to exclude him from all 
voice in public affairs. He was still the puppet of a 
small group of interested associates, who wished to use 
him as a catspaw for their own advancement. His first 
wife had died in childbirth, and he was anxious to 
marry Mary of Gonzaga, the daughter of the duke of 
Mantua. This was opposed both by his brother and 
mother ; and Mary de Medici, during the king's absence 
in Italy, went so far as to imprison the princess Mary 
at Vincennes. Gaston then demanded an increase of 
his appanage, and the government of some important 
provinces, such as Champagne and Burgundy. Louis 
was so jealous of his younger brother that Richelieu's 
advice was not needed to convince him of the danger 
of handing over frontier provinces to a discontented 



88 RICHELIEU chap. 

heir-apparent. Gaston, however, attributed the refusal 
to the influence of the cardinal, and loudly demanded 
his dismissal. When Louis returned from Languedoc, 
Gaston refused to meet him at court, and retired to 
Champagne. There he professed to believe that he was 
in personal danger, and proceeded to Lorraine, where 
Charles IV., always willing to harass the French govern- 
ment, received him with open arms. 

Still more formidable to Eichelieu was the open 
hostility displayed to him on his arrival by Mary de 
Medici. For the last three years the relations of the 
queen-mother and her former servant had been growing 
more and more strained, and the chief causes of her ill- 
will are not difficult to trace. Throughout her life 
Mary de Medici was guided rather by passion than by 
policy. She cherished strong likes and dislikes, but 
they were directed against persons, not against principles. 
She had learnt to regard Eichelieu as a creature of her 
own, who owed his advancement to her patronage, and 
she was chagrined to find him acting in complete 
independence of her wishes. She intended to keep 
her elder son entirely under her own control, and she 
discovered, to her dismay, that the cardinal's influence 
over Louis was stronger than her own. The guiding 
thread to the tortuous labyrinth of her caprices is to be 
found in a steady attachment to dynastic interests, and 
especially to those of her three daughters. 

This brought her into direct collision with the 
cardinal's policy, which was dictated solely by a regard 
to the interests of France. Her eldest daughter was 
the queen of Spain, and Eichelieu was the arch opponent 
of that power. Another daughter was married into the 



V THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION 89 

house of Savoy, and Mary de Medici would gladly have 
supported its claims to Montferrat. But Eichelieu had 
actually carried Louis off to Piedmont, had humiliated 
the duke of Savoy, and had forced him to resign his 
claims in favour of the duke of Nevers, whom she 
hated, both for his past career, and because he wished 
to become the father-in-law of her younger son. The 
third daughter was the wife of Charles I., and her 
interests — so her mother thought — had been completely 
sacrificed in the last treaty with England. After the 
interests of her family, Mary de Medici was most 
solicitous for the interests of religion, and these were 
specially urged upon her at this time by her most 
intimate advisers. Cardinal Berulle and Michel Marillac. 
They wished for a general alliance of Catholic against 
Protestant states, for the maintenance of a good under- 
standing with Spain, and for the persecution of the 
Huguenots at home. But their aims were not those 
of Eichelieu. If political reasons rendered it advisable, 
he was as willing to ally himself with Holland or 
Sweden as with Bavaria or Austria. He had ample 
experience of the hollowness of Spanish promises, and 
of the resolution of the court of Madrid to do all in its 
power to weaken France by stimulating internal discord 
and encouraging foreign enemies. He may also have 
been actuated by a sentiment of personal rivalry against 
the Spanish minister, Olivares, who certainly entertained 
that feeling towards Eichelieu. Finally, he had reduced 
La Eochelle and Languedoc, but Berulle, a bigoted 
mystic, could not pardon him for having left the heretics 
in enjoyment of religious toleration. 

Against the hostility of the queen-mother, based 



90 RICHELIEU chap. 

upon personal, dynastic, and religious motives, Eichelieu 
was not without supporters. Mary de Medici, as in the 
days of her regency, had connected herself with the 
Guise party at court. Her favourite confident was the 
princess of Oonti, a sister of the duke of Guise. She 
made up her former quarrel with her daughter-in-law, 
Anne of Austria, also a vigorous hater of Richelieu, and 
opened a connection with the queen's exiled favourite, 
Madame de Chevreuse, whose husband was a Guise. 
The duke of Guise himself had a personal quarrel with 
Richelieu because -he claimed the command in the 
Mediterranean as pertaining to his governorship of 
Provence, whereas the cardinal held that his office gave 
him control over all maritime affairs in every sea. But 
the old antagonism between the Guises and the princes of 
the blood — a dominant factor in the history of the later 
part of the sixteenth century — still subsisted, and the 
cardinal could oppose to the queen's partisans the support 
of Oond6, who had become his enthusiastic admirer since 
the siege of La Rochelle, and of the count of Soissons, 
who had now returned to France, and had made up 
his quarrel with the government. His only real 
security, however, lay in the hold which he had acquired 
over Louis XIII. Richelieu was no favourite, in the 
proper sense of the word. He did not rise to power, 
like Buckingham, by personal favour, nor did he retain 
it by flattering his master and humouring his foibles. 
But he was a favourite in the sense that every minister 
of a despotic sovereign must be a favourite. He could 
not hold his office if he forfeited the king's confidence 
or incurred his serious displeasure. Circumstances had 
brought him into Louis XIII.'s service, and he had so 



V THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION 91 

employed them as to make himself indispensable. 
Much has been written, in contemporary memoirs and 
in later histories, of the ascendency acquired by Richelieu 
over the king, and of the jealous hatred which Louis 
entertained against the minister, whose superiority he 
resented, but whom he dared not thwart or dismiss. 
Much of this can be proved by documentary evidence 
to be an exaggeration of the cardinal's enemies. Louis 
XIII. was rather timid than weak, and his moral 
cowardice made him eager to say what would please 
the person he was talking to. He was also slow and 
hesitating in his speech, and he was often unable to 
find words to answer the violent expostulations of his 
mother, or the voluble entreaties of his wife. His 
silence was easily interpreted to imply what he had no 
intention of expressing, for under his apparent weak- 
ness was concealed considerable obstinacy of opinion 
and purpose. He really shared his minister's devotion 
to the aggrandisement of France in Europe and the 
increased authority of the monarchy. Probably they 
often differed as to the means which were to be 
employed, and the cardinal's superior abilities doubtless 
enabled him as a rule to convince and persuade the 
king ; but there were several occasions when Richelieu 
found it advisable to give way, and any temporary 
resentment which Louis may have entertained was 
more than removed by the success which attended their 
joint exertions. It is impossible to prove that Louis 
loved his minister, but he respected him, and he loved 
nobody. 

The coldness with which the queen-mother received 
Richelieu at Fontainebleau was too obvious to escape 



92 RICHELIEU chap. 

the notice of a curious court. Eichelieu met the 
hostility of his former patroness by offering his resigna- 
tion — a favourite weapon in the hands of a minister 
conscious of his fidelity and of the merit of his services. 
Louis, who "wept bitterly for nearly a whole day" on 
account of his mother's importunities, refused to accept 
the resignation, and issued letters - patent conferring 
upon the cardinal the formal dignity of "principal 
minister of state." Mary de Medici was compelled to 
swallow her indignation, and she was the more willing 
to postpone her desire for vengeance as the death of 
Berulle — whom Richelieu was absurdly accused of 
poisoning — deprived her of one of her most trusted 
advisers. Eichelieu now set himself to arrange terms 
with Gaston of Orleans, whose residence at a foreign 
court was a glaring proof of French dissensions, 
and an encouragement to the enemies of France. 
Months were wasted in the attempt to satisfy the 
jealous prince and his ambitious councillors, and it 
was not till January 1630 that the offer of an increased 
appanage induced Gaston to return to France, though he 
still refused to see his brother or to appear at court. 

Meanwhile Eichelieu discovered that he ran the risk 
of losing all that he had achieved by his march to 
Piedmont. The emperor, elated by his victories over 
the German Calvinists and their Danish champion, was 
furious at the attempt of France to settle the succession 
to imperial fiefs without any regard to his authority. 
He looked on the treaty of Susa as an insult, and with- 
drew a considerable number of his troops from the 
north to vindicate his suzerainty in Italy. In the 
spring of 1629 the imperial army entered the Grison 



V THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION 93 

territory and proceeded to occupy the Valtelline and 
other passes. After some time had been spent in 
negotiations, the imperial general, Colalto, descended 
into the Lombard plain. Philip lY. and Olivares were 
eager to seize the opportunity for resuming the schemes 
which they had been forced for the moment to abandon. 
The unconquered Spinola was sent to supersede Don 
Gonzales in the government of Milan. While the 
Imperialists advanced upon Mantua, where the duke 
himself was shut up, Spinola led the Spanish troops 
into Montferrat and again threatened Casale, which was 
now defended by a French garrison under Toiras, the 
hero of St. Martin. 

France could not allow Spain and the empire to 
triumph in Italy, and the despatch of a new army was 
an obvious necessity. But who was to lead it? The 
expedition involved diplomatic as well as military 
difficulties, and their solution could not safely be 
trusted to a subordinate. Eichelieu, of course, was 
anxious not to leave Louis XIII. to resist unaided the 
influence and intrigues of Mary de Medici and her 
partisans. On the other hand, he could hardly venture 
once more to expose the still childless king to the 
hardships and dangers of a winter campaign. Moreover 
the treaty with Gaston was not yet finally settled, and 
there was danger of an attack from Germany on the 
side of Champagne. In the interests of France 
Eichelieu was compelled to risk his personal security. 
On December 29, 1629, he set out from Paris with 
powers such as have rarely been granted to a subject. 
He was appointed "lieutenant-general, representing the 
person of the king with his army both within and 



94 RICHELIEU chap. 

without the kingdom." He had authority to receive 
and send envoys, and to conclude or reject treaties. 
Under him served Marshals Cr6qm, Schomberg, and 
la Force. 

The passage of the Alps was effected without opposi- 
tion, though not without considerable loss, and in the 
first week of March the French army reached Susa. 
Richelieu had made up his mind not only to fight the 
battles of the duke of Mantua, but also to secure some 
fortress at the foot of the Alps that would enable 
France at any time to interfere decisively in Italy. 
He had no intention of falling into the error of Louis 
XH. and Francis I., and of attempting to make France 
the mistress of Italian provinces, but he meant to strike 
a blow at Spanish domination, and to gain the confi- 
dence of those Italian states which still retained a 
shadow of independence. The great difficulty in his 
way was the attitude of Savoy. If Charles Emmanuel 
had been willing to fulfil the treaty of Susa, it would 
have been impossible to pick a quarrel with him, and it 
was only at his expense that the desired fortress could 
be acquired. But the wily duke played into the 
cardinal's hands. His one idea was to involve France 
and Spain in open hostilities with each other, and to 
make his own profit by selling his support to the 
highest bidder. He offered to aid the French, if they 
would join him in attacking Milan and Genoa, and 
would promise not to lay down arms till both had been 
conquered. This Eichelieu refused, as he did not wish 
for an open rupture with Spain, and desired that 
France should continue to play the part of an 
auxiliary and not of a principal in the war. Then the 



V THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION 95 

duke offered to remain neutral, and to supply provisions 
for the French. This Richelieu at first accepted, in 
order that Casale might obtain ample supplies to resist 
a blockade. But he soon discovered that Charles 
Emmanuel was also negotiating with Spinola and 
Colalto, and that he was strengthening the intrenched 
camp which he had formed at Avigliana, between Susa 
and Turin, as a barrier against the French advance. 
Eichelieu now decided to abandon negotiations, and to 
turn his arms against his treacherous ally, as it 
would be madness to advance upon Casale with a hostile 
Piedmont in his rear. On March 19 the French 
army advanced against Eivoli, where Charles Emmanuel 
had his headquarters. An eye-witness has described 
the cardinal's appearance as he crossed the little river 
Dora at the head of the troops. " He wore a blue 
cuirass over a brown coat embroidered with gold. He 
had a feather round his hat, and two pages marched 
before him on horseback, one carrying his gauntlets, 
the other his helmet. Two other pages marched on 
either side of him, and each held by the bridle a 
valuable charger; behind rode the captain of his 
guards. In this guise he crossed the river on horseback, 
with his sword at his side and two pistols at his 
saddle-bow. When he had reached the other side he 
made his horse caracole a hundred times in presence of 
the army, boasting aloud that he knew something of this 
exercise." In spite of all this martial pomp, the assault 
on Rivoli failed to effect the desired capture of the 
duke and his son, who escaped to Turin. But instead 
of advancing upon the capital of Piedmont, the French 
suddenly returned towards the Alps and invested 



96 RICHELIEU chap. 

Pinerolo, a fortress commanding the exit of the chief 
pass from Dauphine. Pinerolo, which had been held by 
France for a considerable period in the previous century, 
was compelled to surrender on March 30, before the 
duke of Savoy had time to relieve it. 

The capture of Pinerolo was a terrible blow, not only 
to the duke of Savoy, but also to the Spaniards and 
Imperialists, whose chief dread was that the French 
might obtain a permanent footing in Italy. They at 
once offered to negotiate, and Urban VIIL undertook 
the office of mediator. It was on this occasion that 
Griulio Mazarin, who was employed as a papal agent, 
first attracted the notice of Eichelieu, whose service he 
afterwards entered, and whom he eventually succeeded 
as first minister in France. The negotiations came to 
nothing, because the one essential condition of peace was 
the cession of Pinerolo, and Eichelieu had no intention 
of resigning his conquest except in the last necessity. 
But so far he had done nothing for the duke of 
Mantua, and Spinola and Colalto were already preparing 
to resume the sieges of Casale and Mantua, which had 
been abandoned during the winter. The cardinal con- 
ceived the bold plan of saving these fortresses by an 
invasion of Savoy. If the Spaniards and Imperialists 
advanced to the aid of their ally, they would have to 
postpone their enterprises in Montferrat and Mantua. 
If they did not, the duke of Savoy would be compelled 
to come to terms, and this would render possible the 
despatch of an army to relieve Casale. If the worst 
came to the worst, and both Mantua and Casale fell, 
France would have something substantial in hand to 
offer in return for their restitution. 



r THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION 97 

On May 2 Richelieu left the army at Pinerolo 
under Schomberg and la Force, and hurried to Grenoble 
to meet Louis XIII., who had undertaken to conduct 
the invasion of Savoy. The king had started in the 
company of his mother and his wife, both of whom dis- 
approved of the expedition, but he had left the tv\^o 
queens at Lyons. From G-renoble the king and cardinal 
advanced into Savoy, and their operations were con- 
ducted with the good-fortune which had always attended 
their joint presence. Chambery surrendered after a 
siege of one day, and in June the whole duchy had 
been reduced, with the exception of the single fortress 
of Montmelian. The natural sequel to this success was 
an advance to the relief of Casale, which was now 
closely besieged by Spinola. But the outbreak of 
pestilence in Piedmont made it impossible for Louis 
XIII. to enter Italy, and Richelieu's position was now 
so directly threatened by the queen-mother and her 
adherents that he dared not risk another period of 
absence from the king. The bulk of the royal army 
was despatched on July 6 under Montmorency and 
d'Effiat across Mont Cenis, and they succeeded, after a 
sharp contest with the troops of Charles Emmanuel at 
Avigliana, in effecting a junction with the army which 
had been left at Pinerolo. The marquisate of Saluzzo 
was now conquered by the French, but their success 
was more than counterbalanced by the news that 
Mantua, which the Venetians had undertaken to relieve, 
had been stormed on July 17, and that the Imperialist 
forces were free to advance to the aid of Spinola. 
Charles Emmanuel, whose intrigues had resulted in the 
loss of the greater part of his dominions, died on July 

H 



98 RICHELIEU chap. 

26, but his successor, Victor Amadeus, though less 
committed to an anti-French policy, could not free him- 
self at once from the obligations which his father 
bequeathed to him. France, therefore, gained nothing 
directly from the change of rulers. Meanwhile Casale 
was being hardly pressed, and Toiras announced that 
he could not hold out much longer without assistance. 
If Eichelieu could have come to Italy in person, the 
threatened fortress might have been relieved, but the 
cardinal was more than ever absorbed by the king's ill- 
health and the machinations of his enemies. In his 
absence, the French marshals were afraid to run the 
risk of a bold and decisive march, and their troops were 
harassed by sickness and bad weather. Under these 
circumstances Mazarin was at last able to arrange a 
truce at Eivalta on September 4. Hostilities were to 
be suspended on all sides until October 1 5 ; the town 
and castle of Casale were to be handed over to the 
besieging army, who were to supply provisions for the 
interval to the garrison of the citadel. After Octo- 
ber 15, if peace had not been concluded, the French 
army might resume its advance, but Toiras pledged 
himself to surrender if relief did not reach him before 
October 30. Spinola, who was lying on his deathbed, 
refused to abandon his prey by signing the truce, but it 
was accepted by the duke of Savoy and Colalto, and 
the death of the veteran general three days later re- 
moved all difficulties, as his successor pledged himself 
to observe the stipulations. 

It was fortunate for France, in its quarrel with the 
emperor and with Spain, that Richelieu had not relied 
solely upon the achievements of the French arms in 



V THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION 99 

Italy. His gaze embraced the whole field of European 
politics, and he knew how to make the most various 
and distant circumstances subserve his immediate aims. 
It was the retirement of Christian IV. of Denmark 
from the German war which had enabled the emperor 
to send an army against Mantua. But Eichelieu had 
already made preparations to bring another prince on 
the stage to take the place vacated by the Danish king. 
Gustavus Adolphus, the young and energetic king of 
Sweden, had many motives for hostility to the emperor, 
and he was eager to defend the cause of Protestantism 
and to extend the power of Sweden on the Baltic coasts. 
He had already thwarted Wallenstein's attempt to take 
Stralsund, and nothing but his dynastic quarrel with 
the Polish king prevented him from throwing himself 
into Germany. Here was Richelieu's opportunity. 
Early in 1629 a French envoy, Charnace, had been 
despatched to the northern courts. He succeeded in 
negotiating a ten years' truce between Poland and 
Sweden, and he drew up a projected treaty of alliance 
between Sweden and France. Thus Gustavus Adolphus 
was able to enter Germany in the next year without 
leaving his own territories exposed to invasion, and 
with the additional advantage that a large contingent 
of the emperor's troops was engaged in Italy. 

Still more skilful were the combinations of Richelieu's 
policy in Germany. The victories of Wallenstein had 
raised the power of the empire to a height which had 
not been reached for more than three centuries ; but at 
the same time they had weakened the alliance between 
the emperor and the Catholic League. Maximilian of 
Bavaria and his associates had fought to humiliate the 



100 RICHELIEU chap. 

Protestants ; but they had no intention of sacrificing 
their princely independence to the domination of Ferdi- 
nand II. and his haughty general. They demanded the 
dismissal of Wallenstein and the disbandment of his 
army. It was in vain that Ferdinand tried to con- 
ciliate them by issuing in 1629 an edict ordering the 
restitution of all ecclesiastical possessions which had 
been occupied by Protestants since the great religious 
peace of Augsburg. The only result was to alienate 
the Lutheran princes, who had been the most loyal ad- 
herents of the empire, and who were forced against 
their will to form an alliance with Sweden. The 
Catholics continued to persist in their demands, and 
their opposition, carefully stimulated by Eichelieu, 
brought matters to a crisis at the diet of Eatisbon, 
which Ferdinand summoned in June 1630, to procure 
the election of his son as king of the Komans. Eichelieu 
sent Leon de Brulart as French ambassador to the diet, 
and with him went the cardinal's alter ego, the famous 
Father Joseph. Their intrigues were crowned with 
complete success. At the moment when G-ustavus 
Adolphus landed on the coast of Pomerania, Ferdinand 
was compelled to dismiss Wallenstein and to hand over 
his army to Tilly, the general of the Catholic League. 
Even at this price he was unable to obtain his son's 
election, which Eichelieu had instructed his envoys to 
oppose. 

The emperor, deprived of his German army and his 
greatest general, was no longer able to continue the 
war in Italy. The Catholic princes had always been 
opposed to the war, and they were eager to bring about 
peace with France, which they had learnt to regard as 



V THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION 101 

their ally. On October 13 Father Joseph and his col- 
league signed the treaty of Ratisbon, which was to 
settle the question of the Mantuan succession. The 
dukes of Savoy and Guastalla were to receive compen- 
sation for the resignation of their claims ; the emperor 
was to give formal investiture to the duke of Mantua 
within six weeks, and a fortnight after the investiture 
had been granted the Imperialists were to quit Mantua, 
the Spaniards Montferrat, and the French their con- 
quests in Savoy and Piedmont. After all this had 
been done the emperor was to withdraw his forces from 
the Grison passes and to destroy the newly-erected 
fortifications. France pledged herself to give no assist- 
ance, direct or indirect, to the enemies of the emperor. 
Copies of the treaty were at once despatched to the 
court at Lyons and to the French camp in Italy. 

It is extremely improbable that Father Joseph acted 
in this matter in opposition to Richelieu's instructions, 
and it is certain that he never forfeited the cardinal's 
favour or confidence. But Richelieu clamoured that 
the envoys had exceeded their powers, and that the 
treaty was so disadvantageous to France that it could 
not possibly be confirmed. The solution of the problem 
seems to be that Father Joseph was playing a pre- 
concerted part at Ratisbon. At all costs he was to 
conciliate the Catholic electors to France and to prevent 
the election of a king of the Romans. These ends he 
could only obtain by signing the treaty. But Richelieu 
had so worded the instructions of his representatives 
as to reserve to" himself the power of rejecting the 
terms which they had found it advisable to accept. 
And it is possible that events at home made the ^^rompt 



102 RICHELIEU chap. 

conclusion of peace at this moment peculiarly unaccept- 
able to him. The health of Louis XIII. had suffered 
from the hot weather in Savoy. The solicitations of 
his mother induced him to return to Lyons, and there 
he was seized with an attack of dysentery, which was 
aggravated by the exhausting treatment then in vogue. 
As his doctor bled him seven times in a week, and 
administered an innumerable variety of drugs, it is no 
wonder that his life was despaired of. The crisis to 
which Richelieu must often have looked forward seemed 
to have arrived on September 20, when the king 
received extreme unction and took a formal farewell of 
the world. Gaston of Orleans prepared to succeed to 
his brother's crown, if not, as some say, to his brother's 
wife. The enemies of the cardinal discussed who 
should take his place, and whether it was better to 
remove him by imprisonment or by death. Their 
schemes were suddenly disconcerted by the king's 
recovery • but in the exhaustion of convalescence he 
gave way to the incessant pressure of his wife and his 
mother, and held out hopes that he would dismiss the 
cardinal as soon as peace was concluded. The king's 
promise was not very definite ; but the mere suspicion 
of such an intention was enough to make Richelieu 
insist upon the defects of the treaty of Ratisbon. 

Meanwhile the news of this treaty reached the French 
camp just as the army was advancing to effect the relief 
of Casale before October 30. Montmorency had been 
recalled to France, and his place was taken by Louis 
Marillac, brother of the keeper of the seals, who had 
previously commanded the army of Champagne. He 
wished to accept the terms, but his colleagues, Schomberg 



V THE DAY OF DUPES 103 

and d'Effiat, insisted that they were too favourable to 
the enemy. By the truce of Eivalta the Spaniards were 
to quit Casale as soon as the citadel had been relieved, 
whereas by the treaty they would be allowed to remain 
there for two months. The march was resumed, and on 
October 27 the two armies were on the point of an 
engagement, when Mazarin appeared between them 
at the imminent risk of being shot for his pains, and 
announced that peace had been arranged. The Spaniards 
agreed to quit Montferrat at once, on condition that 
Casale was handed over to the duke of Maine, the son 
of the duke of Mantua, who was to pledge himself to 
maintain only a native garrison in the citadel. The 
French had so far triumphed that Casale had never been 
taken, and that they retained their conquests in Savoy 
and Piedmont as security for the evacuation by the 
Imperialists of Mantua and the Yaltelline. 

The news of the relief of Casale reached the French 
court as it was returning from Lyons to Paris after the 
king's recovery, and Mary de Medici had a bonfire 
kindled to celebrate the event. She believed that the 
Italian difficulty was at an end, and that Louis would 
now dismiss the hated minister, whom he no longer 
needed. To her astonishment the king opposed an 
obstinate resistance to her entreaties, refused to recog- 
nise any engagements made during his illness, and 
desired his mother to abandon her ill-founded enmity 
against the cardinal. At last Mary's passion got the 
better of the crafty dissimulation which was the tradition 
of her family. On November 10 she picked a violent 
quarrel, in the king's presence, with Madame de Com- 
balet, the cardinal's favourite niece. After upbraiding 



104 RICHELIEU chap. 

her in language that would have disgraced a fishwife, 
she bade her leave her service and presence for ever. 
The king himself escorted the young woman, weeping 
and scared by such an unexpected scene, to the door, 
which was soon afterwards entered by the uncle. Mary 
de Medici turned her fury upon him with the same 
vehemence of language and gesticulation. Eichelieu 
made no attempt to defend himself, but listened in 
respectful silence, and quitted the room. Then the 
queen turned to her son : she accused the cardinal of 
designing to marry his niece to the count of Soissons, 
to depose Louis, and to place the count on the throne. 

Forgetting that she supplied evidence of a precon- 
certed conspiracy, she divulged her schemes for the 
conduct of the government after Richelieu's fall. Michel 
Marillac was to become chief minister, and his brother 
was to assume the supreme command of the army. The 
king made no attempt to interrupt or reply to this 
violent monologue. He retired to his chamber and 
threw himself in a rage upon his bed. He was unwilling 
to quarrel irretrievably with his mother, but he had no 
intention of parting with his minister. The very com- 
plaints which he had listened to only furnished a strik- 
ing proof of Richelieu's fidelity. The basis of the 
queen-mother's resentment was that the cardinal was 
more devoted to the king than to herself. Louis's 
chamberlain and favourite, St. Simon, father of the 
famous memoir -writer, strengthened his resolution by 
urging that he had duties not only as a son, but also 
as a king, and that the cardinal was necessary to France. 
To escape any further maternal intimidation, the king 
determined to depart for Versailles. 



V THE DAY OF DUPES 105 

Meanwhile Mary de Medici had convinced herself 
that her son's silence implied acquiescence. The news 
of her victory was circulated through Paris, and couriers 
were sent to announce the cardinal's downfall to foreign 
courts. The French courtiers crowded to the queen- 
mother's magnificent palace, the Luxemburg, to offer 
their congratulations. The rumour spread that Eichelieu 
was collecting his papers and valuables, and was prepar- 
ing to depart from Paris, if not from France. And it 
is true that the cardinal was profoundly discouraged. 
He knew how a violent woman may influence, in spite 
of himself, a man who dislikes to have troubles and dis- 
pleasure around him. He may well have feared that 
Mary de Medici's estimate of her success was no ex- 
aggeration. "While he thus desponded and hesitated as 
to his future course, a messenger arrived to bid him 
join the king at Versailles. Louis had never really 
doubted as to his ultimate decision ; he was conscious 
that his reign owed its success and its reputation to the 
cardinal ; and if he had to choose between his mother 
and his minister, his mind was already made up. He 
only waited till he was safe from interference to an- 
nounce his determination. On the next day Michel 
Marillac was called upon to surrender the great seals, 
and a courier was despatched to Schomberg ordering him 
to arrest Marshal Marillac and to send him a prisoner 
to France. November 11, 1630, has come down to 
history as the " day of dupes." 

Eichelieu's position was all the stronger for the 
failure of the attack upon him. Mary de Medici was 
compelled to acknowledge her defeat, and in December 
she controlled her rage so far as to be formally recon- 



106 RICHELIEU chap. 

ciled with the cardinal, and to resume her seat in the 
council. But she had no intention of abandoning her 
desire for vengeance on the man who had thwarted and 
humiliated her. As open violence had failed, she deter- 
mined to try once more the paths of intrigue. Her 
elder son had escaped from her influence, but she still 
had some control over his younger brother. Glaston's 
importance as heir -apparent to the throne was far 
greater than his own abilities would have given him, 
and he was readily induced to fall in with his mother's 
wishes. In January 1631 he appeared in the cardinal's 
chamber and openly renounced his friendship ; directly 
afterwards he set out for Orleans. It was the intention 
of the queen-mother to rally round her second son all 
the elements of opposition to the monarchy, and, if 
necessary, to trust to the chances of a civil war. 
Richelieu fully appreciated her designs. To allow her 
to remain in impunity at court would only strengthen 
and encourage her faction, and the king was easily per- 
suaded to separate himself from an influence which he 
now dreaded and disliked. The court journeyed to 
Compiegne, and the queen-mother followed to watch 
her son. Early in the morning of February 23 the 
king and the cardinal hurried back to Paris. Anne of 
Austria was ordered to follow her husband, but was 
allowed to take a tender farewell of her mother-in-law, 
with whom she had been closely united of late years by 
common antipathy to Eichelieu. They never met again. 
Mary de Medici received written instructions to retire 
for a time to Moulins, as circumstances made her 
presence at court undesirable. The princess of Conti 
and other ladies of her household were exiled to their 



V THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION 107 

estates, and Marshal Bassompierre, an ally of the 
Marillacs, was committed to a prison from which he 
never emerged while Richelieu lived. 

The cardinal now tried to conciliate Gaston, but the 
prince was persuaded by his followers to reject all offers, 
and in March he retired for a second time to Lorraine. 
Meanwhile Mary de Medici obstinately refused to leave 
Compiegne, and endeavoured to excite sympathy by re- 
presenting that she was harshly imprisoned by the man 
whom she had raised to greatness. Her residence so 
near to Paris was a constant source of annoyance to the 
king and minister, but they did not venture to risk un- 
popularity by removing her by force. Their end was 
at last effected by relaxing the careful watch hitherto 
maintained over her movements. Weary of inaction, 
the queen escaped from France in July, and made her 
way to Brussels. She was destined never to revisit the 
country in which her marriage had enabled her to play 
so prominent a part. 

These exciting events had distracted public attention 
from the Mantuan question, which had so long absorbed 
it. Hostilities had been terminated by the truce con- 
cluded by Mazarin before Casale, but as Eichelieu had 
steadily refused to confirm the treaty of Eatisbon, no 
permanent settlement had been agreed to. Early in 
1631 the French envoys, Toiras and Servien, proceeded 
to Cherasco in Piedmont to meet the plenipotentiaries of 
the emperor, and the representatives of Spain, Savoy, 
and Mantua. The chief difficulties arose about the com- 
pensation to be given to the duke of Savoy for the 
resignation of his claims, and about the dates at which 
the various powers were to abandon their conquests. 



108 RICHELIEU chap. 

At length everything was settled by two treaties, in 
April and June, and in July the duke of Nevers received 
the imperial investiture of Mantua and Montferrat, To 
the surprise of contemporaries, it was the duke of Man- 
tua who had most reason to be dissatisfied with the 
treaties of Cherasco. His champion, France, compelled 
him to sell the greater part of Montferrat to the duke 
of Savoy. The explanation was not long a secret. 
Eichelieu publicly agreed to restore Pinerolo in order 
to satisfy European opinion and to obtain peace. But 
he was determined to keep the fortress if any opportunity 
offered. Victor Amadeus, instructed by the failure of 
his father's policy, was inclined to the French alliance 
which his marriages rendered natural. The offer of 
larger territories in Montferrat induced him to consent 
that the French should have Pinerolo, and a secret treaty 
to that effect was signed on March 31. The only diffi- 
culty that remained was to obtain some plausible pre- 
text for breaking the treaty of Cherasco, which stipulated 
for the restoration of all French conquests. Eichelieu 
was not at a loss for an expedient. He complained that 
Spain kept so large a garrison in Milan as to excite the 
fear of a new attack on Mantua, and he called upon 
Savoy to give surety against any new league with the 
Spaniards. Victor Amadeus, after feigning an appeal 
for aid to Milan, agreed that Pinerolo should be handed 
over as a pledge, nominally to the Swiss, but in reality 
to the French. In 1632 this flimsy pretence was 
abandoned, and Pinerolo was bought by France. 

Thus Eichelieu had achieved a complete triumph in 
these years. He had obtained the submission of the 
Huguenots ; he had defeated the intrigues and the open 



V THE MANTUAN SUCCESSION 109 

assaults of his domestic enemies ; he had humbled Spain 
and the empire ; and he had secured French influence 
in Italy by seating a Frenchman in the duchy of Man- 
tua, and by obtaining for France the key of the Alpine 
passes. 



CHAPTEE VI 

FRANCE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR 

1631-1635 

Richelieu made duke and peer — Threatened coalition in favour of 
Gaston — Lorraine — Treaty ©f Vic — Gaston's marriage and re- 
treat to Brussels — Gustavus Adolphus in Germany — Services 
which he renders to France — Louis XIII. and Richelieu in 
Lorraine — Treaty of Liverdun — Gaston in France — Montmor- 
ency — Battle of Castelnaudari — Execution of Montmorency — 
Gaston retires to Brussels — Death of Gustavus Adolphus — 
Illness and recovery of Richelieu — Fall and imprisonment of 
Chateauneuf — Richelieu and his colleagues — League of Heil- 
hronn — Renewed invasion of Lorraine — Surrender of Nancy — 
Abdication of Charles IV. — Complete occupation of Lorraine — 
Gaston's marriage with Margaret annulled — Return of Gaston 
and Puylaurens — Imprisonment and death of Puylaurens — 
Wallenstein's policy — His death — Battle of Nordlingen — Break 
up of the Protestant League in Germany — Treaty of Prague — 
Dangers to France if the war came to an end — Seizure of the 
elector of Trier by the Spaniards — France declares war against 
Spain. 

Louis XIII. was not ungrateful to the minister who in 
seven years had already done enough to make the reign 
notable in the history of France. In August 1631 he 
issued letters-patent creating Eichelieu duke and peer. 
On September 5 the ceremony took place of admitting 
the new peer to the parliament. Cond6, Montmorency, 



CH.vi FRANCE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR 111 

and the chief nobles of France formed his escort, but 
such a crowd had assembled at the doors that the pro- 
cession could only make its way to the grand chamber 
through the galleries. Eichelieu was never popular, but 
the people appreciated the grandeur of his aims and his 
achievements. They admired, if they did not love. At 
the same time the cardinal received the government of 
Brittany, so important for his maritime and commercial 
projects. Nor was it at home only that his merits were 
applauded. The Eepublic of Venice, always eager to 
recognise greatness outside her own walls, sent a special 
envoy to offer him the rank of noble, with power to 
name any of his relatives as his successor. 

But no one knew better than Eichelieu that he was 
only on the threshold of greater difficulties than those 
which he had already overcome. The triumph of French 
policy in Italy had provoked and alarmed the house of 
Hapsburg. Both Austria and Spain were now fully 
alive to the danger which threatened them if France, 
united at home, were to espouse the cause of their 
enemies in Germany and the United Provinces. Such 
a catastrophe could only be prevented by doing all in 
their power to revive the embers of dissension in France. 
Spain was the more immediately interested in this be- 
cause the line of provinces through which a connection 
was maintained between Lombardy and the Netherlands 
ran along the eastern frontier of France. If the emperor 
could only crush the opposition in Germany, Spain would 
be free to suppress its dangerous rival in the west, and 
the means for attaining this end were sufficiently ob- 
vious. The heir to the French crown was more danger- 
ous outside France than he could be within. With the 



112 RICHELIEU chap. 

assistance of foreign troops, and the support of the dis- 
contented nobles and parliaments of his own country, 
Gaston might succeed in overthrowing the minister 
whom his favourites had taught him to detest. And 
with the fall of Richelieu France might again become as 
powerless and contemptible as it had been under the 
regency of Mary de Medici. 

The headquarters of the conspiracy were' at Nancy, 
where Gaston had taken refuge. Charles IV. of Lorraine 
was eager to free his duchy from the control which 
France had secured by the seizure in 1552 of the three 
bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. He had already 
raised an army of 15,000 men, and he had persuaded 
the emperor to enforce his suzerainty over the three 
bishoprics by the capture of Moyenvic, a disputed de- 
pendency. With the assistance of troops from the 
Netherlands and from Germany, Lorraine might be a 
formidable starting-point for an invasion of France. 
Gaston was to be bound to the confederacy by a mar- 
riage with the duke's sister, Margaret. 

But Eichelieu was far too prompt to allow his enemies 
to complete their preparations. In the winter of 1631 
he despatched la Force and Schomberg to drive the 
Imperialists from Moyenvic, while he carried off the 
king and court to Metz, leaving Soissons as lieutenant- 
governor in Paris. Complete success rewarded both 
movements, Moyenvic was taken, and the duke of 
Lorraine hastened to conclude the Treaty of Vic 
(January 6, 1632), by which he promised to withdraw 
from all hostile alliances, and to expel from his 
territories all the enemies of France. Richelieu hoped 
by depriving Gaston of his refuge to induce him to 



VI PRANCE mVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR 113 

accept a reconciliation, but the latter was persuaded 
by his chief adviser, Puylaurens, to withdraw to Brussels. 
The plot was postponed and not abandoned. Charles IV. 
had no intention of observing the promises, and almost 
at the moment of the conclusion of the treaty of Vic 
Gaston was secretly married to Margaret of Lorraine. 

While Eichelieu was engaged in averting the im- 
mediate perils which threatened France, events were 
occurring in Germany which were destined not only to 
frustrate the schemes of his enemies, but to open the 
way for a new policy of aggrandisement and annexation. 
In 1632 the cardinal began to dream of that extension 
of the French frontier to the Rhine which becomes so 
dominant a tradition in subsequent generations. The 
beginning of this great enterprise was one of the many 
important results of the victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 
Although the Swedish king had been urged by Richelieu 
to invade Germany, and although a formal treaty be- 
tween them was concluded at Barwalde in January 
1631, the aims of the two great protagonists were far 
from harmonious. For the chief objects of Gustavus, 
the aggrandisement of Sweden and the maintenance or 
extension of Protestantism, Richelieu cared not at all. To 
him the Swedish army was merely a tool to be used for 
the humiliation of the house of Hapsburg, and to divert 
the attention of Austria from Italy and France. He 
would have preferred to attain his ends by an alliance 
with the Catholic League, if that had been possible, and 
it was only when he found that Maximilian of Bavaria 
had too many interests in common with the emperor 
that he finally decided on a treaty with Sweden. And 
his diplomacy, skilful as it was, was insufficient to keep 

I 



114 RICHELIEU chap. 

a man like Gustavus Adolphus in the leading-strings of 
France. The latter set himself to secure his position 
in the north before he would risk a direct attack upon 
the enemies whom he had come to seek. The emperor's 
obstinate persistence in enforcing the Edict of Eestitution 
drove the Lutheran princes into an alliance with Sweden. 
The hesitation of John George of Saxony, averse to the 
intervention of a foreigner in German affairs, and still 
more unwilling to acknowledge a superior, was finally 
overcome by the sack of Magdeburg. Having at last 
achieved his first aim, Gustavus Adolphus advanced to 
meet the army of the League under Tilly. Few more 
important battles have been fought than that of Leipzig 
(September 7, 1631). On its issue were staked the main- 
tenance of Protestantism in Germany, the very existence 
of Sweden as a state, and in a lesser degree the future 
of France and its great minister. If Tilly had 
triumphed, it would have been immensely difficult to 
resist the foreign coalition in favour of Gaston of 
Orleans. 

The victory of Gustavus Adolphus removed this 
danger, but the attention of Europe was at once con- 
centrated upon the conqueror's future movements. If 
he marched straight upon Vienna, it seemed impossible 
that the emperor, without either army or general, could 
make any effective resistance, and terms of peace might 
be dictated in the capital of the Austrian Hapsburgs. 
This seemed the most obvious policy, and it had 
much to recommend it to Richelieu, who had always 
desired to employ the Swedes against Austria and to 
spare the Catholic League. But Gustavus Adolphus 
was jealous of French dictation, and resolute to follow 



VI FRANCE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR 115 

his own course. Leaving John George to invade 
Bohemia, he led his own army against the defenceless 
states of the Ehine prelates. No resistance was offered 
to his triumphal march, and before the end of the year 
Mainz itself was in his hands. That Richelieu was 
chagrined by his decision is undeniable. In his Memoirs 
he asserts that Gustavus Adolphus, like Hannibal, knew 
how to conquer, but not how to use his victory. 

But in spite of the cardinal's criticism it is doubtful 
whether France could have been better served by a 
direct attack upon Vienna than she was by Gustavus's 
triumphal march along the "priests' lane." The 
European coalition in favour of Gaston, which depended 
more upon Spain than upon Austria, was practically anni- 
hilated. The duke of Lorraine was deprived of the 
allies who might have interfered to protect him from 
the consequences of his continued intrigues, and of his 
treacherous breach of the treaty of Vic. But the chief 
result was to give an opening for French intervention 
in Southern Germany. The ecclesiastical electors 
hastened to implore the mediation of the cardinal, and 
the archbishop of Trier promptly placed himself under 
French protection, and offered to admit French garrisons 
into his fortresses of Hermanstein (now Ehrenbreitstein) 
and Philipsburg. The marquis de Brez6, Eichelieu's 
brother-in-law, was sent to warn Gustavus Adolphus 
from a further advance into Elsass, and to negotiate 
terms for the neutrality of Bavaria and Cologne. 

In order to profit by the opportunity which the 
Swedish successes offered to him, Richelieu determined 
to make himself master of Lorraine, an enterprise for 
which the conduct of Charles IV. offered a convenient 



116 RICHELIEU chap. 

pretext. Gaston, after collecting troops in Brussels, had 
returned to Lorraine on his way to France, where his 
emissaries were active in stirring up the malcontent 
nobles to active measures against the cardinal. As a 
warning to his enemies, Eichelieu brought Marshal 
Marillac to trial for peculation before a special com- 
mission, and he was condemned and executed (May 8). 
Richelieu then recalled the French army, which had 
already appeared on the Rhine and occupied Ehren- 
breitstein, and carried the king with him to Lorraine. 
In eight days the campaign was over. The capture of 
Pont-a-Mousson, and the advance of Marshal d'Effiat to 
lay siege to Nancy, brought the duke to his knees. By 
the treaty of Liverdun (June 26) he undertook to 
observe the promises he had made at Yic, to do homage 
for his duchy of Bar, and to sell the county of Clermont 
to France. As security for his good faith he was to 
leave his brother, the cardinal of Lorraine, as a hostage, 
and to place the fortresses of Stenay and Jametz in 
French hands. The French army was now free to 
renew the campaign in Germany, and in spite of the 
discouragement caused by the death of d'Effiat, his 
successor, d'Estrees, succeeded in driving the Spaniards 
from the city of Trier. By thus seizing the bridge over 
the Moselle, the French cut off the most direct route 
between the Netherlands and the Spanish provinces in 
Italy. 

Having drawn the teeth of the duke of Lorraine, it 
was now high time for Richelieu to turn his attention 
to Gaston, who had entered France on June 8, and 
had issued a manifesto containing a violent attack upon 
the cardinal. Personally the heir to the throne was a 



VI FRANCE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR 117 

contemptible antagonist, but he had succeeded in gaining 
over the greatest noble in France, after the princes of 
the royal blood. Henri de Montmorency, the last bearer 
of a famous name in history, had won reputation as a 
soldier at Avigliana, and had since been on terms of 
affectionate intimacy with Eichelieu, who relied on his 
fidelity. But the young duke was discontented with 
the humble part which the great nobles had to play 
under the cardinal's rule. He coveted his ancestors' 
office of constable, which had been suppressed, and he 
resented the harsh treatment of his province of Langue- 
doc. Above all, the influence of his wife, a relative of 
Mary de Medici, urged him to come forward as the 
champion of the oppressed mother and brother of the 
king. He invited Gaston to advance from Burgundy 
into Languedoc, and it was confidently hoped that his 
name and reputation would give the rebels a firm foot- 
ing in Southern France. But Eichelieu was now to 
reap the reward of his firm and prudent policy. The 
Huguenots, contented with religious toleration, refused 
to join a movement which was encouraged by Spain. 
The chief nobles and governors of provinces, warned by 
the fate of Marillac, hesitated to commit themselves 
until some substantial success had been obtained, and 
the leaders of the rising were at variance among them- 
selves. Puylaurens, eager to maintain his ascendency 
over the feeble Gaston, was jealous of Montmorency's 
influence, and the latter's claim to command was dis- 
puted by d'Elbo3uf. These dissensions had already 
assured the failure of the rebels when they came into 
collision with the royal army under Schomberg at 
Castelnaudari (September 1). A chivalrous but reckless 



118 KICHELIEU chap. 

cavalry charge carried Montmorency into the middle of 
the enemy ; his horse was killed under him, and he was 
carried from the field wounded and a prisoner. 

Gaston, who accepted the devotion of his adherents 
without sharing their risks, and who had taken no 
part in the battle, at once realised that all was lost, and 
opened negotiations with Louis. There was no dis- 
position to treat him harshly, and he received most 
lenient terms from his brother. On condition of abandon- 
ing all hostile alliances, he recovered all his appanages, 
and an amnesty was promised to most of his adherents, 
with the significant exception of Montmorency. Eichelieu 
knew how to be moderate in the hour of victory. The 
king presided in person at a meeting of the estates of 
Languedoc at B6ziers, and restored for a money payment 
the liberties of which the province had been deprived 
in 1629. 

Attention was now concentrated upon the fate of 
Montmorency, who had been basely deserted by his 
accomplices, but whose life was pleaded for by illustrious 
relatives, and even by crowned heads. Richelieu, how- 
ever, merciful as he had been to the mass of the rebels, 
was determined to make an example of their leader. 
He would teach the French nobles that rebellion, even 
in the interests of the heir to the throne, was not an 
enterprise to be lightly undertaken. To the king he 
urged that Montmorency's execution was the only way 
to make G-aston powerless by depriving him of adherents. 
A still more potent argument to himself was to be found 
in a remark made by Bullion, and which is reproduced 
by the cardinal himself — that the house of Montmorency 
was so powerful in Languedoc that the peo]3le regarded 



VI FEANCE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR 119 

the royal power as imaginary. To Richelieu, the duke's 
removal may well have seemed an almost necessary step 
to that absorption of the provinces under a powerful 
monarchy and a centralised administration which was 
the grand object of his life. In his Memoirs he pleads, 
not without plausibility, that his severity proved his 
devotion to France at the expense of his own personal 
interests. To have spared the prisoner would have been 
an easy method of gaining popularity. To punish him 
was to expose his own life to the risk of assassination, 
because it would convince his enemies that they could 
only secure themselves by his death. But these con- 
siderations had little weight with Eichelieu, who was 
superior to vulgar terrors, and who had assimilated, either 
consciously or unconsciously, the maxim of Machiavelli, 
that it is safer to be feared than to be loved. Mont- 
morency was brought to trial before the parliament of 
Toulouse, whose competence to pass judgment on a peer 
was more than doubtful, condemned to death, and 
executed on the same day (October 30). Men to whom 
the traditions of the civil wars were still familiar, and 
who remembered the impunity with which princes and 
nobles conspired under the regency, must have realised 
that a new era had begun for France when a minister 
of the crown ventured to bring to the scaffold the last 
male of a family whose name w^as so honourably and 
conspicuously written in the country's history. 

One result of the execution Richelieu had probably 
failed to foresee. Although Gaston had omitted to 
stipulate for Montmorency's pardon, even his torpid 
selfishness could not but feel the ignominy which the 
fate of his chivalrous supporter threw upon himself. 



120 RICHELIEU chap. 

His own fears and those of Puylaurens were kindled by 
the recollection that his marriage with Margaret of 
Lorraine had not yet been acknowledged, and that it 
would never be tolerated by the king and cardinal. On 
November 6 he fled from Tours, and again sought 
refuge in Brussels. 

Thus the heir to the throne was once more in the 
hands of the enemies of France, and the task of depriv- 
ing them of this dangerous weapon had to be commenced 
afresh. At the same time an event occurred in Germany 
which altered the whole aspect of affairs in Europe, and 
demanded the exercise of all Eichelieu's prudent watch- 
fulness. Grustavus Adolphus had listened to French re- 
monstrances so far as to abstain from advancing into 
Elsass and to respect the neutrality of Trier. But he 
refused to resign the ecclesiastical territories which he 
had already seized, and the attempt to arrange terms 
with the leaders of the Catholic League proved a failure. 
Early in 1632 the Swedes advanced against Bavaria, 
and Tilly was defeated and slain in attempting to dispute 
the passage of the Lech. Gustavus Adolphus entered 
Munich in triumph, and Maximilian was driven from 
his own duchy. Austria was once more exposed to 
invasion, and the army of the League was no longer 
able to defend the emperor. In his despair Ferdinand 
II. had been compelled to appeal to Wallenstein, who 
recovered his command on terms which made him an 
independent potentate. With an army which was 
brought together by the magic of his reputation, and 
which he treated as his private following, Wallenstein 
had already driven the Saxons from Bohemia, and he 
now advanced to check the eastward march of the 



VI FRANCE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR 121 

Swedes. At Niirnberg Gustavus Adolphus met with 
his first check, as he dared not attack the enemy's 
intrenchments, and failed to force him into a pitched 
battle. From Niirnberg Wallenstein drew the Swedes 
after him into Saxony, and on November 16 their 
heroic king lost his life on the glorious field of Llitzen. 
At this very moment Eichelieu was lying on a bed 
of sickness, from which it seemed more than possible 
that he would never rise again. After settling affairs 
in Languedoc, Louis XIII. had hurried back to Paris, 
while the cardinal undertook to escort the queen on a 
tour through Western France, where she was to visit his 
home at Eichelieu and his great conquest, La Rochelle. 
But an internal abscess had long preyed upon a frame 
that had never been strong, and to this disorder was 
now added disease of the bladder. The cardinal was 
compelled to stop at Bordeaux, and to leave the task of 
entertaining Anne of Austria to his uncle, the commander 
de la Porte. About November 20 his condition seemed 
almost hopeless, and in Paris the rumour spread that he 
was dead. Open enemies and faithless friends exulted 
over the expected removal of an oppressor or a too- 
powerful patron. Chateauneuf, the keeper of the seals, 
who owed his elevation to Eichelieu, was indiscreet 
enough to betray his hopes of succeeding to the position 
of his dying colleague. But an indomitable spirit often 
triumphs over the weakness of its mortal covering. 
Eichelieu recovered as if by a miracle, and as soon 
as he had rejoined the court he hastened to punish 
those personal affronts which in his eyes were almost 
as unpardonable as serious crimes against the state. 
Chateauneuf was accused, on the loose assertions of the 



122 RICHELIEU chap. 

cardinal's spies, of being engaged in an intrigue with the 
duchess of Chevreuse, the queen-mother, and Henrietta 
Maria of England. His real offence was that he had 
deserted Eichelieu at Bordeaux, that he had danced 
before the queen while his patron was thought to be 
dying, and that he had allowed himself to dream of 
succeeding to the office of first minister. For this he 
was deprived of the seals and imprisoned at Angouleme, 
but the fact that he was never brought to trial goes far 
to prove that there was little foundation for the graver 
charges against him. 

Kichelieu's recovery was exceedingly opportune, as 
he found France threatened by three simultaneous 
dangers. The death of Gustavus Adolphus weakened 
the league against the Austrian Hapsburgs, and might 
easily lead to its dissolution. The United Provinces 
were negotiating for a truce with Spain, and if this were 
arranged, the Spaniards would be free to carry out their 
schemes for assisting Gaston, who had again joined the 
enemies of his country. Never did the cardinal display 
more coolness and decision than at this crisis, when the 
whole weight of affairs rested on his own shoulders. His 
colleagues in the council, of whom the chief were Bullion 
and Bouthillier, had one great qualification — devotion to 
their chief. They were always consulted by him, but 
the decision he always reserved to himself, and they 
were quite content to carry out a policy which they 
knew themselves to be incapable of originating. The 
only personage who may have possessed influence over 
Eichelieu was Father Joseph, who was not officially a 
member of the council, and whose relations with the 
cardinal have always been something of an enigma to 



VI FEANCE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR 123 

historians. Such evidence as we possess, however, goes 
to prove that the influence of the " grey cardinal " has 
been exaggerated by Eichelieu's detractors, and that the 
special subjects on v^^hich he was consulted were affairs 
in Germany and the relations with Rome. Louis XIII. 
himself, whose penetration and decision the cardinal is 
never tired of contrasting with his own "simplicity," 
was conspicuously devoid of the qualities which his 
minister attributes to him. His notes on the minutes 
of the council, which are published in the great collection 
of M. d'Avenel, proved that he never dreamed of disput- 
ing the conclusions of an adviser whose superiority he 
always recognised even when he was most inclined to 
resent it. 

Early in 1633 two of the ablest of French diplom- 
atists, Feuquieres and Charnac6, were despatched to 
Germany and Holland, and their instructions, which are 
model state-papers, show how clearly Richelieu compre- 
hended the situation, and how he planned to turn it to 
the advantage of France. While avoiding as long as 
possible an open declaration of war, he wished to 
strengthen all the elements of opposition to the house 
of Hapsburg, and to seize every opportunity for strength- 
ening the monarchy at home and for extending the 
power of France on the eastern frontier. In Germany 
the embassy of Feuquieres was completely successful. 
The alliance of France with Sweden, which was now 
governed by Oxenstiern on behalf of Christina, the young 
daughter of Gustavus, was renewed. At Heilbronn the 
influence of the French envoy was mainly instrumental 
in securing the confirmation of the Protestant League, 
which was strengthened by further additions at the later 



124 RICHELIEU chap. 

conference at Frankfurt. French diplomacy defeated 
the attempt of John George of Saxony to procure the 
direction of the League, which was given to Oxenstiern, 
but, to his great disgust, Avith strictly limited powers. 
Eichelieu had regarded the death of Gustavus with 
composure, if not with secret complacency, and events 
justified his view. The Swedish king was an unmanage- 
able ally, and continued successes might have enabled 
him to found a power independent of, and possibly 
formidable to, France. His removal rendered the 
Swedes again dependent upon French support, and at the 
same time enabled French influence gradually to supplant 
that of Sweden in Germany. 

In Holland Charnac6 was equally successful. By 
making dexterous use of the divisions among the seven 
provinces he succeeded in frustrating the negotiations 
with the Netherlands, where the Spanish power suffered 
a severe blow by the death of the popular and prudent 
infanta, Clara Isabella. The continuance of the Dutch 
war prevented the Spaniards from sending assistance 
to Charles IV. of Lorraine, who had been encouraged 
by the death of the Swedish king to disregard the 
obligations he had contracted at Liverdun. This gave 
Eichelieu the opportunity which he wanted for the 
annexation of a province whose possession would be as 
advantageous as its hostility was dangerous to France. 
He had already employed the labours of learned anti- 
quarians to prove that the imperial suzerainty was a 
usurpation which no lapse of time could legalise, and 
that Lorraine was properly a dependency of the French 
crown. Fortified with their arguments, he proceeded 
to take active measures. On the ground that the 



VI FRANCE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR 125 

stipulated homage had never been paid for Bar, the 
parliament of Paris declared the duchy confiscated. 
Saint Chaumont was sent with an army to advance 
upon Nancy, and in August Eichelieu set out with the 
king to direct operations on the spot. Charles IV., 
as unprepared as ever to resist invasion, sent his brother, 
the cardinal of Lorraine, to offer to annul the marriage 
between Gaston and Margaret, and to propose on his 
own behalf a marriage with Madame de Combalet. 
Eichelieu refused the proffered honour to his niece, 
and demanded that Nancy should be surrendered as 
a pledge of the duke's good faith. As this condition 
was rejected as too harsh, the French laid siege to the 
capital of Lorraine, which was regarded as one of the 
best fortresses of Europe. Charles IV. now gave way, 
and agreed to surrender Nancy, but he still hoped for 
the arrival of Spanish troops from Italy, and ordered 
the commander of the citadel to delay the formal cession. 
But the duke of Feria, who had already marched from 
Milan through the Valtelline, was delayed at Constance 
by the Swedes under count Horn. This check deprived 
Charles of his last hope, and on September 25 Richelieu 
accompanied Louis in his formal entry into Nancy. He 
was provided beforehand with an excuse for retaining 
a pledge which he had no intention of relinquishing. 
During the siege the Princess Margaret, with the con- 
nivance of her brothers, had escaped from the city to 
Luxemburg, whence she proceeded to join her husband in 
Brussels. Earlier in the year the creation of a parliament 
at Metz had cut off the last link between the three 
bishoprics and the empire. The lilies supplanted the 
imperial eagle, and the duchy of Lorraine, with all its 



126 RICHELIEU chap. 

chief fortresses garrisoned by French troops, was 
practically a province of France. It was in vain that 
Charles IV. sought to disarm the enmity of Louis by 
abdicating in favour of his brother, who resigned the 
cardinalate and married his cousin Claude. France 
refused to recognise the marriage, and the new duke 
and his bride found themselves compelled to escape 
imprisonment by flying to Florence. Their departure 
enabled Richelieu to complete the occupation of Lorraine 
by seizing the last fortresses and by establishing a 
conseil souverain at Nancy for the administration of 
justice. 

Although Margaret of Lorraine had escaped, Eichelieu 
could now proceed at leisure to procure the dissolution 
of her marriage with Gaston. This union he had 
always regarded with such aversion that contemporaries 
attributed it to the desire to marry his niece to the 
heir of the French throne. At first it was decided to 
appeal to the pope for a divorce, but Urban VIII. insisted 
upon trying the case at Eome, and Eichelieu dreaded 
delay and Spanish influence. Accordingly a civil suit 
was instituted before the parliament of Paris under the 
absurd form of a charge of abduction against the duke 
of Lorraine. The decision of the court was pronounced 
on September 5, 1634. The marriage was declared 
to have been invalidly contracted, and Charles TV. was 
found guilty of treason. To appease the pope an 
envoy was sent to Eome to explain that the decision 
did not affect the ecclesiastical aspect of the marriage, 
and that there was no intention to contest the papal 
jurisdiction. 

About this time Mary de Medici, weary of her exile 



VI FRANCE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR 127 

in Brussels, and jealous of Puylaurens, who would allow 
her no influence over her second son, made overtures 
for a reconciliation with the king and cardinal. But 
Richelieu would have nothing to do with his former 
patroness, and had little difficulty in inducing Louis 
XIII. to fix impossible conditions as the price of his 
mother's return. At the same time he was as anxious 
as ever for a reconciliation with Gaston, whose return 
was almost necessary to secure the unity of France in 
the face of foreign enemies. Negotiations were being 
carried on with Brussels when the capture of one of 
the prince's agents revealed the actual conclusion of a 
treaty with Spain for the invasion of France. This 
discovery exasperated the cardinal, and he openly 
declared to the king in council that there were only 
two means of foiling his brother's intrigues. The one 
was the birth of a son, which depended upon the grace 
of God, and the other was the altering of the succession, 
which involved a revolution in the fundamental laws 
and traditions of France. The dangers of the latter 
alternative would not have deterred Eichelieu from 
urging its adoption, but it was rendered unnecessary 
by Gaston's submission. The complete conquest of 
Lorraine and the active measures which were taken to 
annul the marriage terrified Gaston and Puylaurens, 
who had both discovered that the Spaniards only used 
them as tools for their own ends. A golden bridge 
was built for the return of the baffled conspirators. 
Gaston recovered his appanages, with the government of 
Auvergne instead of Orleans, while Puylaurens, together 
with the rank of duke and peer, received the hand of a 
wealthy heiress. But it was soon evident that their 



128 RICHELIEU chap. 

acceptance of these terms involved only a partial 
reconciliation. To the arguments of an ecclesiastical 
deputation, which tried to convince him of the nullity 
of his marriage, Gaston lent a polite but evasive atten- 
tion. It was discovered that he had written to Eome 
to protest beforehand against the validity of any acts 
or admissions that might be extorted from him after his 
return to France. This obstinacy Richelieu attributed 
to the continued intrigues of Puylaurens, who had 
indiscreetly boasted that if anything happened to Louis 
XIII. he would be first minister under his successor. 
He had to learn that it was safer to plot in Brussels 
than in Paris, and that his marriage with a relative of 
the cardinal was not enough to secure his impunity. 
In February 1635 he was suddenly seized and imprisoned 
at Yincennes, where a natural death saved him from 
the penalties of treason. Deprived of his chief adviser 
and absorbed in sensual pleasures, Gaston fell for a 
time into insignificance, and was compelled to accept 
the divorce from Margaret, which was ultimately pro- 
nounced by a synod of Galilean clergy. 

All this time the Swedes, in spite of their king's 
death and the vacillation of the elector of Saxony, had 
been more than holding their own in Germany, while 
French influence was steadily extended in the south- 
west. In 1633 the elector of Cologne had formally 
put his estates under French protection, and the duke 
of Wurtemberg, unable to defend Montbeliard against 
the Spaniards, handed over both town and citadel to a 
French garrison. In the next year several towns in 
Elsass also threw their gates open to the French, who 
thus acquired their first footing in a province which 



VI FRANCE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN" WAR 129 

was destined to be Eichelieu's chief territorial gift to 
his country. 

The chief cause of these successes, and of the failure 
of the imperial forces to profit by the death of 
Gustavus Adolphus, was undoubtedly the conduct of 
Wallenstein. The great general had resumed his com- 
mand with the firm intention of securing, not the 
emperor's interests, but his own. With the religious 
objects of Ferdinand 11. and the Catholic League he was 
entirely out of sympathy. His object was to make 
himself a great prince of the empire, and to use his 
military superiority to impose a general pacification 
upon the warring sects, so as to prevent Germany from 
being torn in pieces to serve the selfish ends of foreign 
princes. For Spain, the close and necessary ally of 
the emperor, he had the greatest hatred. When the 
Cardinal Infant, Philip IV. 's brother, applied to him for 
4000 cavalry, who were needed to bring his army from 
Milan to Germany, he refused. Instead of vigorously 
prosecuting the war, he contented himself with his con- 
quest of Bohemia, where he maintained almost royal 
state, and whence he carried on simultaneous negotia- 
tions with Sweden, France, and the Protestant princes 
of Germany. Eichelieu was willing enough to profit by 
Wallenstein's inactivity, but he had the keenness to 
detect that antipathy to foreign interference which was 
at the bottom of his schemes, and he paid little atten- 
tion to overtures which could bring no advantage to 
France. But at Vienna it did not need much exercise 
of Spanish influence to convince Ferdinand that a 
general who presumed to treat with foreign states as an 
independent prince could not be tolerated in the im- 

K 



130 RICHELIEU chap. 

perial service. In his contract with his employer, 
Wallenstein had been careful to provide against a 
second dismissal, but he could not secure himself against 
assassination. As long as his army was faithful he was 
safe. But the fidelity of his officers was tampered with 
by Spanish gold, and on February 15, 1634, he fell 
under the dagger of traitors who received his pay. 

The death of Wallenstein marks a great turning- 
point in the history of the Thirty Years' War. His 
army was induced to accept the command of the young 
king of Hungary, Ferdinand's eldest son. In June the 
Cardinal Infant led his long -delayed expedition into 
Germany, and his troops succeeded in joining those of 
the emperor. At Nordlingen the united armies in- 
flicted a crushing defeat upon the Swedes under Horn 
and Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. For the moment it 
seemed as if the work of Gustavus Adolphus would be 
undone by the first failure of his successors. The 
League of Heilbronn, the product of the joint diplomacy 
of Eichelieu and Oxenstiern, was broken to pieces. 
John George of Saxony hastened to accept the treaty of 
Prague (May 1635), by which the Edict of Restitution 
was revoked, and a compromise was arranged between 
Catholics and Lutherans. Within a few months these 
terms were accepted by all the Lutheran princes. As 
far as Germany was concerned, the Thirty Years' War 
was at an end. The great questions at issue at its com- 
mencement had received a solution which satisfied 
everybody except the German Calvinists, and they were 
too few and too powerless to continue hostilities by 
themselves. But the war had long ceased to be a 
purely German struggle. In the course of years the 



VI FRANCE INVOLVED IN THE EUROPEAN WAR 131 

German contest had come to involve in itself all the 
rivalries and enmities which agitated Europe : the 
quarrels of Sweden and Poland, the jealousy of Den- 
mark against its northern neighbour, the struggle of 
Spain to reduce the Dutch into subjection, and, above 
all, the enmity between France and Spain, which dated 
back to the time of Charles V. It was these foreign 
interests that prolonged the war for the next thirteen 
years. 

The great schemes of Richelieu would have been ruined 
if the war had been ended by the treaty of Prague. It 
is true that the battle of Nordlingen, by weakening 
Sweden, had brought some direct gains to France. The 
Swedes, who had seized Philipsburg from the Spaniards, 
and had hitherto evaded the French demands for its 
surrender, were compelled to abandon the fortress, and 
Colmar and other strong places in Elsass endeavoured to 
obtain security by the admission of French garrisons. 
But these and the earlier acquisitions would have to be 
surrendered at a general pacification, and Eichelieu had 
no intention of surrendering them. Nor was this the 
only danger. The termination of the German war 
would enormously strengthen Spain. If the Spaniards, 
freed from the heavy obligation of supporting Austria, 
could reduce the Dutch or make peace with them, they 
would then be able to throw all their might into the 
recovery of their omnipotence in Italy, or even into a 
direct attack upon France. And France would be left 
without an efficient ally, as Sweden could render little 
service in a struggle with Spain. 

To avoid these certain and possible disasters, it was 
necessary that the war should be continued ; and to 



132 RICHELIEU chap, vi 

secure its continuation only one expedient remained — 
the open intervention of France. For such a step 
Eichelieu had long been preparing, and it would have 
been easy enough to find a pretext for hostilities, even 
if Spain had not gone out of her way to provide one. 
In March 1635 a Spanish force sallied from Luxem- 
burg, surprised the city of Trier, and carried off the 
elector a prisoner to the Netherlands. Eichelieu at 
once sent to the Cardinal Infant to demand the release 
of an ecclesiastical dignitary whose sole offence was his 
alliance with France. A refusal was followed by the 
appearance of a French herald in Brussels, who, with all 
the old formalities, declared war against the king of 
Spain. Eichelieu had engaged France in the greatest 
European struggle in which that country had taken part 
since the death of Henry II. 



CHAPTER VII 

REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 

1635-1640 

French alliances — Military preparations — Disasters of 1635 in the 
Netherlands, Genmany, Italy, and at sea — Causes of failure — 
Campaign of 1636 — Invasion of Picardy — Panic in Paris — 
Richelieu's courage — Piepulse of the Spaniards — Conspiracy of 
Orleans and Soissons — Risings in Normandy and Guienne — 
Episode of Louise de la Fayette — Campaign of 1637 — More 
French reverses — Loss of the Valtelline — The French fleet 
recovers the Lerins — Series of triumphs begin in 1638 — Bern- 
hard of Saxe -Weimar takes Breisach — His death — France 
becomes his heir— The Spaniards in Piedmont — Battle and 
capture of Turin — Naval victories — Destruction of Spanish 
fleet in the Downs — Relations with England — Revolt of Cata- 
lonia and Portugal — Capture of Arras — Extent of Richelieu's 
triumphs — Birth of the dauphin — Death of Father Joseph. 

Richelieu had long contemplated the possibility of 
France being forced to take direct part in the war, and 
he had made ample preparations, so far as they could 
be effected by diplomacy. He had failed, it is true, to 
maintain the alliance between Sweden and the Lutheran 
princes of Germany, and he had never been able to 
detach the members of the Catholic League from their 
union with the emperor. On the other hand, he bad 
arranged an offensive and defensive alliance with the 



134 RICHELIEU chap. 

United Provinces, by which the combined forces of the 
two states were to be placed under the command of 
Frederick Henry, the stadtholder. He had hopes of a 
rising in the Netherlands, where many of the nobles 
were discontented with the direct rule of Spain, which 
had been re-established on the death of the Infanta. 
The neutrality of England was assured by Charles I.'s 
resolution to dispense with a parliament, without which 
he could not hope to obtain the supplies for a war. 
With Oxenstiern, who visited Paris in person for the 
purpose, a treaty was concluded by which France and 
Sweden pledged themselves to conclude no separate 
peace with either Austria or Spain. Eichelieu's aptest 
pupil in diplomacy, the count d'Avaux, had foiled the 
confident attempt of Austria to hamper Sweden by 
reviving the old feelings of jealousy on the part of 
Poland and Denmark. The truce between Sweden and 
Poland, originally concluded by French mediation, was 
prolonged for another twenty-five years by the same 
agency. In Italy, Richelieu arranged a league with 
Savoy, Parma, and Mantua for the partition of the 
duchy of Milan, and he had hopes that Urban VIII., 
always jealous of Spanish domination, might be brought 
to regard the scheme without disfavour. Finally, the 
duke de Rohan, who had been skilfully converted from 
a dangerous opponent into a loyal agent, was despatched, 
with the approval of the Grisons, to occupy the Val- 
telline, and thus to prevent assistance being sent from 
Germany to the Milanese. If these grand schemes had 
all been attended with success, the power of Spain 
beyond the limits of the peninsula would have been 
almost annihilated. 



VII REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 135 

But the most active and far-seeing diplomacy could 
create neither a trained and disciplined army, nor com- 
petent generals in a country which for the last genera- 
tion had been engaged in nothing but short outbursts 
of civil war, varied by an occasional brief expedition to 
Italy. The numbers of the French forces, amounting 
in all to 130,000 men, excited the astonishment of 
Europe, where no equal effort had been made during 
sixteen years of incessant warfare. But nothing was 
gained to correspond to these exhausting preparations. 
The campaign in the Netherlands, to which Eichelieu 
attached the greatest importance, ended in complete 
failure. The expected rising never took place, as dis- 
content with Spanish rule gave way to patriotic indigna- 
tion at the outrages of French invaders. The arrival of 
imperial troops, set free by the treaty of Prague, enabled 
the Spaniards to raise the siege of Louvain, and 
Frederick Henry of Orange, who commanded the 
combined French and Dutch forces, was not strong or 
enterprising enough to risk a battle in the open field. 
On the German frontiers the French succeeded in 
defending their position in Elsass and Lorraine, but 
their aid was not sufficient to enable Bernhard of Saxe- 
Weimar to hold his own on the Rhine. By the end of 
1635 Frankfort, Mannheim, Heidelberg, and Mainz 
had fallen into the hands of the Imperialists. In Italy, 
although Bohan succeeded in occupying the Yaltelline, 
and thus cut off German aid from Lombardy, the 
attempted invasion of the Milanese proved a fiasco. 
Victor Amadeus and Cr6qui, at the head of a large 
force of Piedmontese and French, wasted the whole 
summer in a futile siege of Valenza. Meanwhile the 



136 RICHELIEU chap. 

Spaniards enjoyed a complete ascendency at sea, which 
enabled them to maintain a constant intercourse both 
with the Netherlands and the Italian peninsula. It 
was a bitter humiliation for France when a Spanish 
fleet occupied and garrisoned the two little islands of 
Lerins, off the coast of Provence. 

Eichelieu's magnificent schemes of conquest were for 
the time at an end, and the cardinal himself is not 
free from some responsibility for his failure. His past 
experience had taught him to be always suspicious, and 
he could not trust his generals. He was so long used 
to command himself, and so confident in his own capacity, 
that he thought his orders from a distance must be 
better than those of a mistrusted subordinate on the 
spot. When possible, he divided the command, so that 
differences between the two generals might secure his 
own supremacy. But the chief cause of failure is to be 
found in the character of the French soldiery. In the 
course of three generations of civil strife they had lost 
every military virtue except courage. They could fight 
in face of the enemy, but in camp they were disorderly, 
mutinous, impatient alike of hardship and of control. 
Against veterans trained in the school of Gustavus and 
of Tilly such troops were worse than useless. But for 
the support of Bernhard of Saxe -Weimar and his hardy 
mercenaries the campaign of 1635 would have been 
still more disastrous. 

In spite of the check he had received, Eichelieu de- 
termined to continue his aggressive policy in 1636. In 
Italy Victor Amadeus and Cr6qui advanced to the 
Ticino, where they inflicted a crushing defeat on the 
Spanish army. But the duke of Savoy was on bad 



VII REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 137 

terms with his colleague, and. prevented any attempt 
to join Rohan, who was waiting near Lake Como for a 
combined advance upon Milan. In August the troops 
returned to winter quarters. Meanwhile a French 
army had invaded Franche Comte and laid siege to 
D61e. But the population was better treated, and 
therefore more loyal than that of any other Spanish 
province, and Ddle was still untaken when the unex- 
pected news arrived that France itself was exposed to a 
formidable invasion. Frederick Henry had succeeded 
in retaking the fortress of Schenk, which the enemy had 
captured in the previous year, and the French troops 
in the Netherlands were preparing to relieve Liege, 
besieged by the imperial general Piccolomini. But the 
arrival of the Bavarian commander, John of Werth, and 
of a considerable Spanish force, under the Cardinal 
Infant Leopold, encouraged the enemy to. attempt a 
more ambitious enterprise. Patching up terms with 
the Li^geois, the imperial troops marched southwards, 
and in July crossed the frontier of Picardy. No 
preparations had been made for resistance. The 
border fortresses of La Chapelle and Le Catelet sur- 
rendered at the first summons, the passage of the 
Somme was forced with ease, and the enemy advanced 
burning and ravaging to the banks of the Oise. So 
great was the terror inspired by his mounted Croats 
that the name of John of Werth served French mothers 
for years as a bogey to frighten children with. 

Paris was panic-stricken. Louis XIII., always 
gloomy, was more reserved than ever. Everybody 
seemed to throw the responsibility for danger and 
disaster upon the minister who had declared war. 



138 RICHELIEU chap. 

Eichelieu alone preserved his courage and presence of 
mind in a crisis that would have daunted a lesser man. 
In spite of the entreaties and warnings of his friends, 
he proceeded almost unattended through the streets to 
the Hotel de Ville to call upon the citizens to make 
sacrifices for the safety of their country. The effect of 
his undaunted resolution and confidence was magical. 
Paris hastened to respond to his appeal with a devotion 
like that which was shown a century and a half later 
in the revolutionary wars. The municipality, the par- 
liament, the Sorbonne, and the trading guilds vied with 
each other in offering grants of money, and volunteers 
hastened to enrol their names on the list which was 
drawn up in the Hotel de Ville. The example of Paris 
was followed by the other large towns, and the 
Huguenots were as eager to prove their patriotism as 
the Catholics. Eichelieu had many enemies, but for 
the moment men thought only of his services to the 
country. 

The danger proved less than it had at first 
appeared. The invaders succeeded in taking Corbie, 
but they never advanced beyond the Oise. The 
Dutch were threatening the Netherlands, and the 
Cardinal Infant feared to involve his troops too far in 
the interior of France. By the time that the new 
levies were ready to take the field, John of Werth was 
in full retreat towards the frontier. No attempt was 
made to harass the enemy, and the French army con- 
tented itself with undertaking the siege of Corbie, 
which was forced to open its gates in November. At 
the same time an attempted invasion of Burgundy by 
the duke of Lorraine was successfully repulsed. France 



VII REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 139 

had failed to make conquests, but within its own 
frontiers it was still invincible. 

But though France was saved, the minister was still 
exposed to personal danger. The Spaniards had striven 
to revive internal disunion, and the manifesto of the 
Cardinal Infant had been filled with denunciations of 
Richelieu. The duke of Orleans and the count of 
Soissons, instead of being conciliated by their appoint- 
ments to command the army of defence, thought only 
of the opportunity to gratify their personal ambition or 
their desire for vengeance. Soissons had been irritated 
by the refusal of the command in Elsass, entrusted to 
the cardinal de la Valette, and deemed himself insulted 
by the proposal of a marriage with Richelieu's niece, 
Madame de Combalet. The two princes, laying aside 
their former animosity, formed a dangerous conspiracy 
against the object of their mutual hatred. Their 
schemes went so far as to project the assassination of 
the cardinal at Amiens, but Gaston's courage failed him 
at the moment when he should have given the concerted 
signal. The failure of the Spanish invasion and the 
recapture of Corbie discouraged the conspirators, and 
an attempt to tamper with the fidelity of the troops 
proved futile. Dreading discovery and arrest, the two 
princes fled from the army in ISTovember, Gaston to 
Blois and Soissons to Sedan. Negotiations proving 
futile, the king and cardinal led an army against Blois 
in January 1637. Gaston was unprepared for resist- 
ance, and was allowed to make peace on easy terms. 
Soissons, more obstinate or more distrustful, held out 
till July, when he also made his submission, but refused 
to return to court. 



140 RICHELIEU chap. 

Unfortunately discontent was by no means confined 
to the princes and great nobles. The middle and lower 
classes resented the heavy taxation which was rendered 
necessary by the war. Brilliant successes might have 
kindled a spirit of patriotic self-sacrifice, but these 
successes were still to be won. The parliaments made 
themselves the organs of local dissatisfaction. In 
Normandy the opposition of Eouen to the financial 
edicts of 1637 was only overcome by a threatened 
advance of king and cardinal at the head of an army. 
In Guienne citizens and peasants rose in armed revolt 
against the tax - collectors. But the monarchy, as 
usual, profited by class divisions. The duke of la 
Valette, one of Richelieu's most active opponents, took 
command of the royal troops and put down the rebels. 
To suppress local independence Richelieu extended the 
use of intendants in 1637, and thus forged the most 
powerful link in the chain which bound France in 
servitude to an absolute monarchy. 

While the cardinal was engaged in defeating open 
opposition, his power was threatened by an extra- 
ordinary court intrigue, in which religion and love 
were curiously intermingled. Louis XIIL, though 
constitutionally chaste, had all a Bourbon's delight in 
feminine society. Alienated from his wife by political 
and personal antipathy, he was accustomed to cherish 
a platonic attachment for one of the ladies of his court. 
For some years his virtuous affection had been fixed 
upon Mademoiselle de Hautefort, the recognised beauty 
of Parisian society. But the titular mistress was a 
devoted admirer of the neglected Anne of Austria, and 
used all her influence to inspire the king with distrust 



VII REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 141 

of the cardinal, whom she regarded as the chief barrier 
between the royal husband and wife. Richelieu and 
his supporters were delighted when, in 1635, Louis 
transferred his affections to Louise de la Fayette, a 
beautiful and pensive brunette, whose personal attrac- 
tions were equalled by her piety. The new favourite 
was a relative of Father Joseph, and the king's devotion 
seemed likely to strengthen the cardinal's ascendency. 
But Richelieu's energetic and almost ruthless policy 
had little fascination for women, and the innocent 
Mademoiselle de la Fayette became the tool of a hostile 
cabal. Its leader was a Jesuit, P^re Caussin, the royal 
confessor, who shared the general distrust of his order 
towards the cardinal. But the growing affection of 
the king excited the scruples of the maid -of -honour, 
and she wished to escape danger by entering the 
cloister. This pious resolution was applauded and 
encouraged by Richelieu and his supporters. On the 
other hand, her relatives and the zealous Caussin strove 
to persuade her that she could remain at court without 
risk to her virtue. Few more curious incidents are 
recorded in French history than this struggle to repress 
or to aid the monastic inclinations of a young girl. 
At last, whether frightened by royal tenderness, or won 
over by the advice of the Dominican agents of Richelieu, 
Mademoiselle de la Fayette entered the convent of the 
Visitation in the rue St. Antoine (May 19, 1637). 
But the battle was only half won. The king, who 
applauded while he deplored the resolution of his 
mistress, continued to visit her at her convent, and her 
denunciations of the cardinal were the more vigorous 
now that her virtue was protected by her vows and 



142 EIOHELIEU chap. 

the convent bars through which the conversation was 
conducted. The influence of Pere Caussin over the king 
seemed to be stronger than ever, and an open contest 
began between the confessor and the minister. But the 
ties which bound Louis XIII. to the cardinal were too 
strong to be broken even by the combined weight of 
priestly and feminine influence. In December 1637 
P^re Caussin was exiled to Eennes, and the king 
ceased his visits to the convent of the Visitation. 

Meanwhile the war continued to be waged in 1637, 
as before, with varying success. The death of Ferdinand 
II. in February made little diff'erence to a struggle of 
which he had been a principal author. Although the 
new emperor, Ferdinand III., was more pacifically dis- 
posed than his father, he was forced to continue 
hostilities by the refusal of France and Sweden to 
recognise an election in which the archbishop of Trier, 
still a prisoner, had taken no part. Eichelieu made his 
great effort in this year in the Netherlands, whither he 
sent his friend, the cardinal de la Yalette, to co-operate 
with Frederick Henry. But the militant cardinal did 
little to justify the confidence of his patron. His only 
achievements were the capture of two places in Flanders, 
and the recovery of the frontier fortress of La Ohapelle, 
while the Prince of Orange, more careful of Dutch than 
of French interests, contented himself with laying siege 
to Breda, which surrendered in October. These slight 
successes were more than counterbalanced by losses in 
Germany and in Italy. In Germany the Imperialists 
carried all before them. The Swedes were driven from 
Pomerania, John of Werth took Ehrenbreitstein and 
Hanau, while Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar, who had over- 



VII REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 143 

run Franche Oomte, failed in his attempt to relieve the 
last fortress, so that the French lost their last hold on 
the coveted province of Elsass. In Italy the successive 
deaths of the dukes of Savoy and Mantua broke up 
the coalition which Richelieu had formed against the 
Hapsburgs, and the duke of Parma was forced by the 
invasion of his duchy to desert the French alliance. 
Still more serious was the expulsion of Rohan from the 
Grisons, and the recovery of the Valtelline by Spain. 
For once, sacrificing religious to political considerations, 
the Spaniards offered the Protestants greater conces- 
sions than even France had been willing to give. The 
Grisons accepted the bribe, and undertook to rise against 
the French, whom they had welcomed as deliverers. 
Rohan found his position untenable without native 
support, and was forced to evacuate the territory of the 
Leagues. The Hapsburgs thus recovered the interrupted 
communication between Tyrol and Lombardy. The only 
counterpoise to these disasters was an event which 
must have been peculiarly gratifying to Richelieu. For 
ten years he had laboured to create a French navy, and 
in 1636 he had been rewarded by the appearance in the 
Mediterranean of a fleet of more than forty vessels. 
Nothing was achieved in that year, owing to want of 
agreement between the joint commanders, count 
Harcourt and the archbishop of Bordeaux. But in 
1637 the fleet sailed from the harbours of Provence, and 
after threatening a descent upon Sardinia, returned to 
recover the two islands of Lerins, which had been 
occupied for two years by the Spaniards. It was a 
small triumph in itself, but it was a relief to the 
national pride, and it presaged a great change in the 



144 EICHELIEU chap. 

balance of maritime power in Southern Europe. A 
powerful French navy could inflict more damage upon 
the scattered empire of Spain than a succession of the 
most brilliant victories by land. 

The Thirty Years' War had developed, mainly under 
Eichelieu's guidance, into a duel between the houses of 
Hapsburg and Bourbon, and it was evident that the 
struggle would be long and desperate. But Eichelieu 
showed no signs of flinching from the task which he 
had undertaken. He v/as resolute not to make peace 
until he had obtained substantial advantages for his 
country, and until he had broken the power of her 
rival. France, in spite of financial mismanagement, 
was the least exhausted of the combatants. The 
campaign of 1637, although it had not been dazzlingly 
successful, had at any rate opened the prospect of better 
things. It was with some confidence that the cardinal 
set to work to renew his alliance with the Swedes and 
Bernhard of Saxe- Weimar, while he made strenuous 
preparations for simultaneous hostilities in Elsass, the 
Netherlands, Italy, the Spanish frontier, and on the sea. 
Of so many enterprises, it was impossible that all 
should be equally successful, but it may be safely 
affirmed that none was without important and lasting 
results. 

With the year 1638 begins the series of triumphs 
which have given to Eichelieu his almost unequalled 
reputation as a statesman. If he had died at the end 
of 1637 he would be remembered as a great home 
minister, who had crushed the princes, rendered the 
Huguenots powerless, and supplied the despotic mon- 
archy with an efficient administrative machinery. It 



VII REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 145 

was during the next five years that he earned un- 
dying fame as the man who crushed the power of 
the house of Hapsburg, secured the ascendency of the 
house of Bourbon, and gave an impulse to the history 
of Europe which was felt for more than a century after 
his death. And he has the further claim to admiration 
that for all his achievements both at home and abroad 
he had consciously and intentionally laboured. Hitherto 
we have been tracing the period of preparation and of 
partial failure. Space allows only a brief effort to 
point out the direction and extent of his triumphs. 

The first, and perhaps in French eyes the greatest of 
Richelieu's successes was the conquest of Elsass. The 
hero of this achievement was Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, 
a descendant of the Albertine line of Saxony, which 
had championed the Protestant cause against Charles Y., 
and had paid for its religious zeal by the confiscation of 
its territories. Bernhard's great ambition was to revive 
the glories of his family by the acquisition of a German 
principality. It was with this object that he had joined 
the Swedes, and after the death of Gustavus Adolphus 
he had almost succeeded in erecting a principality in 
Franconia. But the battle of Nordlingen had destroyed 
his hopes, and had forced him to accept the French alliance 
as the only means of making head against the emperor. 
Richelieu had hastened to secure so valuable an ally 
by promising him French aid in acquiring the land- 
graviate of Elsass, the oldest possession of the Austrian 
Hapsburgs. For three years, owing mainly to the 
absorption of France in the Netherlands, Bernhard had 
made little advance towards the goal of his endeavours. 
But in 1638 Richelieu decided to make Elsass the 

L 



146 RICHELIEU chap. 

principal scene of warfare. He paid up the arrears of 
the promised subsidies, and promised to make no treaty 
which did not secure the interests of Bernhard and his 
army. Thus encouraged, Bernhard hastened to take 
the field before the winter was over. He had already 
captured three towns in the Breisgau, and was besieging 
Rheinf elden when the Imperialists attacked his camp, and 
after an obstinate struggle forced him to retreat. Nothing 
daunted by this check, he reorganised his forces, and 
three days later fell upon the enemy while they were 
still celebrating their victory. The surprise was com- 
pletely successful. The Imperialist generals, among 
whom was the famous John of Werth, fell, with the 
standards and artillery, into Bernhard's hands. Bhein- 
felden at once surrendered, and in a few weeks the 
whole of the Breisgau was reduced to submission. 

Bernhard now crossed to the right bank of the Rhine 
and laid siege to Breisach, the famous fortress which 
commanded Elsass, and enabled its possessor to control 
the line of communication between Italy and the Nether- 
lands. The importance of Breisach was fully realised 
by the Spaniards, and numberless efforts were made to 
relieve the garrison. But Bernhard succeeded in re- 
pulsing all attacks, and on December 19 Breisach was 
forced to open its gates. The conquest of Elsass was 
assured. But the advantage to France was by no means 
so immediate or obvious. Bernhard was fighting his 
own battle and that of Protestantism, and had no inten- 
tion of being used as a catspaw by his ally. To the 
demand that he should recognise French suzerainty over 
Elsass, he replied that he would not be the first to par- 
tition the German Empire. But the erection of an 



VII REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 147 

independent and powerful principality on the French 
frontier was by no means in accordance with Eichelieu's 
wishes. Bernhard seemed likely to prove as inconvenient 
and unmanageable as Gustavus Adolphus. But here 
fortune came to the assistance of France, as it had done in 
1632. Bernhard was eager to secure his new principality 
by forcing the emperor to make peace. To effect this 
he determined in 1639 to march westward in order to 
support the Swedish general, Baner, who was invading 
Bohemia. But his health was already broken by 
anxieties and fatigue, and he had hardly crossed the 
Rhine when he died, on July 1 5, at the age of thirty-six. 
By his will he left his army to the joint command of 
his generals, and his territories to whichever of his 
brothers would accept them. Bernhard's death was 
Eichelieu's opportunity. French gold purchased the 
allegiance of the German officers and troops, who accepted 
a French commander and admitted a French garrison into 
Breisach. France had secured a hold upon Elsass which 
nothing but a series of signal and unexpected reverses 
could compel her to relax. At the same time a fatal 
blow was dealt at the cohesion of the Spanish Empire. 
In Italy the French triumphs, though rather later, 
were hardly less decisive, and they were the more 
gratifying because they were directly due to the courage 
and generalship of Frenchmen. The death of Victor 
Amadeus of Savoy had left the regency for his infant son 
in the hands of his widow, Christine. She was a sister 
of Louis XIII. , but she was anxious to adopt a neutral 
attitude in order to secure the interests of her children. 
She was, however, forced into a French alliance by 
the diplomacy of Richelieu, and by the open hostility of 



148 RICHELIEU chap. 

the Spaniards, who found allies in her brothers-in-law, 
Thomas and Maurice. Armed with an imperial edict 
annulling the will of the late duke, and supported by 
Lleganes, the Spanish governor of Milan, the two princes 
headed a revolt in Piedmont against Christine. Eichelieu 
did not hesitate to take advantage of the duchess's 
difficulties to secure the interests of France, and de- 
manded the admission of French garrisons into the 
capital and chief fortresses of Piedmont. But Christine, 
whose public conduct was more creditable than her 
private life, refused to sacrifice the independence of her 
son's territories even to her own brother. She would 
only consent to the temporary occupation of three minor 
fortresses. For the moment she suffered for her patriot- 
ism: in the autumn of 1639 both Turin and Nice fell 
into the hands of her opponents, and she was formally 
deposed from the regency. 

Christine now fled from Piedmont to Savoy, whither 
she had already sent the young duke for safety. At 
Grenoble she had a personal interview with Louis XIII. 
and the cardinal, and again discovered that disinterested 
assistance was the last thing she could expect from the 
country of her birth. Eichelieu demanded that the 
young duke should be sent to Paris to be educated, and 
that the whole of Savoy, together with the places in 
Piedmont which still held out, should be handed over 
to French occupation. But the duchess, hard pressed 
as she was, refused to entrust her son to foreign custody, 
and insisted upon reserving the fortress of Montmelian 
as his residence. Eichelieu did not conceal his irritation 
at what he called Christine's obstinacy, but he could not 
allow the Spaniards to retain their hold on Piedmont. 



VII REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 149 

The cardinal de la Valette, who had been sent to 
command in Italy, had died there in September 1639. 
He was the only son of Epernon, who was loyal to 
Richelieu, and he owed his military employments more 
to the minister's gratitude than to his own capacity. 
His place was taken by Count Harcourt, the first of the 
distinguished French generals who obtained their train- 
ing in this war. In 1640 Harcourt commenced the 
campaign which laid the foundation for the military 
prestige of France. By a bold march he forced Lleganes, 
though at the head of a vastly superior force, to raise 
the siege of Casale. Thence the French returned to 
undertake the siege of Turin. Meanwhile Lleganes 
collected all the Spanish troops and advanced to the aid 
of Prince Thomas, who commanded the defending garri- 
son. Harcourt found himself at once besieger and 
besieged, and his army was threatened with disease and 
starvation. Fortunately the enemy, instead of harassing 
the French and avoiding a direct conflict, tried to crush 
them by a combined attack. After a desperate struggle 
under the walls of Turin, Harcourt succeeded not only 
in forcing the garrison back to the city, but also in 
driving the Spaniards from their position. After two 
months of blockade the garrison could hold out no longer. 
A last effort on the part of Lleganes to break through 
the besiegers was repulsed, and on September 22 
Turin opened its gates. "I would rather be Count 
Harcourt than emperor ! " said the captive John of 
Werth, when he heard the news of this achievement. 
In November Christine returned to her capital amidst the 
applause of the citizens. By the end of another year the 
Spaniards had been completely driven from Piedmont. 



150 RICHELIEU chap. 

For the victories in Italy Eichelieu was indebted to 
the capacity of subordinates, whom he had selected and 
inspired, but whose actions he could not direct. For 
the naval triumphs of France he may claim far more 
personal glory, as he was the virtual creator of the 
French navy. Hitherto the only achievement of the 
fleet had been the capture of the L6rins, and there had 
been no attempt to meet the Spaniards in open battle. 
But the year 1638 witnessed the first serious blow to 
that maritime ascendency without which Spain could 
hardly defend its own territories, much less prove for- 
midable to foreign states. On August 22 Archbishop 
Sourdis attacked and almost destroyed a Spanish squad- 
ron off Guetaria in the Bay of Biscay. Only a week 
later fifteen French vessels under Pont-Courlay, a 
nephew of Eichelieu, assaulted an equal number of 
Spanish ships near Genoa. The struggle was long 
and exhausting, but the superior artillery of the 
French gave them an advantage at close quarters, 
and their victory was crowned by the capture of the 
Spanish admiral. This success, though smaller, was 
even more significant than that of Guetaria, because 
the Spanish power had, since Lepanto, no rival on the 
Mediterranean, whereas in the northern seas it was already 
threatened by the growing navy of the United Provinces. 
In 1639 events at sea were still more decisive. A large 
Spanish fleet succeeded in evading the watchfulness of 
Sourdis, and reached the English Channel. There it 
met the Dutch under Martin Tromp, and after fighting 
for two days the Spaniards sought the Downs and the 
shelter of the English coast. While Charles I. was 
higgling with Spain about the price to be paid for 



VII REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 151 

his protection, Kichelieu succeeded in conveying to 
Tromp an intimation to disregard the threats of 
England. Nothing loth, the Dutch admiral sailed 
against the Spanish fleet, and almost completely de- 
stroyed it (October 11). Barely ten of the great 
galleons succeeded in reaching Dunkirk in safety. 
Spain had experienced no such crushing disaster since 
the loss of the great Armada. With its fleet shattered 
and Breisach in the hands of the French, it was almost 
impossible to send assistance to the Netherlands. 

Since the treaty of 1629 Eichelieu had little to fear 
from the hostility of England. Charles I. seemed 
determined to maintain an inexpensive if inglorious 
neutrality, and he was alienated from Spain by the 
steady refusal to do anything for the Palatine family. 
But the growing naval power of France excited mis- 
givings in England. Charles was indignant at the 
insult to the English flag in the Downs, and Henrietta 
Maria was not disinclined to espouse the cause of her 
mother against the minister who condemned her to 
life-long exile. But Eichelieu had weapons ready to 
hand against the English king, and he did not scruple 
to use them. French agents and French money had 
no small part in stirring up that Scotch rebellion which 
dealt the first fatal blow to Stuart despotism. And 
when the expenses and failures of the war forced Charles 
at last to summon the Long Parliament, Kichelieu did 
not hesitate to establish relations with the opposition 
party, which had less cause than the king to favour 
Spain. No doubt the Great Eebellion would have 
arisen if Eichelieu had never lived, but he had some 
share in moulding the actual events which led to it. It 



152 RICHELIEU chap. 

was even reported and believed that when Charles 
endeavoured to seize the five members, the warning 
which enabled them to escape came from the French 
ambassador. The minister who did more than any 
other man to establish absolutism in France may claim 
to have assisted — from purely selfish motives — in the 
vindication of liberty in England. 

The same keen insight which enabled Richelieu to 
appreciate and make use of the elements of discontent 
and opposition in England and Scotland was equally 
apparent in his relations with the Spanish peninsula. 
Spain, unlike France, was never a united state. The 
Hapsburgs were primarily kings of Castile, and they 
ruled the other parts of the peninsula as dependent 
provinces, no better ofi" than Naples or Milan. This 
policy was not likely to conciliate a population in which 
local prejudices and traditions were always stronger 
than central interests. The two extremes of the 
peninsula, Portugal and Catalonia, were especially 
alienated by a government which trampled upon their 
pride and their aspirations to independence. Olivares, 
the all-powerful minister of Philip IV., saw the weak- 
ness of Spain, but could not devise the proper remedy. 
He attributed the superiority of France, quite rightly, 
to its greater unity and centralisation, and thought to 
exalt his own country by imitating the government of 
his rival. But it was not easy to make the bonds more 
tolerable merely by tightening them. The only result 
of his premature experiment was to provoke a double 
rebellion, which France was quite ready to ferment and 
to use for its own advantage. 

The local militia of Catalonia had loyally defended 



VII REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 153 

tlie little province of Roussillon against French invasion 
in 1639. But the people resented the outrages of the 
Castilian troops, who were quartered upon them during 
the winter. Early in 1640 Olivares issued an edict 
ordering the enrolment of all men capable of bearing 
arms to serve wherever they should be sent. This was 
contrary to the traditional privileges of the provinces, and 
excited a general revolt. As the government of Madrid 
would make no concessions, the rebels turned for assist- 
ance to France. Richelieu had no scruples about the 
legitimacy of a revolt which served his plans, and 
promised to send officers and 8000 men to aid the 
Catalans. Nor was a mere diversion of the enemy's 
attention the only result at which he aimed. In 
January 1641 a treaty was arranged by which the 
Catalans were to become not only the allies but the 
subjects of France, on condition that their liberties 
should be respected. The Pyrenees had never been a 
boundary, and for centuries Spanish rule had extended 
north of the mountain range. Now France threatened 
to advance to the Ebro, once the limit of the power of 
Charles the Great. 

The example of Catalonia was promptly followed by 
Portugal, which had been annexed by Philip XL in 1580, 
but had never acquiesced in the rule of its conquerors. 
From the first declaration of war Eichelieu had reckoned 
upon Portuguese assistance, and his agents had been 
busy in encouraging and stirring up discontent. Prob- 
ably the revolt would have begun sooner but for the 
moderation or timidity of the duke of Braganza, the 
largest landholder in Portugal and the representative of 
the old royal line. But in 1640 circumstances were 



154 RICHELIEU chap. 

too favourable to be neglected. The nobles refused to 
obey the order of Olivares to march against Catalonia, 
and could only avoid the penalty of disobedience by 
rebellion. The scruples of the duke of Braganza were 
overcome by French representations, and in December 
he was proclaimed king as John IV. Never was a 
revolution accomplished with greater ease or unanimity. 
The first act of the new king was to conclude a treaty 
with France, which promised to aid him against Spain, 
while he pledged himself to conclude no treaty without 
French approval. 

In the Netherlands events were not so rapid or 
decisive as elsewhere; but here also the year 1640 
witnessed an important triumph for France. In June 
the French army laid siege to Arras, the strongly-forti- 
fied capital of the border province of Artois. Artois 
was an ancient fief of France, but had been freed from 
vassalage by Charles V. The Cardinal Infant and the 
duke of Lorraine tried to harass the besiegers by 
occupying the adjacent country and cutting off sup- 
plies. Eichelieu himself went to Amiens to superin- 
tend the sending of reinforcements and provisions to 
Arras. A regular army was formed to conduct the 
convoy. Before it could arrive the Spaniards made a 
desperate attack upon the French camp, but were 
repulsed. This failure was decisive. On August 9 the 
town of Arras was surrendered, and the province of 
Artois was declared to be reunited to the French 
crown. It was a conquest which France was not likely 
to relinquish. 

The aspect of affairs had undergone a startling 
change since 1636. In that year the Spaniards had 



v-ii REVERSES AND TRIUMPHS 155 

been victors on French soil, and their advance had 
excited a panic in the French capital. In 1640 France 
was not only secure against invasion, but its frontier 
had been advanced in the east, in the north, and in the 
south, and its great rival, Spain, was threatened with 
imminent dissolution. The connection with the Nether- 
lands was already destroyed, and the French fleet in the 
Mediterranean made communication with Italy difficult 
and dangerous. In the peninsula itself two provinces 
were in open revolt, and one of them seemed likely to 
become a part of France. The man who, in five years, 
had produced such marvellous results was Richelieu. 

While the cardinal's foreign policy had been at- 
tended with such gratifying success, an event had 
occurred at home which he regarded with even greater 
satisfaction. The essential weakness of Richelieu's 
position was the fact that Louis XIII. was childless, 
and that the heir to the throne was his inveterate 
opponent, the feeble and vicious Gaston of Orleans. 
But on September 5, 1638, after twenty-three years of 
married life, Anne of Austria rendered her first service 
to the minister whom she detested by giving birth to a 
dauphin, afterwards Louis XIV. Richelieu presented 
a diamond rose to the messenger who brought him the 
welcome news, and all France shared in his exultation. 
In 1640 the succession was still further secured by the 
hirth of a second son, the ancestor of the house of 
Orleans. 

One misfortune clouded the felicity of the grand 
period of Richelieu's career. In December 1638, just 
after the news of the capture of Breisach, he lost Father 
Joseph, " his prop and consolation," as he called him in 



156 RICHELIEU chap, vii 

the first fervour of his grief. Richelieu's detractors 
have not hesitated to make the most of the obscurity 
which covers the relations between these two men. 
They have contended that Father Joseph was the brain 
and Eichelieu the arm ; that the red cardinal was only 
the marionette who danced before the public, while the 
grey cardinal pulled the strings. To such assertions 
or innuendoes no answer is possible except that there 
is no evidence for it, and against it we have not only 
antecedent improbability, but the fact that Eichelieu's 
policy and character show no signs of vacillation or 
weakness after the death of his friend. The only 
reasonable conclusion is that the Capuchin monk was 
the most able and perhaps the most trusted of the few 
confidential agents whom Richelieu collected round 
him, but that there is no ground for believing that he 
was more than a familiar adviser whose counsel was 
always valued, but not always adopted. 



CHAPTER VIII 

DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 

Richelieu's influence almost as great in France as abroad — The aims 
of his domestic policy — Treatment of the Huguenots — Measures 
against the nohles : the destruction of fortresses ; edict against 
duelling; appointment of intendants — Relations with the 
Parliament of Paris — Hostility to the provincial estates — 
Organisation of the Conseil du Roy — The Conseil d'etat — 
Centralisation inevitable — Merits of Richelieu's government : 
military and naval organisation ; patronage of commerce and 
colonisation — Defects : neglect of manufactures and agri- 
culture ; financial maladministration — Attempts to conciliate 
public opinion — Meetings of notables — Patronage of literature 
and foundation of the Academy— Origin of the Gazette de la 
France. 

The foremost statesmen of history may be roughly 
divided into two chief classes. Some are great diplom- 
atists, endowed with a natural gift for understanding 
and influencing the relations between the great states 
of their time, and they employ this gift to such purpose 
as to secure the prestige and the material advancement 
of their own country, and thereby profoundly influence 
the general history of the world. Others concentrate 
their attention mainly upon domestic problems : either 
upon economic questions, such as the development of 
trade, or manufactures, or colonisation ; or upon more 



158 RICHELIEU chap. 

purely political questions, such as the relations of classes 
to each other or to the crown, the extension or limita- 
tion of local independence, the widening or narrowing 
of the basis of government. It is one of Eichelieu's 
claims to exceptional distinction that he belongs to both 
these classes. For good or for evil, he left an inefface- 
able mark both upon the general history of Europe and 
upon the internal development of France. It may be 
contended that he was more successful as a diplomatist 
than as a ruler of France, that he was too much absorbed 
in foreign politics to give sufficient attention to the 
solution of domestic problems ; but there can be no 
doubt that his influence was equally great in both 
departments of government. 

The aims of Eichelieu's domestic policy are extremely 
simple, and they have been described by himself with 
equal point and clearness in the " brief narration of the 
great actions of the king," which he drew up towards 
the close of his ministry. " When your Majesty resolved 
to admit me to his council and to a share in his confid- 
ence, I can say with truth that the Huguenots divided 
the State with the monarchy, that the nobles behaved 
as if they were not subjects, and that the chief governors 
of provinces acted as if they had been independent 
sovereigns. ... I then undertook to employ all my 
energy and all the authority that you were pleased to 
give me to ruin the Huguenot faction, to humble the 
pride of the nobles, to reduce all your subjects to their 
duty, and to exalt your name to its proper position 
among foreign nations." Hostile critics have contended 
that the dangers from the Huguenots and the nobles 
were less than Eichelieu would have us believe, but no 



VIII DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 159 

one has denied that he made it his first object to estab- 
lish the unity of France, that he conceived a strong 
monarchy to be the only basis of that unity, and that 
he set himself resolutely to remove or destroy all 
obstacles to the direct and efficient exercise of the 
central power. 

Eicheiieu's treatment of the Huguenots has been al- 
ready sufficiently described. He deprived them of their 
exceptional privileges and securities, reduced them to 
political impotence, but left them in the enjoyment of re- 
ligious liberty. The result was that many of the nobles, 
who had espoused the reformed doctrines mainly as a 
means of recovering independence, returned to orthodoxy 
in the hope of gaining court favour. An orderly and 
governing mind could hardly fail to appreciate the value 
of uniformity of belief and worship as a bulwark of 
national unity, and there were not wanting advisers to 
urge upon Richelieu that a little politic pressure might 
result in the extinction of a sect with which he had 
scant reason to sympathise. But the cardinal steadily 
refused to risk the undoing of the work he had accom- 
plished and to revive religious discord by persecution. 
His complaint against the Huguenots had been that 
they were Protestants first and Frenchmen afterwards ; 
if they would only consent to be Frenchmen in the first 
place, and to regard patriotic devotion as their primary 
duty, he had no desire to alienate them once more from 
the state by attempting to enforce religious conformity. 
His moderation was rewarded with complete success. 
The Huguenots showed their gratitude by becoming in 
the next generation not only the most industrious and 
thrifty, but also the most loyal subjects of the crown. 



160 RICHELIEU chap. 

The list of great commanders whose ability turned the 
scale in the struggle between France and Spain would 
be sadly diminished, both in numbers and in brilliance, 
if it had not included such famous Huguenots as 
Gassion, de la Force, de Eohan, Duquesne, and Turenne. 

The Vicomte d'Avenel, in his great work on 
Bichelieu et la Monarchie Ahsolue, has endeavoured to 
defend the French nobles from the charges of factious 
disloyalty which constitute the sole justification of 
Eichelieu's harsh treatment of their order. But his 
special pleading, learned and ingenious as it is, breaks 
down before the bare facts of history during the religious 
wars, the regency of Mary de Medici, and the Fronde. 
It is impossible for any unprejudiced reader of those 
periods to avoid the conclusion that as a class the 
nobles were the most dangerous and useless part of the 
population. Their pretensions to lawless independence 
were equally inconsistent with the efficiency of the 
central government and with the prosperity of the 
people. They had ceased to perform most of the 
duties which had devolved upon them in the days of the 
feudal system, yet they retained all the privileges and 
exemptions which they had gained in consideration of 
their discharge of these duties. The relations of the 
chief nobles with Gaston of Orleans and the queen- 
mother, together with the fact that the foreign enemies 
of France openly encouraged and exulted in these 
divisions, would have justified Richelieu's attitude on 
the simple ground of self-defence, even if it were im- 
possible to find any higher motive for his actions. 

The power of the French nobles rested mainly upon 
a triple basis : (1) their strongly-fortified castles, each 



VIII DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 161 

of which required a separate siege for its redaction ; 
(2) their contempt for ordinary jurisdiction, and their 
claim to settle their own disputes by what had once 
been their recognised right — private war ; (3) the power 
which they exercised in the provinces through their 
position as governors. With that insight which is 
always the highest proof of statesmanship, Eichelieu 
struck directly at the foundations, confident that if they 
could be overthrown the superstructure would topple 
down of its own accord. In 1626 two important edicts 
were issued. One ordered the destruction of all 
fortresses, except such as were needed for the defence of 
the frontiers, and forbade in the future the fortification 
of private houses. The other prohibited duelling on 
pain of death. The first of these edicts was carried out 
amidst the applause of burghers and peasants. It has 
been urged that the compulsory demolition was un- 
necessary, and therefore of slight importance, that the 
changed habits of the nobles required comfort rather 
than fortifications, and that the later style of baronial 
residence would have come in of its own accord without 
any action on the part of the government. But this 
argument carries with it its own refutation. The 
changed habits of the nobles were the result, not the 
cause, of their political impotence ; and that impotence 
arose from the disappearance of the old sense of 
impunity, to which the loss of defensible walls un- 
questionably contributed. The edict against duels, in 
spite of the severity dealt out to Bouteville and des 
Chapelles, was not enforced with anything like the 
same stringency. Eichelieu himself had too much of the 
sentiment of his noble birth and his military training 

M 



162 RICHELIEU chap. 

not to feel a real sympathy for the traditional method 
of defending personal honour. No execution for which 
he was responsible cost him more hesitation and mis- 
givings than that of Bouteville, and he devotes several 
pages of his Memoirs to a regretful estimate of his 
merits and misfortunes. It was rather the general 
character of Richelieu's administration than the letter 
of any particular edict which caused the gradual decline 
of the practice of duelling. 

When Richelieu entered the ministry in 1624 he 
found the chief provinces divided among nineteen 
governors, all of them belonging to the highest rank of 
nobility. These regarded their posts as private and 
heritable property to be administered for their personal 
interests. Whenever they had occasion to quarrel with 
the court, it was to their province that they retreated, 
either as a secure asylum or as a source of strength for 
attack. By the time of the cardinal's death, only four 
of these nineteen governors retained their position. 
The rest had been removed to make room for officials 
whom the minister could trust. And a terrible lesson 
of the duty and necessity of obedience had been taught 
to these local rulers by the defeat and execution of 
Montmorency in his own province of Languedoc. But 
by far the greatest blow to the authority of the nobles 
was dealt by the appointment of intendants. A small 
literature has arisen in recent years on the subject of 
the origin of these famous officials. An edict of 1635 
which had long been regarded as marking the definite 
creation of intendants has been conclusively proved to 
have no reference to them. It has been further proved 
that mattres des reguUes of the royal council had been fre- 



VIII DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 163 

quently sent out to the provinces in the sixteenth century 
with the title of intendant, and with special instructions 
to supervise and control local administration. But the 
tradition which regards Richelieu as their real author 
has still a substantial foundation. It was he who made 
the intendants permanent officials, who extended them 
to the whole kingdom, and gave them their complete 
functions as intendants of justice, police, and finance. 
No single edict determined their appointment or defined 
their powers, but gradually they obtained the supreme 
control of all departments of administration, and became 
the recognised channel of communication between their 
districts and the royal council. The jealousy which 
they inspired among the privileged classes is illustrated 
by the fact that one of the first demands of the Fronde 
was for their suppression. But under Louis XIV. they 
were restored, to become the agents of that efficient, 
if excessive centralisation, which constituted at once 
the strength and the weakness of the later Bourbon 
monarchy. The nobles retained their dignity and 
their revenues as provincial governors, but all substan- 
tial authority passed to the middle-class officials, who 
had neither the means nor the temptation to resist the 
crown. 

It would take too long to examine in detail all the 
measures taken by Richelieu to simplify and centralise 
the government of France. He suppressed the ancient 
and dignified offices of constable and admiral because 
they gave their holders a power too great to be safely 
entrusted to a subject. He never summoned the States- 
General, and he sternly checked the political pretensions 
of that most interesting and unique of judicial courts. 



164 RICHELIEU chap. 

the Parliament of Paris. By an edict of 1641 the 
parliament was forbidden to take any cognisances of 
affairs of state, unless its advice was specially asked by 
the king; all edicts on matters of government or 
administration are to be registered at once without 
opposition or debate ; on financial matters the parlia- 
ment is forbidden to introduce amendments ; any re- 
monstrances it may wish to make must be presented at 
once, and if they are rejected, registration is to follow 
as a matter of course ; finally, the old formula of 
refusal, "we ought not and cannot," is expressly pro- 
hibited as injurious to the authority of the prince. Nor 
was Eichelieu content with this suppression of political 
powers, to which the claim was of more than doubtful 
validity ; he also encroached upon the undoubted rights 
of jurisdiction which the court had always possessed. 
In spite of the vigorous and well- justified protests, both 
of the parliament and of the accused, the trial of 
prominent political offenders was in all cases withdrawn 
from the cognisance of the supreme law court, and 
entrusted to extraordinary commissions nominated for 
each case. This exceptional jurisdiction, which enabled 
Eichelieu to give a dangerous latitude and vagueness to 
offences against the state, was one of the most arbitrary 
and least defensible features of his administration. 

Of the local liberties which had survived in some 
parts of France Richelieu showed himself the bitter 
enemy. Most of the provinces were pays d'Sledion, i.e. 
they were divided into districts in which the assessment 
and collection of taxes were vested in royal officials 
called dlus. But several provinces had retained repre- 
sentative institutions, either by custom or by special 



VIII DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 165 

agreement made at the time of their annexation to the 
crown. The chief of these pays d'Mats were Languedoc, 
Normandy, Brittany, Burgundy, Provence, and Dauphine. 
The composition and powers of the provincial estates 
varied in innumerable details, but all had one common 
privilege : they made their own financial bargains with 
the crown, and they appointed their own ofiicials to 
assess and collect their contributions to the state. The 
suppression in 1629 of the Huguenot revolt in Lan- 
guedoc gave Eichelieu an opportunity for attempting 
the suppression of this privilege, and edicts were issued 
to extend the division into Sections to all the provinces 
of France. These edicts were finally enforced in Nor- 
mandy and Dauphin^. In the latter the estates were 
altogether abolished, and in Normandy, though the 
estates continued to meet till their final suppression in 
1666, they lost all practical power. In the other 
provinces the edicts provoked strenuous remonstrances 
and resistance, to which Eichelieu, warned by Mont- 
morency's rising in Languedoc, found it advisable to 
yield. In Languedoc, Burgundy, and Provence the 
elections were abolished, but these provinces had to 
purchase the concession by heavy money payments and 
by accepting conditions which deprived the provincial 
estates of much of their independence. For instance, 
in Languedoc, by far the most important of the pays 
d^etats, the estates were only allowed to meet every other 
year : their session was limited to fifteen days, and they 
were strictly forbidden to levy any tax or loan without 
the royal approval. In Brittany alone, where the com- 
position of the estates was least democratic, and where 
Richelieu had special authority, both as governor and 



166 RICHELIEU chap. 

as head of the maritime administration, no special 
attempt was made to harass the provincial assembly, 
which indeed had shown a desire to aid rather than to 
impede the minister's policy. But even in Brittany 
some changes were made to the advantage of the crown. 
The nobles lost the right of personal attendance, ' and 
could only appear when authorised by royal letters- 
patent, and the towns which were to send deputies to 
the meeting were to be selected on each occasion by the 
governor. In this connection, too, it must be remem- 
bered that the institution of intendants contributed to 
strengthen the control of the central government over 
both ^ays d'Stats and pays d'Sledions. 

One obvious result of Richelieu's policy was to throw 
a vast increase of work upon the royal council, and 
it was necessary to improve its organisation so as to 
enable it to meet its enlarged duties and responsibili- 
ties. Richelieu's arrangements, which lasted, with slight 
changes in detail, till the fall of the monarchy, may be 
instructively compared with the organisation of the 
Privy Council undertaken by the Tudor kings under 
the pressure of similar necessities. To render the 
conduct of business regular and uniform the council 
was split into sections, which met on special days for the 
consideration of particular departments. On Tuesdays 
was held the conseil des ddpkhes, which was responsible 
for the provincial administration. To it were sent all 
reports from the governors and other local officers, 
and its functions resemble those of our Home Office. 
The conseil des finances sat twice a week — on Wednes- 
days, to consider all questions connected with assess- 
ment and expenditure, and on Thursdays, to hear all 



vm DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 167 

appeals on financial matters, either from officials or from 
private individuals. On Saturdays was held the conseil 
des parties or the conseil priv^. This was a purely judicial 
body. Before it were brought appeals from other courts 
to the crown, and a number of cases of first instance, 
especially those in which officials were interested, which 
were evoked from the ordinary courts to the royal 
council. These councils must not be regarded as 
distinct bodies, but as parts of the same body. The 
great officers of state, the chancellor, the surinfendant 
des finances, and the four secretaries of state, were 
members of all the divisions, and so were many of the 
ordinary councillors. The business of each section was 
prepared and reported upon by a number of mattres des 
requites, who took it in turns to serve at the council for 
three months at a time. At other times they were 
employed in special commissions in the royal service. 
These men formed the nursery of French administrators, 
and it was from among them that the intendants were 
always selected. 

But this elaborate organisation was only concerned 
w^ith the routine work of administration. The conseil 
du roy, like the English Privy Council under the later 
Stuarts, had become too numerous and clumsy a body 
to provide that secrecy and concentration which a 
despotism always requires, and especially for foreign 
affairs. The same motives which led in England to the 
growth of the Cabinet, produced a similar institution in 
France, which is variously known as the conseil d'Stat, 
the conseil d^en haut, conseil itroit or conseil prive. 

It is impossible to describe Eichelieu as the founder 
of this institution, which grew out of obvious necessities ; 



168 RICHELIEU chap. 

but it was he who gave it the form and the importance 
which it retained till the Eevolution. The council of 
state — to choose one out of its numerous appellations — 
had the sole consideration of foreign affairs, which had 
formerly gone to the conseil des ddpeches, and it possessed 
the real initiative and decisive voice in all domestic 
matters. Its members, who were always nominated by 
the king, were called ministres d'Staf. The chief officers 
of state were usually, but not necessarily, included in 
the council, but the king often admitted men who held 
no special office. The king himself presided, and in his 
absence the first minister. The powers of the council 
were in appearance very great. It quashed the decisions 
of ordinary courts, it evoked cases for its own considera- 
tion, and appointed extraordinary judicial commissions. 
It issued the edicts which became law on registration 
by the parliament. It could make peace or war, 
determine the amount and method of taxation, and 
supervise the conduct of all other administrative bodies. 
But these enormous powers were in reality not the 
powers of the council but of the crown. The ministers 
of state had no other function than to advise. There 
was no voting, and no decision by a majority. The 
members stated their opinion, often in the form of a 
written memoir, but the king decided at his own 
pleasure. 

Thus Richelieu had erected an administrative system 
which survived the attacks of nobles and parliament 
in the Fronde, and justified the boast attributed to 
Louis XIV., VEtat c'est moil It is usual, though of 
doubtful fairness, to hold the cardinal responsible for 
the fact that succeeding kings abused the powers be- 



VIII DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 169 

queathed to them, or at any rate failed to use them 
for the best advantage of their country. It is the 
inherent vice of despotism that no human ingenuity 
can provide a succession of men wise and virtuous 
enough to be intrusted with that omnipotence which 
in the hands of a perfect ruler may be for a moment 
the best form of government in the world. English- 
men have, except for a short interval, preferred a 
government in which there is more balance of forces, 
more complicated machinery, and less individual initi- 
ative and responsibility. Such a system has many 
unquestionable defects; it is less simple, less logical, 
and less easy to work than a centralised despotism ; 
but it has the supreme merit of being safer, of leaving 
less to chance, of resting upon the average capacity of 
the many, rather than upon the possibility of excep- 
tional capacity in one. Those critics who condemn 
Richelieu for the ultimate failure of French despotism 
are of opinion that he ought to have founded, or tried 
to found, a constitutional government in France like 
that which gradually grew up in England. Instead of 
doing " everything for the people, and nothing by the 
people," he should have allowed the subjects some 
voice in their own government. To this criticism 
there is one simple and overwhelming answer : it was 
quite impossible. It would require a long analysis of 
French history and French institutions to furnish conclu- 
sive proof of this assertion, but it can be so established 
beyond question. Ever since the thirteenth century 
there had been an incurable twist against constitution- 
alism. The secret of the successful beginning of parlia- 
mentary government in England is to be found in the 



170 RICHELIEU chap. 

alliance of classes against the crown, which begins with 
the great struggle to extort the charter from John. 
Such an alliance is conspicuously absent in France, 
where from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century 
there is no single instance of a league between the 
nobles and the third estate to secure an interest common 
to both. The jealous hostility of classes in France 
enabled the crown to play off one against the other, 
and thus to raise itself to unchallenged supremacy. 
Geographical needs and the long struggles, first with 
England and afterwards with Spain, all contributed to 
the triumph of the monarchy. No statesman, how- 
ever great, can free himself from the influence of 
historical development, nor can he work with other 
instruments than those which are supplied to him from 
the past. In France there were two institutions which 
at one time or another claimed what we should call 
constitutional powers. The States -General, after a 
brief triumph in the middle of the fourteenth century, 
proved a complete and hopeless failure. The division 
into three orders, each more zealous for its selfish 
interests than for the general welfare, and the inability 
of the third estate to make its influence felt against 
the ascendency of nobles and clergy, condemned this 
assembly to sterile impotence. Kichelieu himself, as 
has been seen, was a prominent member of the States- 
General of 1614, and had seen enough to convince him 
that the success of France was not to be sought there. 
No similar assembly met till the eve of the Revolution. 
The disappearance of the States-General gave increased 
prominence and importance to the Parliament of Paris, 
which endeavoured to fill the gap thus created. This 



VIII DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 171 

hereditary corporation of judges aspired to emulate 
the English legislature, with which it had nothing in 
common but the name. The practice of registration 
enabled them to claim a right first of remonstrance and 
afterwards of veto on all legislation, and their independ- 
ence of royal nomination or dismissal gave this claim 
an importance which it would not otherwise have pos- 
sessed. But it would be the grossest mistake to argue 
from the spirited and often just opposition of the Par- 
liament to despotism that its members had any sym- 
pathy with popular wishes, or any understanding of 
popular needs. The Parliament of Paris, as was con- 
clusively shown on the eve of the Revolution, was 
really the last and firmest stronghold of official pre- 
judices and class privileges. If Richelieu ever seriously 
considered the alternatives he would have been right 
in deciding that it was better to trust the future of 
France to the monarchy than to a narrow and bigoted 
bureaucracy. In the one there was a chance of salva- 
tion, in the other there was none. 

The criterion by which Richelieu's government 
should be tested is to be sought, not in an estimate of 
the successes or blunders of the later Bourbons, but in 
an examination as to whether Richelieu himself made 
the best use of the authority which he established. 
That his foreign policy was prudent and far-sighted, 
and that it was guided by a single-minded desire to 
promote the interests of his country, has been generally 
admitted both by Frenchmen and by foreigners. But 
it is not easy to be equally positive about his domestic 
administration. Many of his measures may doubtless 
be praised without reserve. He revived the military 



172 RICHELIEU chap. 

organisation, which had fallen into chaos during the 
disorders of the religious wars. The steps which he 
took to increase the numbers of the army by an im- 
proved system of recruiting, to develop and systematise 
the commissariat, and to enforce strict discipline, antici- 
pated the more thorough reforms of le Tellier and 
Louvois, and began the process which made the French 
army for half a century the finest fighting force in the 
world. Still more personal credit is due to the naval 
administration, to which Richelieu gave strenuous and 
unflagging attention. When he came into office there 
was practically no navy at all, and in time of war the 
government had to depend upon the vessels it could 
hire from individuals. When Sully, under Henr}^ IV., 
was sent on an embassy to London, he had to make 
the voyage in an English vessel, and we have seen that 
Eichelieu, in his first measures against the Huguenots, 
was forced to employ borrowed ships from England and 
Holland. Thus the whole task of naval construction, 
of the forming and training of efficient crews, had to 
be begun from the very beginning. But Richelieu's 
energetic will was equal to all difficulties. By the time 
of his death France possessed thirty-two men of war in 
the Mediterranean, and twenty-four on the Atlantic 
coast, without counting the smaller vessels. And this 
force had shown itself fully capable on more than one 
occasion of holding its own against the naval power of 
Spain, which had hitherto been without a rival in 
Southern Europe. At the same time special attention 
was paid to the fortification of naval ports. The de- 
fences of Toulon in the south, and of Havre in the north, 
were immensely strengthened. Richelieu's special in- 



VIII DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 173 

terest in Poitou led him to exaggerate the importance 
of Brouage, on which large sums of money were wasted ; 
but he more than redeemed this mistake by creating 
the port of Brest, which was destined in the future to 
be the great French arsenal on the Atlantic. It is 
further to his credit that he recognised the important 
truth that the only sound basis of naval power is to be 
found in a mercantile marine, and that he spared no 
pains to extend French commerce and colonisation. He 
protected Mediterranean traders against the pirates 
of Algiers, Tunis, and Morocco, and he opened fresh 
markets in the north by commercial treaties with 
Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. His colonial policy was 
marred by the practice, common to all statesmen of 
that day, of entrusting colonial enterprise entirely to 
exclusive companies. These corporations, by which 
privileged individuals were protected at the expense of 
the general body of consumers, were extremely unsuc- 
cessful in French hands, partly through their excessive 
dependence upon state patronage and control, and partly 
through their total neglect of agriculture, and the con- 
sequent failure to form permanent and prosperous 
French settlements. Still, in spite of the inherent 
defects of the methods he employed, Richelieu's ministry 
marks a notable era in the history of French colonies. 
His support secured the restoration to Canada of 
Quebec and Nova Scotia, which had been seized by the 
English, and his encouragement also led to the estab- 
lishment of French settlements on the coast of Guiana 
and in the West Indian islands of St. Christopher, Mar- 
tinique, Guadaloupe, and St. Domingo, and in the east 
to the first attempt to occupy Madagascar, 



174 RICHELIEU chap. 

But against these measures, which were well- 
intentioned if not always wise, must be set an almost 
complete neglect of the internal wellbeing of France. 
In the history of the progress of French agriculture and 
manufactures there is a distinct and lamentable gap 
between the time of Sully and that of Colbert. In 
spite of the strongly-worded protests of the third estate 
in 1614, Richelieu left production hampered by the 
system of guilds and privileged corporations, and he 
made no attempt to remove or limit the provincial 
customs duties which acted as a barrier to internal trade, 
and as a hindrance to the complete realisation of 
national interests and unity. But by far the most serious 
charge against Richelieu's domestic government is based 
on his complete failure to reform the abuses of the 
financial administration of France. The direct taxes, 
from which the privileged classes were wholly exempt, 
were extremely oppressive in their incidence, especially 
in those provinces where the faille was levied on 
personal and not on real property. The indirect taxes, 
assessed for the most part on the selling prices of com- 
modities, were likewise extremely unequal, and con- 
stituted a direct discouragement to exchange. The 
gabelle on salt was perhaps the most ludicrously 
iniquitous tax recorded in the history of any civilised 
community. The sale of offices, a practice which had 
been going on for more than a century, had given rise to 
a disguised national debt, contracted on the most 
extravagant and ruinous terms. The practice of farm- 
ing the indirect taxes, and the constant insufficiency of 
the revenue to meet the expenditure, had placed the 
government at the mercy of the financiers, who were 



VIII DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 175 

accustomed to make large fortunes at the expense of the 
tax-payers. The secrecy and consequent disorder of the 
public accounts had facilitated fraud and peculation, and 
the reckless concessions to rebellious nobles during the 
king's minority had more than undone the reforms 
which Sully had introduced under Henry IV. 

Richelieu was not a trained economist, and many of 
the evils of the financial system were doubtless less 
obvious in the seventeenth than they are in the 
nineteenth century. But that contemporaries were 
fully alive to some of the worst abuses, and were 
clamorous for their removal, is fully established 
by the cahiers of the third estate in 1614. That 
Eichelieu himself was equally alive to the necessity of 
reform is proved, not so much by the dubious evidence 
of the so-called Testament Politique, as by numerous 
passages in his Memoirs, and by the detailed proposals 
which he submitted to the king in 1625. It is equally 
certain that Eichelieu was the only minister in French 
history who possessed sufficient authority and strength 
of will to carry through a sweeping measure of financial 
reform against the interested opposition of the privi- 
leged classes, who in the end succeeded in maintaining 
the old abuses till they were swept away by the 
Revolution. A few tentative measures were taken in 
his earlier years, such as the reduction of the taille by 
600,000 francs, and the appointment of a chamber of 
justice which mulcted the financiers of some of their 
ill-gotten gains. But these Acts led to no permanent 
improvement, and in the meantime the worst evils, the 
sale of offices, the gabelle, and the system of the ferme, 
were left absolutely untoucjied. And under the grow- 



176 RICHELIEU chap. 

ing pressure of military expenditure all idea of reform 
was ultimately abandoned. Every method of raising 
the revenue was strained to the uttermost. The 
opposition of the parliaments, of the provincial estates, 
and of armed rebellion, as in the case of the famous 
JVus-^ieds in Normandy, was ruthlessly suppressed. New 
offices were created for the purpose of selling them, and 
direct loans were raised at an ever -increasing rate of 
interest. The result was that after Eichelieu's death 
the queen regent found that the revenues of the next 
three years had been already spent. 

It has, of course, been urged by Richelieu's defenders 
that the greatest and most industrious statesman can- 
not do everything, and that a period of almost incessant 
war does not offer a favourable opportunity for the 
introduction of financial reforms. To the second argu- 
ment it may be answered that Eichelieu was in office 
for ten years before France was involved in war on a 
large scale, and that if he had set himself in those 
ten years to remedy acknowledged abuses, and to abolish 
or restrict harmful and obsolete privileges, he would 
have immensely increased the ability of the country to 
stand the strain of the vastly-increased expenditure 
after 1635. And to the first argument the possible 
answer has still more weight. Like many other notable 
rulers, Eichelieu was extremely jealous of the display of 
any independence or initiative on the part of his 
colleagues. In choosing them, he did not look for 
ability or even honesty so much as for absolute sub- 
mission to himself. The same autocratic assumption 
that impelled him to control from Paris the operations 
of generals in the field, led him at home to surround 



VIII DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 177 

himself, as time went on, with useful tools rather than 
with men of marked capacity. To this must be 
attributed the rapid though temporary decline of France 
after his death. In no branch of administration, except 
in diplomacy, did Eichelieu leave behind him a ready- 
trained politician capable of filling his place. It is not 
too much to say that the Fronde would never have 
taken place if Richelieu had thought more of securing 
efficiency in those departments to which he could not 
give sufficient personal attention, and less of con- 
centrating all authority in his own hands. 

This concentration may have been partially forced 
upon Richelieu by his isolation, and by the necessity of 
defending his authority against jealous opponents, but it 
had none the less disastrous results to the administra- 
tion of finance. On the fall of la Vieuville, the duties 
of sunntendojfit were divided between Michel Marillac 
and Champigny, of whom the former was undoubtedly 
the ablest of Richelieu's colleagues, and had also a 
genuine desire for reform. In 1626 Marillac was ap- 
pointed keeper of the seals, and the finances were in- 
trusted to the marquis d'Effiat. On his death in 1632 
the system of dual control was revived by the appoint- 
ment of Bullion and Bouthillier, whose chief qualifica- 
tion was that they were the docile agents of the 
cardinal, and after the former's death Bouthillier 
remained in office alone. These ministerial changes 
are coincident with a steady decline in the management 
of French finance. The short-lived and rather half- 
hearted reforms belong to the period of Marillac's 
tenure of office. Under d'Effiat some measure of order 
was preserved, and the public credit was maintained, 

N 



178 RICHELIEU chap. 

and in some respects improved, in spite of an increase 
of taxation. The reckless multiplication both of exac- 
tions and of indebtedness belongs to the time of Bullion 
and Bouthillier. 

There can be no doubt that Eichelieu's neglect of 
the paramount duty of financial reform, whether it be 
condemned or excused, was of decisive importance for 
the future history of France. No subsequent minister 
was strong enough to cleanse the Augean stable, and 
the partial improvement effected by Colbert was soon 
effaced by the lavish expenditure of Louis XIY. on 
luxury and war. Throughout the eighteenth century 
the efforts of France were crippled by the burden of a 
chronic deficit which threatened to bring the state to 
bankruptcy. It is impossible to exaggerate the import- 
ance to a state of a wholesome and efficient financial 
system. France was able to get the better of Spain 
because the economic condition of Spain was even worse 
than her own. But the decline of Spain and the 
exhaustion of Holland left France face to face with 
England, and the two states waged a long and desperate 
struggle for commercial and colonial expansion. The 
financial system of mediaeval England, though not so 
full of abuses as that of France, was almost equally 
inefficient and stationary. The greatest boon which the 
Commonwealth conferred upon England was the aboli- 
tion of the antiquated methods of taxation, and the 
substitution of a system which, whatever its faults in 
detail, had the supreme merit of making the national 
revenue proportionate to the nation's wealth. Among 
the many causes which helped England to gain the victory 
over France on the sea, in America and in India, not the 



VIII DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 179 

least important was the vast superiority of her financial 
administration, which enabled her to defray with com- 
parative ease an expenditure which reduced her rival to 
exhaustion and despair. This superiority might never 
have existed if Eichelieu or his colleagues had been 
far-sighted enough to grapple with problems from which 
they deliberately turned their attention. 

Although Richelieu deliberately set himself to 
establish absolutism and to free the monarchy from all 
effective restraints upon its action, it would be a great 
error to suppose that he recklessly disregarded public 
opinion, or that he failed to appreciate the strength 
which any government obtains by conciliating its 
support. It is true that he would have nothing to do 
with the States-General, but he summoned two im- 
portant meetings of Notables, one in 1626 to parade the 
national sanction of his anti-papal action in the matter 
of the Yaltelline, and the other in 1627 to strengthen 
his domestic position after the first conspiracy against 
him had ended in the execution of Chalais. Of course 
these meetings were carefully packed, and they were 
allowed no legislative powers. His motives for their 
convention were much the same as those which induced 
Simon de Montfort to summon the parliament of 1265, 
or Philip the Fair to hold the first sessions of the States- 
General. At the same time the Notables were allowed, 
especially in 1627, considerable latitude and liberty of 
discussion, and their debates gave to the measures and 
schemes of the government a publicity which a less 
enlightened despotism might have considered both 
dangerous and degrading. 

The same desire to satisfy and gain over opinion is 



180 RICHELIEU chap. 

apparent in his patronage of literature, though here 
personal tastes and interests combined to influence his 
action. He surrounded himself with a small regiment 
of learned scribes, whom he employed to produce 
treatises in support of his views on such subjects as the 
claims of the crown to foreign territories, or the proper 
relations of church and state. The Memoirs and the 
Succinde Narration, which constitute his own chief con- 
tributions to literature, were probably drafted in the 
first instance by these subordinates, though he reserved 
the task of revision for himself. But his interest was 
by no means confined to the serious and practical uses 
of literary composition. He was himself an indefatigable 
writer of versified dramas, though his industry could 
not command success nor his authority applause. His 
personal failure, however, did not make him meanly 
jealous of more fortunate followers of the Muses. 
Nearly all the most prominent writers of the day were 
in personal intercourse with him, and were in receipt of 
pensions or gratuities from his purse. The two greatest 
prose writers, Voiture and Balzac, repaid his liberality 
by eulogising his administration in terms of equal 
warmth and sincerity. It is true that the patronage of 
an absolute ruler, whether king or minister, is not 
always an unmixed benefit to literature, and that 
none of Eichelieu's proUgSs, except Corneille, can be 
placed in the highest rank. But on the other hand 
court patronage in France did effect a very notable 
literary revival, and it is impossible to deny to Eichelieu 
some credit for the rise of the next generation of 
authors, whose works have reflected such glory upon 
the France of Louis XIY. 



VIII DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 181 

In connection with literature Kichelieu will always 
be best remembered as the founder of the French 
Academy. This had its origin in the private meetings 
of a number of literary friends, who in 1629 formed 
the habit of assembling once a week for the discussion 
of literary topics and the consideration of each other's 
productions. These meetings had already been going 
on for four years when Eichelieu was informed of 
them by one of the numerous busybodies whose 
function it was to tell him of everything that was 
going on in Paris. With characteristic keenness, 
though foreign affairs seemed sufficiently critical to 
absorb all his energies, he grasped the possible uses 
of such an organisation, and offered the members a 
constitution under government patronage. There was 
some natural hesitation, as party spirit ran high in 
France, and men of letters were by no means un- 
animously cardinalist. But the offer could not be 
safely or courteously refused, and letters -patent were 
drawn up in 1635, though the bigoted opposition of 
the parliament, ever jealous of new corporations, 
delayed their formal promulgation till July 10, 1637. 
The primary function of the Academy was to regulate 
and purify the French language, to make it the most 
perfect of modern tongues, and to "render it not 
only elegant, but also capable of treating all the arts 
and all the sciences." But from the first both the 
founder's intentions and the habits of the members 
combined to give it a second function as a tribunal 
of literary criticism. Richelieu himself pointed clearly 
to this duty by demanding in 1637 a corporate 
opinion on Corneille's Od, which had been attacked 



182 RICHELIEU chap. 

in the Observations of Scu(i6ry. From this time it 
became a regular part of the Academy's business to 
criticise, and, if it thought fit, to express formal 
approbation of the works both of members and others ; 
and it needs only a superficial knowledge of French 
literature to appreciate what an immense influence it 
has thus exerted both upon language and style. 

From the political point of view the origin of 
French journalism is even more important than the 
foundation of the Academy, and to this also Eichelieu 
gave the deciding impulse. Hitherto the only news- 
paper in France had been an annual publication, the 
Mercure frangois, which was a continuation of the 
Chronologie se;pUnaire of Palma Cayet. This was 
obviously insufficient to satisfy the growing interest 
in political events, and it was supplemented by a 
number of unauthorised fly-sheets, called nouvelles a 
la main, which were circulated either in print or 
manuscript, and eagerly read. The most industrious 
compiler of news was a prominent physician, 
Th6ophraste Kenaudot, who supplied nouvelles for the 
distraction as well as medicines for the cure of his 
wealthy patients. Eenaudot succeeded in gaining the 
confidence of Eichelieu, and in 1631 received a formal 
license to transform his fugitive fly-sheets into a 
regular newspaper under government sanction. Thus 
was founded the Gazette, or, as it was called later, the 
Gazette de la France. It appeared weekly in a small 
quarto sheet of four pages, each containing a single 
column. From the first the extent and accuracy of 
its intelligence gave it a secure pre-eminence over any 
rival publication, and its circulation and importance 



VIII DOMESTIC GOVERNMENT 183 

rapidly increased. Both king and minister were 
among the contributors to its pages, and Louis XIII. 
took a special pleasure in the labour of composition 
and revision. Secure of this novel method of in- 
fluencing opinion, Eichelieu was able to dispense 
for the rest of his ministry with the more cumbrous 
system of assembling Notables which he had adopted 
at starting. In the words of Henri Martin, he had 
"given birth to the two great enemies, whose struggle 
was to fill the modern world — absolutism and the 
press." 



CHAPTER IX 

EICHELIEU AND THE CHURCH 

Condition of the French Church during the religious wars— 
Keligious revival in the seventeenth century — Charitable 
orders — Advance of clerical and secular education — Monastic 
reform — Kichelieu's relations with the papacy — Relations of 
Church and State — Clerical taxation — Richelieu and St. 
Cyran — Richelieu's opportunism in ecclesiastical matters — 
His superstition — Case of Urbain Grandier, 

ElCHELlEU, although a bishop and a cardmal, was not 
a great theologian, nor was he in the narrowest sense 
a great churchman. Many of his contemporaries, 
endowed with far less dignity and authority, yet 
exercised an incomparably more distinct and vital 
influence on the religious life of his time than he 
can claim to have done. Still his career is coincident 
with a very important epoch in the history of the 
French Church, and both in his actions and in his 
Memoirs he shows a very keen interest in ecclesiastical 
matters, and a very vivid sense of their importance 
to the order and wellbeing of the state. Possibly 
his interest was rather that of the politician than of 
the ecclesiastic, but it was none the less real, nor 
was the influence which he could not fail to possess 
diminished because he himself was lacking in spiritual 



CHAP. IX RICHELIEU AND THE CHURCH 185 

insight or because his motives were rather secular 
than religious. These considerations make it im- 
possible, even in a brief sketch like the present, to 
dismiss his relations with the Church in a brief and 
perfunctory paragraph. 

The sixteenth century had witnessed two of the 
greatest religious movements in history. The first 
was the Reformation, by which a number of states, 
mostly in Northern Europe, threw off all dependence 
upon Rome, and adopted religious doctrines and 
organisation more or less at variance with those 
which had hitherto prevailed throughout Western 
Christendom. By the second or Counter Reformation, 
the Roman Catholic Church profited by the lessons 
it had received, reformed the abuses which had 
provoked discontent and rebellion, and strengthened 
its internal organisation in order not only to prevent 
further defections, but also to recover some of the 
ground that had been lost. This reforming move- 
ment, which was immensely stimulated by the efforts 
of the Jesuit order, found its final expression in the 
decrees of the Council of Trent. But although France 
was represented at Trent, and although the doctrinal 
definitions of the council were welcomed, yet those 
decrees which touched the constitution of the Church 
and restored discipline were never accepted or pro- 
mulgated in France. There were two primary 
motives for this repudiation of the chief measures of 
reform. The crown contended that the conciliar 
decrees diminished the authority and patronage 
conferred upon the kings by the Concordat of 1516. 
The Parliament of Paris complained that they would 



186 RICHELIEU chap. 

destroy the liberties of the Gallican Church, which 
had always been dear to the official classes since their 
first definition in the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges 
in 1438. 

Thus the Church of France remained unreformed, 
and during the religious wars the abuses of the old 
system become still more numerous and conspicuous. 
Many archbishoprics and bishoprics were allowed to re- 
main vacant, while others were held by men who had 
obtained them by uncanonical or simoniacal means. Most 
of the bishops were non-resident and neglected their 
dioceses. Du Vair, who lived at Aix as first president 
of the Parliament of Provence, was bishop of Lisieux, 
in Normandy, which he never visited. It is recorded 
that on one occasion the bishop of St. Malo confirmed 
two thousand persons in a single village, which proves 
that his visits cannot have been very frequent. There 
were no schools for the education of the clergy, most 
of whom were extremely ignorant and incompetent. 
While the revenues of the church were very large, the 
village cut6s were lamentably ill-paid, and their mode 
of life was practically that of the peasants from whom 
they were sprung, and whom they were vainly expected 
to elevate and instruct. The fabric of the churches 
was in a lamentable state. Many had been used as 
fortresses in the war, with very natural results ; others 
had been profaned or destroyed by the Huguenots. In 
many parishes divine service had come to an end 
•altogether, and the people were left without any religious 
ministrations. And if the condition of the secular 
clergy was bad, that of the regulars was still worse. 
The headships of religious houses were frequently given 



IX RICHELIEU AND THE CHURCH 187 

to children or to persons of scandalous character. In 
many cases the abbot was a layman, who drew the 
revenues of the monastery, while his duties were dis- 
charged by an ill-paid substitute. The count of 
Soissons was said to receive an ecclesiastical revenue of 
100,000 livres a year, while his place was filled by a 
prior with an annual income of 1000. Elsewhere the 
revenues, both of monasteries and of bishoprics, were 
saddled with pensions and reserves which had been 
granted to courtiers of both sexes. Discipline was 
completely neglected, and both monks and nuns lived 
worldly, self-indulgent, and often vicious lives. 

The termination of the religious wars by the acces- 
sion of Henry IV. and his acceptance of the Eoman 
Catholic faith was followed by a notable religious revival 
in France, which reached its zenith during Eichelieu's 
ministry. But this revival was not the work of the state, 
nor even of the Church acting in its corporate capacity. 
The whole credit belongs to a few devoted and highly- 
gifted individuals, whose lives will always attract 
attention and admiration as long as the record of 
religious enthusiasm and heroic self-sacrifice awakens 
any responsive chord in the hearts of mankind. The 
dominant impulse was given by a native of Savoy, St. 
Fran9ois de Sales, but the most active and influential 
worker was a Frenchman, the famous St. Vincent de 
Paul. As was natural, the revival was a composite and 
many-sided movement. One of its manifestations was 
a general desire among the clergy to strengthen the 
bonds which connected France with the Universal 
Church, of which she professed to be the eldest daughter. 
This Ultramontane tendency was specially encouraged 



188 RICHELIEU chap. 

by the Jesuits, who had been restored to France in 
1604 after a brief period of exile, and at once gained 
great influence at court by supplying a series of royal 
confessors. Another sign of the revival was the en- 
deavour of the Church to free itself from the trammels 
of state control, to recover as much as possible the free 
election of its own dignitaries, and, above all, to restore 
the independence of clerical judicature, which had been 
much restricted by the encroachments of the secular courts, 
and especially by the practice of appealing on purely 
clerical matters from the Church courts to the Parlia- 
ment of Paris (the famous appel cornme d'abus). But by 
far the most conspicuous and creditable aspect of the 
movement was its practical side, the immense energy 
and enthusiasm that was thrown into the work of 
active charity, of education, and of monastic reform. 

The Eoman Catholic Church has always shown itself 
honourably conscious of its duties towards the poor and 
afflicted, but at no time and place has it undertaken the 
task of charitable relief with more devotion than in the 
early part of the seventeenth century. It was upon 
pious women that the task was mainly thrown, and 
among the numerous orders that were founded to 
systematise and encourage their labours two are 
specially conspicuous for the piety of their founders 
and for their subsequent development. The Yisitandines, 
or Congregation of the Visitation, were founded at 
Annecy by Fran9ois de Sales, and a branch was 
established in Paris in 1621 by Madame de Chantal. 
In the eighteenth century the order possessed more than 
a hundred houses in France. Still more famous and 
useful have b'een the Soeurs de la ChariU, or Gray 



IX EICHELIEU AND THE CHURCH 189 

Sisters, founded and organised by Vincent de Paul in 
1633, and rapidly extended under the headship of 
Madame Legras. This organisation — for it can hardly 
be called an order — was mainly composed of women 
of humble origin, whose habits and training fitted 
them for the toilsome and often repulsive labours which 
they undertook. At the same time Vincent de Paul 
succeeded in enlisting in the good work many ladies 
of the highest rank, who, with the title of Dames de la 
ChariU, undertook the task of organising relief, and 
acting as visitors and overseers of the humbler Sisters, 
So great was their success, according to an admiring 
biographer of the founder, that in the first year of their 
activity no less than 760 heretics were converted to 
the orthodox faith. Prominent among these ladies 
was Eichelieu's favourite niece, Madame de Combalet, 
afterwards duchess d'Aiguillon, and it was she who 
succeeded in enlisting her uncle's sympathy and support 
in a work which he probably thought outside the duties 
of the state, and which he had little time or inclination 
to direct in person. 

Almost equally numerous were the associations 
formed for the education and training of the clergy. 
Here the lead was taken by de BeruUe, who founded 
the Oratoire de Jdsus in 1611, and obtained its approval 
from Paul V. in 1613. Within a brief period the 
Oratorians possessed no less than fifty houses, and 
among their pupils were such men as Malebranche, 
Mascaron, and Massillon. De Berulle found numerous 
imitators, of whom the chief were Adrien Bourdoise, 
the founder of the seminary of St. Nicolas du 
Chardonnet, and Jean Jacques Olier, who organised in 



190 RICHELIEU chap. 

1641 the celebrated seminary of St. Sulpice. But in the 
work of clerical education, as in that of charity, by far 
the most successful and practical organiser was Vincent 
de Paul. The Congregation of the Mission was founded 
by him in 1625 in the College des Bons Enf ants, and in 
1632, when it received formal confirmation from 
Urban YIII., was moved into more spacious quarters 
in the Priory of St. Lazare, whence its members 
obtained the name of Lazaristes. The success of this 
institution in raising the standard of piety and priestly 
activity throughout the country districts was marvellous, 
and attracted the interested attention of Eichelieu. In 
an interview with Vincent de Paul he asked for full 
information as to the aims and constitution of the 
order, and gave it solid encouragement by recommend- 
ing its more prominent members for ecclesiastical 
promotion. 

Nor was the work of secular education neglected in 
the general revival of clerical enthusiasm. The Con- 
gregation of the Ursulines, founded in Italy in the 
previous century, was now introduced into France by 
Madeleine Lhuillier, and devoted itself with marked 
success to the teaching of girls. But by far the greatest 
educating force was supplied by the Jesuits. The edict 
for their restoration in 1604 allowed them to possess 
thirteen colleges in the provinces, but they were at first 
excluded from the capital. This obstacle was overcome 
by the influence of the king's confessor. Father Cotton, and 
in 1609 they were permitted to give public instruction in 
the College de Clermont. This gave rise to a long and 
bitter struggle between the Jesuits and the University 
of Paris, in which the former only held their own 



IX RICHELIEU AND THE CHUECH 191 

through the unwavering support of Eichelieu. He had 
little sympathy with the Jesuits, who were opposed 
both to his foreign policy and to much of his home 
government, but he realised that in education, if not 
in commerce, a monopoly is a dangerous gift to a 
corporation. Thanks to his support, the pupils of the 
Order in 1627 numbered no fewer than 13,195. This 
strenuous competition was wholesome to the University 
itself, which at last abandoned the effort to suppress its 
rivals, and set to work to recover its declining influence 
by improving its own methods of instruction. 

If Richelieu's attitude towards the work of charity 
and education was passive rather than active, he took a 
more direct interest in the furtherance of monastic 
reform. This holds a prominent place among the 
proposals which he submitted to the king in 1625, and 
throughout his ministry he endeavoured by frequent 
visitations to enforce the observance of the stricter 
rules of monastic life. To increase his authority for 
this purpose he obtained his own nomination as general 
of the great orders of Oluny, Citeaux, and the Premon- 
stratensians, in spite of the opposition of the pope, who 
refused to confirm him in the two latter offices. But 
the magistrates and other secular agents whom Richelieu 
employed provoked ecclesiastical jealousy and opposition, 
and in the end a great deal more was effected by 
individual initiative than by government intervention. 
By far the greatest achievements of the period were 
the foundation of the reformed Benedictine Congre- 
gation of St. Maur, whence proceeded in the next 
generation the monumental works of French erudition, 
and the restoration of discipline in the nunneries of 



192 RICHELIEU chap. 

Port Eoyal and Maubuisson by the famous Angelique 
Arnauld. From Port Eoyal nuns were despatched on 
missions to extend the work of reform to all the 
convents of France. But if Eichelieu's share in the 
movement was less predominant than he probably 
anticipated, yet his example and patronage contributed 
to the success of the efforts of others, and he may 
further claim the credit of having terminated the long 
warfare between regulars and seculars. By the decision 
of a conference which he initiated, and whose labours he 
personally superintended, the jealousy with which the 
parish priests had always regarded the intervention of 
their rivals was at last allayed. The monks were 
subjected to episcopal authority, and they were only 
allowed to preach and receive confession with the 
express permission of the ordinary. 

So far the ecclesiastical revival had proceeded with 
Eichelieu's approval, and to some extent with his active 
encouragement and support. But with the Ultramontane 
tendencies of the movement he came into direct and 
hostile collision. During the minority of Louis XIII. 
the support of Mary de Medici had enabled cardinal 
du Perron and the Ultramontane party in France to 
gain a considerable increase of strength. This was 
conclusively proved by the removal of Eicher, the chief 
champion of Galilean liberties, from his office of Syndic 
in the Sorbonne, by the frustration of the Parliament's 
attack on the Jesuits, and by the attitude assumed by 
the clerical estate in the States -General. But this 
progress was checked by the accession of Eichelieu to 
power. With his strong sense of the overpowering 
importance of national interests, he was not likely to be 



IX RICHELIEU AND THE CHURCH 193 

submissive to a foreign authority, whose action could 
not possibly be dictated by a single-minded regard for 
France. Among his early measures the expulsion of 
papal troops from the Yaltelline and the conclusion 
of the treaty of 1626 with the Huguenots excited 
the horrified animosity of the Eoman Catholic world. 
Bitter attacks were published against the "cardinal of 
the Huguenots," the betrayer of his Church to the 
infidels, and Eichelieu thought it necessary to procure a 
condemnation of these libels from a clerical synod. It 
was at this juncture that a book reached Paris from 
Eome, written by a Jesuit, Sanctarellus, and approved 
both by the pope and the General of the Order. In 
this book, "the most evil of its kind," as Richelieu calls 
it, were maintained in their most extreme form the 
doctrines of papal absolutism : " the pope may punish 
and depose kings, not only for heresy and schism, but 
for any intolerable offence, for incapacity or for negli- 
gence ; he has power to admonish kings and to punish 
them with death ; all princes who govern states do so 
by commission from His Holiness, who may claim to 
govern them himself, etc." These maxims, says Richelieu, 
are capable of ruining the whole Church, and they are 
the more preposterous with regard to the pope, as he 
" is a temporal prince, and has made no such renuncia- 
tion of earthly greatness as to be indifferent to it." He 
hastened to stimulate the Galilean sentiment in opposi- 
tion to such teaching. The Sorbonne, or theological 
faculty of the University, censured the book as "con- 
taining novel, false, and erroneous doctrines, contrary to 
the word of God, and rendering odious the dignity of 
the sovereign Pontiff." The parliament ordered the 

o 



194 RICHELIEU chap. 

book to be publicly burned, and eagerly seized the 
opportunity to renew their attack upon the Jesuits, 
whom they proposed to expel from their colleges, and 
even from France. Richelieu, however, interfered to 
check their ardour, in the belief that "it was neces- 
sary to reduce the Jesuits to such a state that they 
had no power to be harmful, but not to drive them to 
attempt any mischief from despair." The Order escaped 
further persecution by accepting a solemn declaration 
that they repudiated the doctrines of Sanctarellus about 
the power of kings, that they acknowledged that kings 
hold immediately of God, and that they would never 
teach any doctrines on this matter other than those held 
by the clergy, the Universities of the kingdom, and the 
Sorbonne. 

This alliance of Richelieu with the Galilean party 
could not but be distasteful to the papal court, and it 
was by no means obliterated by subsequent services, 
such as the taking of La Rochelle, and the strengthening 
of the temporal power of the papacy by the anti-Spanish 
policy pursued in the Mantuan succession. On the 
strength of these services Richelieu ventured to demand 
a boon for which he was extremely eager — that he should 
be appointed papal legate in France, as cardinal Amboise 
had been in the reign of Louis XIL But Urban VIIL 
had no mind to give increased power to a prelate who 
was already sufficiently independent, and it is possible 
that Richelieu's leniency to the Huguenots was in some 
measure a retaliation for this refusal. Nor were his 
other requests more favourably received. Urban refused 
to make him legate in Avignon, to allow his nomination 
as coadjutor of the archbishop of Trier, and to confirm 



IX RICHELIEU AND THE CHURCH 195 

him as general of the three great monastic orders. The 
cardinal's hat was never granted to Father Joseph, in 
spite of the persistent efforts of the French govern- 
ment; and the pope steadfastly declined to recognise 
the validit}/ of the decision which pronounced the 
marriage of Gaston with Margaret of Lorraine to be 
null and void. 

These continued rebuffs, and especially the last, 
inspired Eichelieu with the wish to teach the pope a 
lesson. Pierre Dupuy, one of the ablest of the authors 
whose learning was always at the cardinal's command, 
drew up an exhaustive treatise on the LiberUs de VEglise 
Gallicane, which stated fully the arguments not only 
against papal despotism, but also for the subjection of 
the church to the state. This book, which was published 
anonymously in 1638, caused the greatest sensation 
both in France and at Rome, and the council found it 
advisable to decree its suppression, though only on the 
technical ground that it had been published without 
license. But the book continued to be sold, and in the 
next year the execution of an attendant of the French 
envoy at Rome gave rise to an open quarrel. The 
envoy, d'Estr6es, ceased all communications with the 
Vatican. Louis XIIL closed his doors to the papal 
nuncio in Paris, and forbade the bishops to hold any 
intercourse with him. It was currently reported that 
Richelieu was prepared to break off all connection with 
Rome and to obtain from a national synod his own 
election as patriarch of France. A priest named Hersent 
hastened to denounce the projected schism in a treatise 
which he published under the title of Optatus Gallus. 
The bishops did not venture to defend the book, and 



196 EICHELIEU chap. 

the parliament hastened to proscribe it, and indirectly to 
express approval of the doctrines of Dupuy. But the 
pope could not afford to carry any further his quarrel 
with France. Satisfaction was given to d'Estr^es, and 
the grant of a cardinal's hat to Mazarin, who acted as 
papal envoy on the occasion, was taken as the pledge of 
reconciliation. But Urban VIII. never forgave the 
prelate who had humbled him. On Eichelieu's death he 
refused to allow the usual commemorative service for a 
cardinal to be celebrated at Eome, and he is said to 
have expressed his opinion of the dead statesman's 
character in terms which sound oddly in the mouth 
of a pope: "If there is a God, he will pay dearly for 
his conduct ; but if there is no God, then he was truly 
an admirable man." 

Although Eichelieu was the champion of Galilean 
liberties against papal pretensions, he was equally 
resolute to enforce the duties of the clergy to the state. 
In this respect his conduct as a minister stands in 
instructive contrast to the more purely clerical attitude 
which he had assumed at the meeting of the States- 
General. In his speech as orator of the clergy he had 
made the following claims for his order : (1) the more 
frequent admission of ecclesiastics to office and to the 
royal council; (2) the prohibition of future grants of 
church revenues to laymen, either directly or by way of 
pensions and reserves; (3) the release of the clergy from 
direct taxes, on the ground that the only tribute which 
they owed was their prayers; (4) the restoration of 
clerical jurisdiction to its former limits and independence; 
(5) the recognition of the decrees of the Council of Trent. 
Of these demands the only one which he gratified when 



IX RICHELIEU AND THE CHURCH 197 

the opportunity came was the first. His partiality for 
ecclesiastical agents, not only in diplomacy, but in 
military and naval commands, was a subject of derision 
in Europe, and gave a handle against him to the pope, 
who openly expressed his disapproval of the employment 
of churchmen, like the cardinal de la Yalette, in leading 
armies to the field. The other proposals proved nothing 
more than pious wishes. The Council of Trent re- 
mained unacknowledged. The diversion of ecclesias- 
tical revenues to laymen continued, and Richelieu himself 
is said to have rewarded a favourite fiddler with the gift 
of an abbey. No limit was placed on the encroachment 
of the secular courts on church jurisdiction, nor on 
the employment of the ap^pel comme d'abus. And the 
question of clerical taxation gave rise to an open and 
envenomed quarrel between Richelieu and his fellow- 
clergy. 

The revenues of the French clergy, whether from 
land or from other sources, were wholly exempt from 
direct taxation. The clerical assemblies were in the 
habit of making an annual grant of 2,000,000 livres, 
but they always protested that this was a don gratuit 
and not a compulsory payment, and, moreover, such a 
sum was ludicrously out of proportion to the wealth of 
the Church. Among the financial expedients forced 
upon Richelieu by military expenses were increased 
demands on the liberality of the Church synods, and 
these were usually granted, though always with 
murmuring and reluctance. But in 1640 he came 
forward with a wholly novel and unforeseen demand. 
His supporter and confidant, the bishop of Chartres, 
had collected documents from the royal archives to 



198 RICHELIEU chap. 

prove that land could only be held in mortmain by 
letters -patent, to be obtained on payment of a droit 
d'amortissement. This form the clergy had systematically 
failed to observe, and therefore it was held that their 
lands were legally forfeited to the crown. Instead of 
enforcing this claim, it was determined to collect all 
arrears of payment due since the year 1520, when 
Francis I. had levied a similar exaction. The sum thus 
due was estimated at nearly 80,000,000 livres, but the 
government announced that it would be content with 
3,600,000. The clergy were furious at the attempt to 
collect such a payment without consulting their assembly. 
It was at this time that the quarrel with Rome was at 
its height, and that Hersent published his Oj)tatus Gallus, 
which attacked Richelieu's conduct at home as well as 
his attitude towards the papacy. Regardless of this 
opposition, the council issued an edict in October 1640, 
demanding the additional payment of one-sixth of church 
revenues for two years'. But the clergy, encouraged by 
the prospect of papal aid, prepared for strenuous 
resistance to the "tyrant" and "apostate" who so shame- 
lessly violated the privileges of his own order. Richelieu, 
unwilling to face this domestic storm at a time when 
foreign affairs demanded all his attention, found it 
advisable to give way to some extent, and agreed to 
summon an assembly of the clergy. The assembly met 
at Mantes early in 1641, and it was announced that all 
the claims of the government would be commuted for a 
lump sum of 6,600,000 livres. Even this diminished 
demand provoked a storm of indignation. The arch- 
bishop of Sens recalled the ancient maxim that "the 
people contribute their goods, the nobles their blood, 



IX RICHELIEU AND THE CHURCH 199 

and the clergy their prayers," and declared that the 
liberty of the Church would be destroyed if " they were 
compelled to open their hands instead of their lips." 
Montchal, archbishop of Toulouse, whose Memoirs give 
the most vivid picture of the passions that were excited 
on the subject, termed the royal exactions " a horrible 
sacrilege committed on the property of the cross," 
and declared " our kings have always believed that the 
gold of the sanctuary would be fatal to them unless 
they received it as a gift." Eichelieu found it necessary 
to take violent measures, and the two archbishops, with 
four other bishops, were ordered to quit Mantes and 
retire to their respective dioceses, without venturing 
to pass through Paris on the way. Their withdrawal 
enabled the dispute to be compromised. The majority 
agreed to pay a sum of five millions and a half, with 
which the government professed itself satisfied, and this 
settlement was followed by the reconciliation with the 
papacy. 

The same determination to prevent Gallicanism from 
developing into a claim for clerical independence, and 
to enforce at all hazards the solidarity and authority 
of the state, is visible in Richelieu's relations with one 
of his most famous contemporaries, the Abb6 de St. 
Cyran. St. Cyran had not yet become the founder of 
a sect, but he was already famous as the reputed author 
of Petncs Aurelius, and as a formidable free-lance on the 
side of Galilean liberties. His piety and learning gave 
him an influence quite out of proportion to his ecclesi- 
astical rank : he was the spiritual director of Port 
Royal, which had been transferred by Angelique Arnauld 
to Paris, and he was the confidential adviser of many 



200 RICHELIEU chap. 

distinguished persons of both sexes. St. Oyran's concep- 
tion of the Church as an oligarchy of bishops rather 
than a monarchy brought him into collision with Eome, 
and both he and his friend Jansen had been from the 
first hostile critics of the principles and morality of 
Jesuit teaching. Both these positions commended 
themselves to Richelieu, who was engaged in a quarrel 
with the papacy, and had good reason to dislike the 
Ultramontane and Spanish predilections of the Jesuits. 
In his early days he had been brought into intimate 
relations with St. Cyran, through their common friend 
the bishop of Poitiers, and he now made strenuous 
efforts to gain the allegiance of the man whom he 
openly declared to be the most learned theologian in 
Europe. No less than five bishoprics — some say eight 
— were successively offered to the friend of his youth. 
But St. Cyran resolutely refused to sacrifice his inde- 
pendence by accepting preferment from a " government 
which only wished for slaves." The autocracy, which 
he suspected Eichelieu of a desire to establish, was 
quite as repugnant to his principles as the absolutism of 
the pope. His obstinate self-confidence and isolation 
were the first cause of Richelieu's enmity. The higher 
his appreciation of St. Cyran's ability, the more he 
mistrusted the growth of an influence which was outside 
his control. And to this first ground of alienation others 
were speedily added. We have seen what importance 
Richelieu attached to the dissolution of Gaston's marriage 
with Margaret of Lorraine. On this subject St. Cyran 
did not hesitate to take the same line as Urban YIII., 
and to declare that it was impious to annul a sacrament 
of the Church for purely political reasons. But probably 



IX RICHELIEU AND THE CHURCH 201 

the greatest displeasure was caused by the action of 
Jansen, of whose teaching St. Cyran was already the 
avowed champion. Jansen, a native of the Spanish 
Netherlands, had published the Mars Gallicus, in which 
he bitterly denounced the conduct of France in betray- 
ing the cause of Koman Catholicism by an open alliance 
with Lutherans and Calvinists. This pamphlet, which 
earned from the Spanish government the elevation of 
its author to the bishopric of Ypres, appeared in a 
French translation in 1638. Eichelieu was always 
keenly sensitive to such attacks on his policy, and as he 
could not touch the chief culprit, he determined to take 
vengeance on the disciple. In May 1638 St. Cyran 
was arrested and imprisoned in Vincennes, where he 
remained till the cardinal's death. His papers were 
seized, and a judicial inquiry instituted, in the hope of 
obtaining evidence for a charge of heresy, but the scheme 
resulted in failure, and the prisoner was never brought 
to trial. That Eichelieu foresaw the formation of a 
Jansenist sect as the inevitable result of St. Cyran's 
combination of personal independence with deep spiritual 
influence over others is proved by his comparing him 
with the great reformers of the previous century. " If 
Luther and Calvin," he said, "had been imprisoned 
when they began to dogmatise, the states of Europe 
would have been spared many troubles." Later, when 
the prince of Conde tried to obtain the prisoner's 
release, he replied, " Do you know the man you are 
speaking of? he is more dangerous than six armies." 
But the cardinal's harshness towards an innocent op- 
ponent was subtly avenged by the famous John of 
Werth. He had been a captive since the battle of 



202 RICHELIEU chap. 

Rheinfelden, and had made St. Cyran's acquaintance in 
their common prison of Vincennes. The general was 
brought from his confinement to witness the sumptuous 
representation of Richelieu's comedy of Miriame before 
the king and court. When asked for his opinion of 
the spectacle, he replied that it was magnificent, but 
that what astounded him most was to find " in the 
Most Christian kingdom, the bishops at the comedy and 
the saints in prison." Eichelieu pretended not to hear, 
but the blow must have struck shrewdly home. 

It is impossible to discover in Eichelieu's relations with 
the Church any signs that he was actuated by profound 
convictions or overmastering principles. Though he 
made use of parties, he belonged to none. In ecclesi- 
astical matters, as contrasted with politics, he was an 
opportunist pure and simple. If the pope had not 
refused his demands, and tried to thwart his schemes, 
he would never have identified himself with the advocates 
of Gallicanism. So long as Galilean liberties existed in 
practice he had no desire that they should be defined 
or formally recognised. When an open quarrel with 
Rome broke out, his haughty and stubborn temper 
doubtless prompted him to carry it through after the 
fashion of Henry YIIL, and to establish the patriarch- 
ate which his enemies accused him of coveting. But 
his temper rarely got the better of his discretion. He 
was keen-sighted enough to apprehend the differences, 
both of history and opinion, which rendered the action 
of England no safe guide for France, and he foresaw 
that a final rupture with the papacy would produce 
such a ferment that the political influence of his country 
would be annihilated for at least half a century. Again, 



rx RICHELIEU AIS^D THE CHURCH 203 

he was far too thoroughly imbued with the spirit of his 
order to be a consistent and thoroughgoing Erastian. 
If the clergy had not been always suspicious of his 
Protestant alliances, and often sympathetic with the 
enemies of France, he would never have stirred a step 
from his way to attack their corporate privileges and 
independence. 

It was this detachment from religious partisan- 
ship which enabled him to subordinate ecclesiastical to 
political considerations, and to be the first European 
statesman who ventured to translate the principles of 
toleration into practice. His attitude in this respect 
is the more remarkable when we remember that he 
was no eighteenth century sceptic, confident in human 
powers and doubtful of divine intervention. If Eichelieu 
profoundly influenced his age, it was not because he was 
before it, but because he so thoroughly identified himself 
with it. It would be misleading to call him a religious 
man, but he was certainly superstitious. His private 
letters furnish plentiful evidence of his belief in astrology, 
in magic, and in the small popular prejudices against 
unlucky days and actions. This vein of superstition — 
not uncommon in great men of action— merits the more 
attention, because without it it would be impossible 
to plead any defence for Eichelieu in an episode which 
looms very largely in the pages of his detractors — the 
case of Urbain Grandier. The story itself is suffi- 
ciently remarkable, and though the evidence has now 
been fully published, there are several questions con- 
nected with the case which it is difficult to answer 
with absolute certainty. 

Urbain Grandier was a priest of Loudun in Poitou, 



204 RICHELIEU chap. 

of a handsome and imposing exterior, and possessed of 
great influence over women, which he almost certainly 
abused. In one way and another he had excited the 
enmity of several prominent inhabitants of the town, 
who brought against him a charge of immorality and 
impiety. In the court of the bishop of Poitiers he was 
condemned, but on appeal the sentence was reversed 
both by the pr4sidial of Poitiers and by the archbishop 
of Bordeaux. Grandier's too obvious exultation in his 
triumph redoubled the fury of his opponents, who were 
eager to find some new means of procuring his ruin. 
One of them, Mignon, was director of the Ursuline 
convent in Loudun. Eumours began to spread that 
some of the nuns were possessed with devils, that they 
were afflicted with extraordinary bodily contortions, and 
that in their ravings they brought grave charges against 
Grandier. The director and other priests were called in 
to exorcise the demons, and they reported that they 
obtained from the mouths of the latter a reluctant con- 
fession as to the master who had sent them. Still no 
formal charge was brought, and opinion in Loudun was 
divided between Grandier's accusers and defenders. As 
before, the bishop of Poitiers was on one side, professed 
his belief in the evidence, while the archbishop of Bor- 
deaux was incredulous. It was at this juncture that a 
commissioner of the government, Laubardemont, came 
to Loudun to superintend the destruction of the castle. 
He was a confidential agent of Eichelieu, and was sub- 
sequently employed to collect evidence against St. Cyran. 
The popularity of a professed spy and informer was not 
likely to be great, and his reputation has consequently 
suffered. Laubardemont was completely gained over by 



IX RICHELIEU AND THE CHURCH 205 

the stories of Grandier's accusers. He undertook to 
bring the whole matter before the cardinal, and he is 
said to have prejudiced him against the accused by- 
asserting that Grandier was the author of a scurrilous 
libel, Le Cordonnier de Loudun, that had been circulated 
when Richelieu was a resident in Poitou as bishop of 
Lu9on. The result was that a special commission of 
fourteen persons, with Laubardemont at its head, was 
appointed to try the case. The trial itself was, from a 
modern point of view, farcical, the bias of the court was 
unmistakable, and the evidence was mainly that which 
the exorcists professed to have extracted from the so- 
called devils. Grandier was sentenced to death, tortured 
to make him confess his accomplices, and finally burned 
under circumstances of exceptional and wanton bar^ 
barity. 

That Grandier s death was a judicial murder of the 
worst kind, and that fraud as well as credulity entered 
into the conduct of the case against him, is incontestable. 
But it is by no means easy to distribute equally the 
exact measures of guilt. That the whole affair was a 
gigantic conspiracy, in which nuns, priests, the bishop 
of Poitiers, and many others played preconcerted parts 
to destroy a common enemy, is preposterous. The very 
length of time — two years — during which the professed 
marvels were prolonged is conclusive against such ex- 
tensive and well -organised complicity. The further 
assertion of Gui Patin that Eichelieu was at the bottom 
of the plot, and that he resorted to such an elaborate 
imposture to ruin a humble but detested libeller, is not 
only absurd in itself, but runs counter to all that we 
know of the cardinal's open, if often excessive, malevo- 



206 RICHELIEU chap, ix 

lence. The probability is that the nuns suffered from 
religious hysteria, of which there are many recorded 
instances in the same period of revival, and that the 
suggestions of their spiritual director led them to make 
their incoherent charges against the priest whom he was 
known to detest, and of whom they had doubtless heard 
much that was evil. Some, at any rate, of the exorcists 
were men whose character raises them above the charge 
of deliberate ill-faith. All that can be urged against 
Richelieu is that he saw no a priori difficulties as to the 
credibility of the accusations, and that he allowed the 
machinery of a special commission, always more likely 
to look for guilt than for innocence, to be employed 
in a case where there was no possible justification for 
its use. 



CHAPTEE X 

Richelieu's last years 

1641-1642 

Military events of 1641 and 1642 — Eising of Soissons — His death — 
Conspiracy of Cinq-Mars — Richelieu's illness at Narbonne — His 
will — Detection of tlie plot — Execution of Cinq -Mars and 
De Thou — Completeness of Eichelieu's success — His death — 
Continuance of his policy — Gradual relaxation of severity — 
Death of Louis XIII. — Permanence of Richelieu's influence — 
Richelieu's character — His ill-health — His isolation — The in- 
security of his position — His relations with liouis XIII. — ^His 
vindictiveness — His unpopularity. 

EiCHELiEU did not live to witness the conclusion of the 
great war in which France had engaged under his auspices. 
The treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees, especially 
the latter, might have been concluded earlier if his life had 
been prolonged, but in spite of the delay he is as much 
their author as if he had signed the actual documents. In 
fact, all the substantial advantages which France gained 
by these treaties had been practically secured by 1640. 
The military events of the next two years did little but 
render more certain the ultimate triumph of France. 
In 1641 the flowing tide of French successes seemed for 
a moment to be arrested. In Italy and in Artois the 
French troops had enough to do to hold their own. 



208 RICHELIEU chap. 

Charles of Lorraine was restored, only to prove once 
more a traitor to his promises, and his duchy had to be 
re-occupied before the year was over. In Germany 
Gu6briant defeated the Imperialists at Wolfenbiittel, but 
the death of Baner and other causes prevented the allies 
from gaining any important results by their success. In 
1642, however, the French cause made rapid and 
decisive strides. In Italy the princes Thomas and 
Maurice deserted the Spaniards to join their sister-in-law, 
and their adhesion turned the balance decisively in 
favour of the French. A great effort was planned by 
Eichelieu on the side of the Pyrenees, and the capture of 
Perpignan and Salces completed the second and final 
union of Roussillon to France. In Germany Gu6briant 
opened the year with a decisive victory at Kempten, and 
this was followed by a campaign in which Torstenson, 
Baner's successor, emulated the most brilliant achieve- 
ments of Gustavus Adolphus. By a series of rapid and 
masterly movements this general, though imprisoned in 
his litter by gout, overran Silesia and Moravia, and 
caused a panic in Vienna. Compelled to retreat by 
superior forces, he threw himself into Saxony and laid 
siege to Leipzig. When the Imperialists advanced to 
relieve the city, he crushed them on the plain of Breiten- 
-feld (Nov. 2, 1642), where Gustavus Adolphus, eleven 
years before, had won the first great victory which estab- 
lished his own reputation and marked a decisive turning- 
point in the history of the war. The surrender of 
Leipzig was the reward of Torstenson's success, and 
the news of this brilliant triumph must have brought 
some consolation to Richelieu as he lay on his death- 
bed. 



X KICHELIEU S LAST YEARS 209 

The enemies of France did not require the lessons of 
1642 to teach them that little hope remained for them 
in arms. They had already realised that their only 
chance of recovering from their reverses lay in the 
overthrow by domestic treason of the minister whom 
they regarded as the author of all their misfortunes. 
In spite of the glory which his administration had 
brought to France, Richelieu had still many enemies who 
longed for his overthrow, and few adherents who would 
make strenuous efforts for his defence. Probably his 
best friend — though few suspected it, and perhaps 
the cardinal himself as little as the general public — was 
the king. The private letters of Louis XIII., in these 
two years, prove that he was not devoid of gratitude 
and even affection towards the man who had made his 
reign illustrious, though the coldness of his manner and 
a certain peevish resentment of anything like dictation 
misled even those in his most immediate confidence into 
a belief that it was no impossible task to alienate the 
king from the minister. Eichelieu had ever to be on 
his guard against secret foes at court, who were far 
more dangerous than his avowed opponents. Among 
the latter the most prominent was the count of Soissons, 
who had never forgiven his defeat of 1636. He had 
been living ever since in the border fortress of Sedan, 
whence he carried on incessant intrigues with foreign 
states, with malcontents at home, and with the nobles 
who had followed the queen -mother into exile. In 
1641 the young duke of Guise arrived in Sedan, and 
discussed with Soissons and Bouillon, the governor of 
the fortress, the organisation of an armed rebellion for 
Richelieu's overthrow. The cardinal, informed of their 

P 



210 RICHELIEU chap. 

projects, sent orders to Bouillon to withdraw his hospi- 
tality from Soissons, and to the latter to depart for 
Venice. This message was the signal for civil war. 
The conspirators threw off all disguise and applied for 
aid to Spain and Austria, who were only too glad to 
encourage a movement which could not fail to serve 
their ends. The king on his side declared Soissons, 
Guise, and Bouillon enemies of the state, and despatched 
the marshal de Chatillon to combine with the restored 
duke of Lorraine in an attack on Sedan. But Charles 
of Lorraine had already decided to break his recent 
treaty with France, and Chatillon was forced to stand 
on the defensive against the rebels, who received the 
aid of an Imperialist detachment under Lamboy. Their 
forces had already quitted Sedan and crossed the 
Meuse when they were attacked by the royal troops at 
La Marf^e. It was generally anticipated that the first 
conflict would have decisive results, and that a victory 
of the insurgents would be followed by a movement on 
the part of Eichelieu's opponents at the court and in 
Paris. But good fortune was on the cardinal's side, 
and the forecast, shrewd as it was, proved fallacious. 
No victory could have been more decisive. The royalist 
cavalry had been tampered with, and the infantry, left 
to itself, fled in panic-stricken confusion. But in the 
turmoil Soissons was killed by a chance bullet, and the 
death of the rebel leader, whose rank as a prince of the 
blood made him indispensable, deprived his confederates 
of all the fruits of their success. The whole scheme of 
rebellion was at an end. Guise fled to Brussels, Bouillon 
submitted and was pardoned, and their secret sym- 
pathisers at court had to wait for a more favourable 



X RICHELIEU'S LAST YEARS 211 

opportunity, only too pleased that they had not betrayed 
themselves by a premature movement. 

Gratitude, as Eichelieu had good reason to know, is 
rarely a permanent force in politics, and the most active 
and resolute of his opponents at court was a young man 
who owed his advancement entirely to the cardinal. 
Henri d'Effiat, marquis de Cinq-Mars, was the son of the 
marquis d'Effiat, who had been for four years super- 
intendent of finance, but had won more renown as a 
military leader. Eichelieu had brought Cinq -Mars to 
the notice of Louis XIII. at a moment when he wished 
to divert the king's interest from the society of Made- 
moiselle d'Hautefort, to whom Louis's platonic affections 
had returned after the retirement of Louise de la Fayette. 
The move was successful in gaining its immediate end. 
Good looks and an attractive manner gained for Cinq- 
Mars the favour of the king, and he was speedily 
advanced to the office of grand equerry. But this 
rapid promotion turned his head. The pleasures and 
magnificence of the court failed to satisfy him, and he 
aspired to the rank of duke and peer, to military 
distinction, and to political ascendency. Eichelieu saw 
clearly that he must resign all hope of using Cinq-Mars 
as a submissive tool, and he consoled himself for his 
disappointment by ruthlessly snubbing his youthful 
ambitions. His pretensions to the hand of Marie de 
Gonzaga, afterwards queen of Poland, were treated as a 
piece of ridiculous presumption. His endeavour to 
remain in attendance on Louis at meetings of the 
council, and even at personal conferences between the 
king and minister, was resented as a gross impertinence. 
Like most young men, Cinq -Mars could endure any- 



212 RICHELIEU chap. 

thing better than contempt, and he became the bitter 
enemy of his former patron. Confident in his secure 
hold of the king's affection, he resolved to play the part 
of a Luynes, vainly hoping that Eichelieu would be as 
easily got rid of as Concini had been. 

Cinq-Mars had been an accomplice in the conspiracy 
of Soissons, and had been terribly frightened by its 
sudden collapse. But his courage returned when he 
found that his complicity was undiscovered, and he 
resumed the schemes which had been for a moment 
interrupted. His chief confidant was rran9ois de Thou, 
a son of the famous historian, who had enjoyed and 
then forfeited the favour of Eichelieu. He seems to 
have been genuinely convinced that his inconstant 
employer was the oppressor of France and the wanton 
disturber of the peace of Europe. Cinq-Mars had for 
a time entertained the idea of assassination as the best 
method of removing his enemy, but de Thou, more 
upright if less thoroughgoing, persuaded him to abstain 
from crime and to adhere to the well-worn methods of 
conspiracy. In order to gain a refuge and a rallying 
point, in case armed rebellion became imperative, de 
Thou was sent to gain over the veteran intriguer. 
Bouillon, who was still in possession of the invaluable 
stronghold of Sedan. As a prince of the blood was 
deemed indispensable to serve as a figure-head for the 
rebels, overtures were made to Gaston of Orleans, who 
had been living in tranquil obscurity since the birth of 
a dauphin had reduced him to comparative insigni- 
ficance. Bouillon, distrusting the strength of purely 
native effort, insisted on the necessity of foreign assist- 
ance. In spite of the opposition of de Thou, who had 



X RICHELIEU'S LAST YEARS 213 

unusual scruples about embarking in obvious treason, 
Fontrailles, another friend of Cinq-Mars, was despatched 
to procure the support of Spain, on condition that when 
peace should be made after the accomplishment of the 
cowp dJMat all French conquests in the war should be 
surrendered. In the meantime no efforts were to be 
spared by the favourite to detach Louis from Eichelieu's 
influence, and to convince the king that his own com- 
fort, the prosperity of France, and the peace of Europe 
required the cardinal's dismissal as an indispensable 
condition. 

On his side Eichelieu, of all statesmen the best 
served by his spies, was by no means blind to the 
dangers which threatened him. He had made a last 
effort to disarm Cinq-Mars and to remove him from the 
court by offering him the government of Touraine. 
The offer was refused, and from that moment there 
was open war between the two men. But there was 
as yet no evidence sufficient to convince Louis XIIL 
of the treasonable designs of his favourite, and until 
that could be obtained the struggle resolved itself into 
a duel for the dominant influence over the king; and 
for this the two rivals seemed to outside observers not 
unequally matched. 

But if they appeared equally matched in one respect, 
in others the contrast was complete and striking. Cinq- 
Mars was in the prime of youthful strength and beauty, 
confident in his magnetic charm of manner, eager to 
prove his yet untried and possibly overestimated abilities, 
and proudly anticipating the brilliant future that seemed 
to await him. Richelieu, on the other hand, had little 
to hope from the future. He had never enjoyed real 



214 RICHELIEU chap. 

health since his boyhood, and he was now a prematurely 
old man, broken down by sixteen years of incessant 
anxiety and uninterrupted labours. Louis XIII., though 
a much younger man, was also in feeble heath. During 
the winter his death had seemed more than possible, and 
the conspirators had busied themselves with schemes 
for the exclusion of the cardinal from all share in the 
government during the anticipated minority. The king 
had recovered, but he was never more than an invalid 
again, and he was not destined to survive the cardinal 
by many months. In spite of their weakness, both king 
and minister set out early in 1642 to superintend in 
person the military operations in Eoussillon. Travelling 
separately and by easy stages, they both reached ISTar- 
bonne in March. There Richelieu, prostrated with 
fever and tortured by an abscess in his right arm, found 
that farther progress was impossible. The doctors 
advised him to seek a more healthy air in Provence, and 
Louis XIII., after a delay of more than a month, set out 
without him to Perpignan (April 21). Eichelieu's 
physical sufferings were thus reinforced by the moral 
agony which it caused him to part from the king at 
this critical moment, and thus to leave the field clear 
for the intrigues of his youthful rival. For another 
month he remained at Narbonne, detained partly by 
anxiety and partly by weakness. On May 3, conscious 
that death was not far distant, he dictated his will to a 
notary of the town. The bulk of his property he left 
to his relatives, with the exception of his library, which 
he bequeathed to the nation, and his residence in Paris, 
the Palais-Cardinal, which he left to the king, together 
with the sum of 1,500,000 livres belonging to the 



X RICHELIEU'S LAST YEARS 215 

public funds, but which he kept in his own hands for 
use as occasion might arise. Four days later he set out 
on his painful journey to Provence. 

Eichelieu had reached Aries when the long-expected 
v/eapon was placed in his hands, in the shape of a copy 
of the treaty concluded by the conspirators with Spain. 
How the secret was originally betrayed has never been 
known. This proof of treason he at once despatched to 
Louis, who could no longer hesitate to take action. 
Probably the danger on this side had never been as 
great as the cardinal, in his weakness and mistrust, had 
dreaded, Louis had not for a moment dreamed of 
seriously balancing the claims of the favourite and the 
minister to his confidence. He had listened to the 
suggestions and accusations of Cinq-Mars because he 
had always found it easier to endure than to check the 
outbursts of those around him, but on more than one 
occasion he had been sufficiently outspoken to betray 
his real intention to any one whose perceptions were not 
blinded by conceit and self-confidence. The arrival of 
Eichelieu's communication only hastened a decision that 
had been already formed. On June 10 he left Perpignan 
and returned to Narbonne. Cinq-Mars might still have 
escaped by a prompt flight to Sedan, but he recklessly 
rushed on his fate, and determined to follow the king. 
On June 12 the order was issued for the imprisonment 
of Cinq-Mars and de Thou, and messengers were sent to 
arrest Bouillon in the midst of the army in Italy, of 
which he had lately received the command. The king 
now set out to join Richelieu at Tarascon, and on June 
28 the interview took place in the cardinal's chamber. 
There the king and minister, both in bed, agreed upon 



216 RICHELIEU chap. 

the steps to be taken for the maintenance of order and 
the punishment of the guilty. Two days later Louis 
appointed Eichelieu lieutenant-governor of the kingdom 
with the full powers of royalty, and set out on his return 
to Paris, having neither the strength nor the inclination 
to revisit Eoussillon. 

The collection of evidence against the three prisoners 
was not a matter of dijSiculty. Gaston of Orleans was 
ready, as usual, to purchase his own safety by betray- 
ing his associates. He made a full confession of his 
relations with Cinq-Mars and of the treaty with Spain, 
pleading only that he was innocent of any plot for the 
cardinal's assassination. To inflict an adequate punish- 
ment on the king's brother was impossible, but Richelieu 
seized the opportunity to humiliate his ancient adversary. 
Gaston was compelled to sign a full deposition for use 
against his accomplices, and to renounce for the future 
all claims to " any office, employment, or administration 
in the kingdom." On these terms he was allowed to 
reside at Blois as a private individual. Nor did 
Eichelieu spare the king for the encouragement which, 
consciously or unconsciously, he had given to the mal- 
contents. Louis XIII. was compelled to turn informer 
against his quondam favourite, and to confess in a formal 
document that he had encouraged Cinq -Mars in his 
freedom of speech and action in order the better to 
ascertain his real designs, and he asserted that the result 
of this policy, more worthy of a spy than of a king, was 
to convince him that his grand equerry was an enemy of 
the state. 

Armed with these depositions, Eichelieu set out on 
August 1 7 for Lyons by the Ehone, towing his prisoners 



X RICHELIEU'S LAST YEARS 217 

in another boat behind him. Bouillon had already been 
sent to Lyons, and there the trial was held before twelve 
commissioners, including the notorious and indispensable 
Laubardemont. The guilt of Cinq- Mars was flagrant, 
and he made no attempt to deny it ; but the extent of 
de Thou's complicity was by no means equally patent. 
But any hesitation on the part of the judges was re- 
moved by the discovery of an ordinance of Louis XL, 
which declared that the concealment of a plot against 
the state was an equal ofi'ence with actual partnership. 
The two friends were both condemned to death on 
September 12, and the sentence was carried out on the 
same day. Their youth, their rigorous treatment, and 
the heroism with which they met their fate, have earned 
for Cinq-Mars and de Thou the sympathy both of con- 
temporaries and posterity. This feeling was intensified 
by the escape of Bouillon, who was at least equally 
guilty ; but he was the nephew of the prince of Orange, 
an ally whom France had every reason to conciliate, and 
he had a valuable hostage for his own life in the fortress 
of Sedan. On condition that Sedan should be sur- 
rendered to the crown, Bouillon obtained a full pardon 
for his numerous past offences. 

The conspiracy of Cinq-Mars was the last episode of 
importance in the life of Eichelieu. The excitement of 
the struggle had revived for a moment his failing powers, 
but with its subsidence the process of decline became 
more rapid than ever. U.iable to leave his litter, he 
was carried slowly from Lyons to Paris, travelling where- 
ever possible by water. Everywhere he was received 
with the respectful pomp usually displayed only for 
royalty. In some towns the gates were too narrow to 



218 RICHELIEU chap. 

admit the spacious litter, and the wall was promptly 
demolished to make room for its entry. At Fontainebleau 
the king came to meet him, and tried to atone for any 
past coldness by the unusual warmth of his greeting. 
From Paris Eichelieu retired to his favourite residence 
at Rueilj where he received a visit from the queen, Anne 
of Austria, who seems to have at last been reconciled 
with her dying enemy. On November 4 he returned 
from Eueil to the Palais-Cardinal, which he was never 
to quit alive. 

A sense of exultation may well have buoyed up the 
spirits of the dying statesman. He was master of France 
as he had never been before. His domestic enemies 
were utterly crushed. One of the most inveterate of his 
opponents, Mary de Medici, had died in this summer at 
Cologne, endeavouring to the last, by an intentional and 
exaggerated parade of poverty, to excite odium against 
the servant of old days whose ingratitude had reduced to 
such misery and degradation the mother of a French 
king and of the queens of Spain and England. From 
all quarters of Europe, from the Pyrenees, from Italy, 
from Franche Comte, from Germany, the news came of 
victories which convinced Eichelieu that the work of his 
life was well done, and that the star of the Hapsburgs 
had paled before that of the Bourbons. 

But this feeling of exultation, legitimate as it was, 
could not quicken his failir^ pulse, nor expel the fever 
from his weakened and emaciated frame. On November 
29 the mischief spread to his lungs; he began to cough 
blood, and to experience great difficulty in breathing. 
Though he lingered for nearly a week, recovery was 
henceforth impossible. The doctors tried to relieve the 



X RICHELIEU'S LAST YEARS 219 

fever by frequent bleedings, but the remedy only in- 
creased the general weakness. The king paid him two 
visits, and the cardinal took the opportunity to commend 
his relatives to the royal protection and favour, and to 
advise the choice of Mazarin as his own successor. The 
courage and composure with which he awaited an end 
which he knew to be inevitable excited the wonder and 
admiration of all his attendants. His intellect and his 
iron resolution were alike unaffected by the approach of 
death. Asked whether he pardoned his enemies, he 
replied : "Absolutely, and I pray God to condemn me, 
if I have had any other aim than the welfare of God 
and of the state." ^ On November 3, the regular 
physicians gave up all hope, and abandoned their patient 
to an empiric, whose prescriptions produced such a 
galvanic effect that the rumour of the cardinal's recovery 
spread through Paris. But the revival was only moment- 
ary; in the evening he relapsed into unconsciousness, 
which was only broken by occasional intervals till the 
following mid-day, when a groan and a last convulsion 
of the limbs announced that all was over, and that the 
man who had been for so many years the great motive- 
power in France had ceased to live. 

Louis XIII.'s studied and habitual coldness of manner 
enabled him to avoid any display of feeling when the 
news arrived. " A great politician has departed ! " was 
the only ejaculation that escaped him on hearing of the 
death of the minister whose greatness so completely 

1 This sentence, like the deathbed utterances of many other 
eminent men, has been corrupted by tradition into a more epigram- 
matic form. According to Madame de Motteville, Richelieu replied : 
" I have had no enemies except those of the state." 



220 RICHELIEU chap. 

overshadowed and obscured his own character. But 
death did not free him immediately from the influence 
to which he had so long been accustomed to yield. The 
wishes of the deceased cardinal were carried out with 
scrupulous and almost ostentatious fidelity. Mazarin, 
who for the last year had shared all Eichelieu's secrets, 
was admitted to the council of state the very day after 
his employer's death, and the other ministers were con- 
firmed in their offices. The lesser posts which were 
vacated by Eichelieu's death were divided among his 
relatives : the government of Brittany was conferred 
upon la Meilleraie ; the offices of intendant of navigation 
and governor of Brouage were given to the marquis de 
Br6z6 j and the young Armand Jean de Pont-Courlay, 
who assumed his great-uncle's title of due de Eichelieu, 
received also the governorship of Havre. A royal cir- 
cular to the provincial governors and parliaments, dated 
December 5, announced the king's determination "to 
maintain all the arrangements made during the ministry 
of the late cardinal, and to carry out all the plans con- 
certed with him for the conduct of affairs both at home 
and abroad." A decree for the formal exclusion of the 
duke of Orleans from the regency, which had been 
drawn up in deference to Eichelieu's wishes, was regis- 
tered on December 9, in spite of the urgent entreaties 
of Gaston's daughter, the famous Mademoiselle. The 
numerous prisoners and exiles, who had hailed the news 
of the cardinal's death as the signal for their own release 
and triumph, discovered, to their disgust and disappoint- 
ment, that no leniency was to be expected from the 
government. 

But no man can continue long to rule from the 



X RICHELIEU'S LAST YEARS 221 

tomb, and the strenuous and resolute policy of Eichelieu 
was unsuited to the more subtle and agile mind of his 
successor. Mazarin had all an Italian's love for the 
refinements of intrigue, and was confident that it was 
both safer and easier to bend his opponents than to try- 
to break them. Gradually a new policy of leniency 
and concession was introduced instead of the older 
methods of stern repression. The prison doors were 
opened, and the eager exiles were allowed to return to 
France. The decree against Gaston was revoked, and 
he was even nominated to the office of lieutenant-governor 
of the kingdom during the approaching minority. The 
change of attitude involved dangers and difficulties, 
which Mazarin may have foreseen, and which he cer- 
tainly succeeded in the end in overcoming. But Louis 
XIII. 5 whose growing ill-health made him the passive 
instrument of his new adviser, did not live to witness 
the results of the cha^nge. His death (May 14, 1643) 
left his widow and infant son to face the problems of 
domestic disorder and rebellion, and the consequent 
prolongation of the war with Spain. That the Fronde 
proved in the end a harmless and almost a ridiculous 
movement was due to Eichelieu, who had deprived the 
nobles and parliaments of all substantial power; that 
the Fronde occurred at all was due to Mazarin's inability 
to rule with the same iron hand as his more illustrious 
predecessor. 

It is needless to dilate further upon the greatness of 
Eichelieu's achievements, or upon the magnitude of the 
influence which he exercised upon both France and 
Europe. That influence, was so great and so lasting 



222 RICHELIEU chap. 

that it continued to be felt until a new France and a 
new Europe were evolved from the ruins caused by the 
Eevolution and by the insensate ambition of Napoleon, 
and even then it was not wholly extinct. In the case 
of France, indeed, it may be held that the traditions of 
Richelieu's administration were regarded with excessive 
and almost fatal veneration. In the next century, when 
domestic conditions had become almost intolerable, and 
when wholly new problems had arisen in foreign politics, 
one generation of ministers after another adhered with 
blind tenacity and fidelity to the old lines of French 
policy. By these methods, and under these couditions, 
France had been raised to greatness, and it was un- 
consciously argued that to depart from them must result 
in bringing the country to ruin. Two instances out of 
many may suffice to illustrate the excessive importance 
attached to Eichelieu's example. In order to check the 
power of Austria in the east, Eichelieu had organised a 
policy of alliance with three client states — Sweden, 
Poland, and Turkey. In the eighteenth century these 
three states had so declined in power that they could 
no longer serve the purpose for which France had 
supported them, and in the meantime a wholly new 
factor had been introduced into eastern politics by the 
rise of Russia. A great statesman would have seen the 
necessity of modifying the policy of France to suit these 
altered conditions, but the French Government persisted 
in regarding the maintenance of the client states as its 
primary duty. The result was to alienate Russia and 
to force her into an unnatural alliance with Austria, and 
France had in consequence to suffer the profound humilia- 
tion of witnessing the partition of Poland without being 



X RICHELIEU'S LAST YEARS 223 

able to move a finger for its prevention. Again, the 
dominant aim of Richelieu's foreign policy was to abase 
the house of Hapsburg, and this end was achieved partly 
by himself and partly by his successors following in his 
footsteps. So thoroughly was the work done that in the 
next century the Hapsburgs had wholly ceased to be 
formidable to France, and French interests imperatively 
demanded the maintenance of Austria to secure the 
balance of power in Europe. But the permanence of 
the Eichelieu tradition prevented France from grasping 
this patent fact until 1756, and till then the government 
continued to act as if its primary duty was to erase 
Austria from the list of great states. This led directly 
to the elevation of Prussia, destined to deal a terrible 
blow to French ascendency and prestige, and to the 
forfeiture to England of the leading part in maritime 
and colonial enterprise. 

It only remains to say something of the character of 
the great statesman whose career has been sketched in 
the foregoing pages. It is impossible to contend that 
Richelieu was wholly admirable as a man, however 
much admiration may be extorted by his political 
achievements. His portrait in the Louvre, the master- 
piece of Philip of Champagne, impresses the observer 
with the conviction that he was no vulgar, domineering 
bully. His clear-cut and delicate features — the white 
hair contrasting sharply with the dark moustache and 
pointed beard — suggest rather the man of letters or the 
ascetic priest than the masterful politician who for so 
many years dominated both France and her enemies. 
But there is the suggestion at once of power and of 
irritability in the thin and compressed lips. One realises 



224 RICHELIEU chap. 

that it is the face of a man who has suffered much, 
even if he has achieved much ; of a man who has not 
gained his end without pain and labour. The fact that 
Eichelieu's health was never strong, and that he was 
constantly subject to physical pain, must be always 
borne in mind if we wish really to understand his 
character and to appreciate the marvel of the work 
which he accomplished. From his early manhood he 
suffered from excruciating headaches — the result of a 
fever contracted in the marshes of Poitou, — and these 
often lasted for several days at a time. In one of his 
letters he says : " I think I have one of the worst heads 
in the world," and adds with a touch of humour not 
usual with him, " There are many who will agree with 
this, but in another sense." 

In spite of this physical weakness his industry was 
incessant and exhausting. He was not one of those 
statesmen who are content to frame the broad lines of 
policy- and to leave the details to be worked out by 
subordinates. Nothing was too small or unimportant 
for his attention, though he never lost sight of the 
general aim amid the multiplicity of minute details. 
His system of spies was the most extensive and alert 
that was ever organised by any statesman. And the 
activity of his informants was by no means limited to 
affairs of state ; they had to bring the latest gossip 
from the salons, the news of literary productions and 
quarrels, the current talk of the streets and the theatres. 
The cardinal's information was always so full and accurate 
that it was believed that priests betrayed to him the 
secrets of the confessional. On one occasion the papal 
nuncio brought him, as a great piece of intelligence, 



X RICHELIEU'S LAST YEARS 225 

the overtures made by Gaston to the vice-legate of 
Avignon. Richelieu acknowledged the communication 
by stating the terms of the answer returned by the 
vice-legate. But he had to pay the penalty for his 
multifarious knowledge in the enormous amount of 
labour which it entailed. Night and day secretaries 
were in attendance to copy from his dictation or his 
rough drafts. Many of his personal letters are dated 
in the night. It was his habit to go to bed about 
eleven, and after sleeping for four or five hours to rise 
and work till six, when he would return to bed to 
snatch another brief interval of oblivion till he rose for 
the day between half-past seven and eight. 

The whole weight of affairs rested upon Eichelieu. 
He was not only a first minister, but practically a sole 
minister. The mistrust inspired by his numerous and 
watchful enemies impelled him to keep all the strings 
of home and foreign politics, of military and naval 
administration, in his own hands ; and the responsi- 
bility must have been at times almost overwhelming to 
a man who lived a life so essentially solitary. Nothing 
in Eichelieu's career is more striking than his isolation. 
He had dependents, flatterers, and tools in plenty ; 
but with the exception of the mysterious Father Joseph 
he had no confidential friend, no one with whom he 
could freely discuss personal and public affairs, no one 
who could relieve him of some part of his burden by 
sharing his secrets and anxieties. He was extremely in- 
accessible ; even foreign envoys could only gain admission 
to his presence when the business to be discussed was of 
special importance. He never quitted his residence with- 
out the attendance of his personal bodyguard, paid from 

Q 



226 RICHELIEU chap. 

his own purse and officered by his own nominees. Even 
in the royal palace he insisted upon retaining their 
services. It was this habit of jealous suspicion, rather 
than the prompting of family affection, that led him to 
promote to high office his own relatives, as his brother- 
in-law, de Breze, his cousin, la Meilleraie, and his 
nephew, de Pont-Courlay. His own colleagues in the 
ministry were little more than clerks who carried out 
instructions received from the cardinal. 

The burden of labour and responsibility which de- 
volved upon Richelieu, partly by his own choice and 
partly by compulsion, must have been rendered all the 
heavier by the extraordinary uncertainty of his own 
position. The king's health was never strong, and on 
several occasions his life was in serious danger from 
disease. If he had died at any time before the birth 
of the dauphin — born, it must be remembered, after 
twenty-two years of barren wedlock — the royal power, 
which Eichelieu himself had so immensely strengthened, 
would have passed at once to the cardinal's arch-enemy, 
Gaston of Orleans. Nor was Eichelieu's hold over 
Louis XIII. by any means secure, at any rate in the 
earlier years of his ministry. Louis was no mere puppet, 
as has been often represented. His understanding was 
retentive though slow ; he took a keen interest in 
public business, especially in its details, and he had a 
large share of the obstinacy and self-confidence of his 
mother. In order to obtain and keep the king's 
confidence, in spite of the domestic and other influences 
always at work against him, Richelieu had to act with 
great tact and caution. He never ventured to take 
any step without the king's consent, and it is certain 



X RICHELIEU'S LAST YEARS 227 

that Louis would never have tolerated such an assertion 
of independent authority. Hence the necessity of 
constant conferences or correspondence, which the 
courtiers hoped and believed would so bore the king 
that he would ultimately seek to escape from such 
enthralling conditions. On every minute point of policy 
and administration Eichelieu found it necessary not 
only to convince Louis — in itself a toilsome task — but 
also to create in his mind the impression that the 
ultimate decision was not the overmastering will of the 
minister but the independent product of the royal 
intellect. While Richelieu was so stern and awe-inspir- 
ing towards the outside world, he had to play the supple 
and pliant courtier in the presence of the master on 
whose favour and confidence all his own authority was 
based. 

The charge most frequently brought against Eichelieu 
is that of cruelty and vindictiveness, and it is a charge 
that cannot possibly be denied. Among the victims 
who perished on the scaffold for opposition to his rule 
were "five dukes, four counts, a marshal of France, 
and the king's favourite equerry, Cinq-Mars." To these 
must be added a number of lesser offenders who were put 
to death, and the many opponents, of all ranks, who were 
condemned to imprisonment in the Bastille or driven 
into exile in foreign lands by the minister whose 
enmity they had incurred. But if Eichelieu was pitiless, 
he was not, like most revengeful despots, either 
capricious or unjust. He did not strike the tool if he 
could reach the employer ; nor did he strike till guilt 
was obvious and incontestable ; his was ho reckless 
reign of terror. His methods, though often arbitrary 



228 RICHELIEU chap. 

and contrary to legal custom and tradition, were always 
fearless and above-board. Political considerations 
sometimes made it impossible to inflict a fitting penalty 
upon men who richly deserved it, such as de Bouillon 
and the traitorous Gaston, but the motive that allowed 
them to escape was never terror nor a wish to curry 
favour. And the experience of Mazarin's administration 
supplies a retrospective justification for ' Eichelieu's 
severity. He was undoubtedly right from his own 
point of view in acting upon the maxim of Machiavelli 
that " it is safer to be feared than to be loved." It was 
the sense of impunity that had made the nobles 
independent and rebellious ; this feeling had been 
strengthened by the concessions and pardons of the 
regency, and the only way to remove it and to compel 
obedience was by making their punishments prompt, 
severe, and impartial. The element of personal resent- 
ment, which seems to disfigure and condemn Eichelieu's 
pitiless treatment of his foes, is accounted for by the 
sublime confidence with which he identified his own 
ascendency with the welfare of the state, a confidence 
without which few rulers have been able to achieve really 
great work. Finally, whatever we may think of the 
morality of Eichelieu's actions, it is impossible not to 
be impressed by the magnificent courage with which, 
almost single-handed, he faced the most powerful nobles 
of the land, allied as they were with members of the 
royal family, and backed up from outside by great 
foreign powers. And this courage becomes the more 
memorable when we remember that Eichelieu was no 
demagogue, supported by the enthusiastic and encourag- 
ing applause of the masses of the people. On the 



X RICHELIEU'S LAST YEARS 229 

contrary, the successes which attended France were 
obscured to contemporaries by the material sufferings 
which were caused by military expenditure and 
defective financial wisdom. In his later years 
Richelieu was detested by the populace, and it is said 
that bonfires were kindled in many provinces of the 
kingdom to celebrate the death of the statesman who has 
been hailed by the almost unanimous opinion of later 
generations as the grandest figure among those who 
have contributed most to the greatness of France. 






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APPENDIX B 

THE CHIEF BOOKS ON THE PERIOD 

I HAVE not attempted to compile a complete bibliography 
of writings on the age of Richelieu, nor even to draw up a 
list of all the authorities which I have consulted. My only 
object is to call the attention of the reader, who may wish 
to make a more detailed study of the period, to those books 
which he is likely to find most helpful and accessible. 

^Richelieu, Memoires, 1610-1638 (Petitot's collection, 2nd 

series, xxi.-xxx. ; Michaud et Poujoulat, 2nd series, 

vii.-ix.). 
\/±lichelieu, Succincte narration des grandes actions du Boi 
• (Petitot, 2nd series, xi. ; Michaud et Poujoulat, 2nd 

series, ix.). 
Richelieu, Lettres, Instructions Diplomatiques et Papiers d^Mat, 

edited by M. d'Avenel. Paris, 8 volumes, 1853-187V. 
Harangue pour la presentation des cahiers, ou clSture de 

Vassemhle'e, aux Mats, prononc^ par Vevique de Lugon, 

orateur du c^er^e (Petitot, 2nd series xi., p. 201). 
Fontenay-Mareuil, Memoires (Petitot, 1st series, 1., li ; 

Michaud et Poujoulat, 2nd series, v.). 
Bassompierre, Memoires (Michaud. et Poujoulat, 2nd series, vi.). 
De Brienne, Memoires (Michaud et Poujoulat, 3rd series, iii. ; 

Petitot, 2nd series, xxxv., xxxvi.). 
D'Estrees, Memoires (Michaud et Poujoulat, 2nd series, vi.). 
De Pontis, Memoires (Michaud et Poujoulat, 2nd series, vi.). 
Mathieu Mole, Memoires (Societe de I'Histoire de France, 

Paris, 1855-1857). 



APPENDIX B 233 

Omer-Talon, Memoires (Micliaud et Poujoulat, 3rcl series, vi.). 
Arnauld d'Andilly, Memoires (Michaud et Poujoulat, 2nd 

series, ix.). 
Madame de Motteville, Memoires (Michaud et Poujoulat, 2nd 

series, x.). 
De Eohan, Memoires (1610-1629) and Memoires sur la 

Guerre de la Valtelline (Micliaud et Poujoulat, 2nd 

series, v.). 
Montclial, Memoires (Rotterdam, 1718). 
Aubery, VHistoire du Cardinal- Due de Richelieu (Paris, 

1660 ; Cologne, 2 volumes, 1666). 
Aubery, Memoires pour Vhistoire du Cardinal - 1) uc de 

Richelieu (Paris, 1660 ; Cologne, 5 volumes, 1667). 
Martineau, Le Cardinal de Richelieu, tome i. (Paris, 1870). 
Hanotaux, Histoire du Cardinal de Richelieu, tome i,. La 

jeunesse de Richelieu, 1585-1614 (Paris, 1893). 
Griffet, Histoire du Regne de Louis XILI. (Paris, 1758). 
Bazin, Histoire de France sous Louis XIIL et sous le ministhe 

du Cardinal Mazarin (4 volumes, Paris, 1846, 2nd 

edition). 
Henri Martin, Histoire de France, tome xi, (4th edition, 

Paris, 1859). 
Ranke, Franzosische Geschichte, vornehmlich im sechszehnten 

und siehzehnten Jahrhundert, Band ii. (Leipzig, 1876, 

Vierte Aufiage). 
D'Avenel, Richelieu et la Monarchic Ahsolue (4 volumes, 

Paris, 1884-1892). 
Topin, Louis XILL. et Richelieu, Etude Historique, accompagnee 

des lettres inMites du Roi au Cardinal de Richelieu (2nd 

edition, Paris, 1876). 
Caillet, U Administration en France sous le ministere du 

Cardinal de Richelieu (Paris, 1857). 



APPENDIX C 

THE TESTAMENT POLITIQUE 

One of tlie most keenly-debated points in connection with 
Richelieu is that of the authenticity of the Testament Politique, 
which was originally published at Amsterdam in 1688, and 
of which I have consulted the Paris edition of IV 64. The 
first chapter, which has been printed in the collections of M. 
Petitot and of MM. Michaud and Poujoulat, under the title 
of Succinde narration des grandes actions du Boi, has been 
generally admitted to be a genuine work of the cardinal's, 
and to be equally authentic with the Memoirs. With this 
view I entirely agree. But the second chapter, the Testa- 
ment proper, to which the Succincte narration serves as a 
sort of introduction, has been the subject of much discussion 
from the time of Voltaire downwards. In the present 
century there has been a growing tendency to treat it as an 
authoritative statement of Richelieu's political opinions in 
his later years. M. Henri Martin goes so far as to say that-, 
" the genius of the cardinal, whatever may be said to the 
contrary, is as obvious in the complete Testament as in the 
first chapter : the lion's mark is to be traced in a thousand 
passages, and the powerful personality of Richelieu is re- 
vealed by a crowd of traits which the abbe de Bourzeis 
could never have invented." This very positive opinion 
seems to me to be wholly untenable. The external evi- 
dence is quite indecisive one way or the other, but the 
internal evidence, both of style and matter, seems to be 
conclusive against the authenticity of the work. It is 
possible that the general plan may have been sketched out 



APPENDIX C 235 

by Riclielieu and filled in by a subordinate, but in that case 
it can hardly have undergone the cardinal's revision, and its 
value as evidence of his opinions is almost as slight as if it 
were an intentional forgery ; and the latter seems to me to 
be, on the whole, much the more probable solution. In 
accordance with this conviction I have carefully abstained 
— in spite of obvious temptations to the contrary — from 
making any use of the Testament as a guide to the real aims 
of Ptichelieu's policy. And I am further of opinion that, if 
its authenticity could be conclusively proved, the current 
estimates of Eichelieu would have to be not merely added 
to, but profoundly modified. Especially the striking saying 
of Mignet, that " he intended everything which he achieved," 
would have to be abandoned, and many results of his rule, 
which are now attributed to intelligent purpose, would have 
to be regarded as the product of chance. 



THE END 



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